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Abstract
National Environmental Funds (NEFs) have been established in numerous economies
to provide economic assistance to industries to encourage them to invest in pollu-
tion abatement projects. An increasing number of such financing mechanisms are
now trying to support the implementation of more preventive, "Cleaner Production"
(CP) approaches. In developing countries and transition economies, such existing
NEFs are sometimes used to channel external financial resources for the environ-
ment. Aid agencies and development banks have established in that case Externally-
Supported Revolving Funds in partnership with the original NEF. This research ex-
plores these two funding mechanisms for the environment. The evidence considered
includes a French water basin agency (Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse) as well as revolv-
ing funds established in China with the World Bank's assistance. Similar experiences
in Central and Eastern Europe have also been studied. A preliminary assessment
of the policy design of such funds has suggested an important distinction between
two categories of funds: (1) government-controlled funds aiming at internalizing en-
vironmental externalities by supporting non-profitable environmental investments;
and (2) more private-oriented institutions aiming at correcting market failures by
focussing on the implementation of profitable environmentally-friendly technologies.
The present operating performance of the various venues was evaluated by applying
a three-dimensional technological assessment to their portfolios of technologies. This
assessment included (1) the level of innovation; (2) the type of process targeted; and
(3) the category of CP option. Significant heterogeneities have been observed and
interpretations are proposed to relate them to possible policy distortions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If pollution reduction were profitable and if economies were perfectly following the
market's invisible hand, environmental policies for industrial pollution would be
meaningless. With the increase of uncontrolled polluting industrial activities, var-
ious financing schemes aiming at supporting pollution abatement investments have
beem proposed in countries where private resources dedicated to environmental is-
sues are not sufficient. Usually combined with a revenue-raising mechanism based on
pollution taxes, they may offer a theoretically efficient redistribution mechanism in
which the heaviest polluters are contributing more, and corporations willing to invest
in pollution abatement technologies receive more assistance. In developing countries
and transition economies where resources are scarce, they might even be the only
available policy instrument to catalyze "green" financing.
The issue is also relevant for aid agencies and development banks, as these existing
financial mechanisms may become a way to channel external investments aiming at
promoting more environmentally-friendly activities. This research attempts to bring
a contribution to this policy debate and explores whether local environment-dedicated
financing schemes should be reinforced in developing and transition economies and
provides recommendations for implementing externally-supported environmental funds
with a focus on preventive environmental policies.
Towards these ends, evidence has been found in three different economies: an in-
dustrialized country (France), Central and Eastern Europe transition economies and
in a developing country where the World Bank has been particularly active (China).
Various environmental funds are presented with their "portfolios" of technologies.
After a presentation of the rationale for Cleaner Production policies and their imple-
mentation in developing countries, this thesis defines the models of National Envi-
ronmental Funds and Externally-Supported Revolving Funds. The operating of the
various venues is then measured by using of technology-based assessment as well as
financial criteria. Finally, the research concludes by presenting a model for imple-
mentation and providing recommendations. Propositions for future research are also
included in this last chapter.
Because financial resources involved are large, it is essential that they give the ap-
propriate incentives to corporations toward more environmentally-friendly behaviour.
This research endeavors both to assess existing mechanisms and to suggest new ones.
It also identifies elements in favor of the more "participative" approach of externally-
supported revolving funds, compared to other financing alternatives. This work is
more particularly dedicated to multilateral and bilateral aid programs for the envi-
ronment but also to technology theorists interested in rationalizing the management
of a "clean technology portfolio".
Chapter 2
Promoting Cleaner Production
(CP) in Developing Countries
This chapter discusses the proposition that implementing CP requires specific insti-
tutional mechanisms providing technical and financial support to enterprises. In de-
veloping countries where this institutional background is often weaker and industrial
processes are less efficiently operated, the role of development banks could be cru-
cial in promoting CP policies and implementing them at the local level. Among the
various possible financial mechanisms, revolving funds seem particularly attractive in
countries where national environmental funds already exist.
2.1 Importance of Financing Environmental Projects
that Promote CP
The preventive approach is now viewed as being the most relevant policy for addressing
industrial pollution. However, there are numerous difficulties to effectively implement
the concept in enterprises. Financial support, as well as technical assistance and
good management training, often have to be provided to companies by an external
institutional actor. Governmental institutions can play a catalysing role in this regard.
2.1.1 CP: toward a more efficient environmental policy
From reaction to prevention
The history of environmental policies usually distinguishes several phases in approach-
ing the reduction of pollution, from the promotion of the dilution of wastes, their
disposal, their t'reatment, their recycling, and finally source reduction. Following these
various phases, a distinction should be made between the first four which are reactive
i.e. trying to address the problem of wastes once these are generated, and the last
one for which prevention measures are applied.
While the so-called "end-of-pipe" approach remains widely used, preventive poli-
cies have been recently integrated in environmental statutes with generally good ac-
ceptance by the industry community. Various terminologies have been used from
source reduction, pollution prevention, cleaner production, clean technologies, and
lately eco-efficiency. A semantic discussion between the various terms is beyond the
purpose of this thesis but it is to be noted that subtle differences exist. This research
adopts the definition of Cleaner Production from the United Nations Environment
Programme's Industry and Environment Center (UNEP IE): "the continuous ap-
plication of an integrated preventive environmental strategy applied to processes,
products, and services to increase eco-efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the
environment".
For environmentalists, the success of this new strategy for the environment de-
pends on the reduction of pollution in the first place where it is generated, and for
industry, on its capacity to reduce costs, risks and to identify new opportunities. Prac-
tically, this includes the adoption of cleaner technologies and management practices
for processes as well as the altering of the nature of products and services throughout
their life-cycles.
Typology of CP options
CP then has two different targets, processes and products, for which two separate
assessments can be made: for processes, flow charts and material balances allow to
locate precisely where wastes are generated and what part of the process should be
targeted; for products, life cycle assessment techniques allow to compare products
among others as well as identifying what stages of the life-cycle are not environmen-
tally friendly.
Based on these tools, several CP options can be considered. The UNEP IE case
study database ' adopted a typology with seven categories: (1) new technologies;
(2) process change; (3) good housekeeping; (4) product redesign; (5) material saving;
(6) internal recycling;and (7) input substitution. However, such a typology mixes
interventions at various levels of the process cycle, with a dimension ranking options
from minor improvement (good housekeeping measures) to radical innovations (new
technologies). A new technology could involve a process change, input substitution
or a new final product. For the purpose of this research, the two dimensions will be
separated. The CP description will categorize options according to both their target
within the process and their level of innovation.
1ICPIC: International Cleaner Production Information Clearinghouse.
Following the process flow, the first category of options targets the input (input
substitution). Then, the process itself could be targeted and productive technolo-
gies could be changed or improved (process change). As an output of the process,
two potential targets are products and wastes. Products can be replaced by more
environmentally-friendly ones (product redesign) while wastes can be treated, dis-
posed, externally recycled (categorized as end-of-pipe options), or be dealt with within
the plant itself by internal recycling, or by selling them as by-products (both cate-
gorized here as waste recovery). Four of these options (input substitution, process
change, waste recovery and product redesign) will be referred to as "CP options cat-
egories" in the following thesis (see Figure B-1).
2.1.2 Implementing CP: Difficulties and Requirements
A "CP paradox"
Although there exists strong evidence supporting the preference for CP compared to
reactive policies, "end-of-pipe" approaches are still widely used. This paradox has
been largely addressed in the literature and remains an active issue for research.
Firstly, a significant difference is observed between large and small enterprises.
Research and development capabilities, economies of scale, as well as access to the
proper information may provide satisfactory explanations for this fact. Differences
among industrial sectors are also observed, depending whether environmental per-
formance can bring new customers by being used as a marketing instrument or by
improving the quality of products. The cosmetic industry in particular has been
aware very early of these opportunities 2. In contrast, old traditional industries for
which a traditional process is a key element for marketing may be reluctant to change.
Breweries, for example, often rely on the more polluting, but important marketing
2The French company Loreal for example has been a pioneer to adopt an integrated strategy for
the environment.
issue, 100% malt process although modern cleaner alternatives based on enzymatic
techniques exist.
Because CP actually "enters the plant" to address the problem of pollution, as
opposed to the "end-of-pipe" approach, rigidities are often observed. These include
management barriers when environmental people are separated from production staff,
and risk aversion when the success of adopting a cleaner technology remains uncer-
tain. It is to be noted that this risk aversion may differ across CP options categories:
waste recovery options are usually less risky than other options because they do not
affect the core processes.
The diffusion of technical information
Without external information dissemination processes 3, many SMEs with poor ac-
cess to information might ignore the existence of cleaner technologies, even if they
are more profitable. Moreover, their lack of innovation and implementation expertise
and their legitimate confidence in old well-known traditional processes, might reduce
their motivation in adopting a new (and therefore risky) technology.
A second difficulty arises that slows down the dissemination of new cleaner tech-
nologies. When a cleaner and more efficient technology is discovered, enterprises have
an incentive to keep the patent for themselves if it represents a significant compet-
itive advantage. In a world ruled by perfect market economy, marginal enterprises
with outdated and less efficient product or processes, should disappear by themselves
under competitive pressure. However, in the real world, this might take a significant
amount of time especially in industrial sectors with inefficient markets or local mo-
nopolies. It is remarkable, for instance, that in spite of economies of scale, there are
still SMEs competing with large firms in most industrial sectors.
3 Like databases such as the new UNEP IE's International Clean.r Production Information Clear-
inghouse (ICPIC).
Requirements for implementing CP
These difficulties made CP specialists conclude that implementing CP is essentially a
question of management and that the critical barriers to be overcome are not technical,
but rather located in human and institutional resistance to change. Facilitating ac-
cess to information, disseminating success stories, maintaining up-to-date databases,
and marketing the preventive approach should therefore become key elements of a
strategy to promote CP.
What attitude to adopt toward the old "end-of-pipe" approach is more ambigu-
ous. While some authors recommend that it be included in an integrated CP strategy
because prevention cannot solve alone the problem of pollution in spite of the grow-
ing number of zero-emissions technologies, others support the idea of a competition
between the two concepts based on their relative cost-effectiveness.
2.1.3 Financing CP
It has been mentioned previously that CP often increases the eco-efficiency of pro-
cesses and produces substantial economic benefits to enterprises. This is justified by
the fact that pollution is a net loss for companies. Moreover, when wastes have to be
treated, pollution levies are charged, or when the regulatory context triggers indirect
costs in litigation 4, CP can turn to be a profitable investment.
Several barriers explain however why CP options are not readily financed by enter-
prises, even when they have access to information concerning the technology. Among
them, one could find the risk aversion for process modification, an inaccurate as-
sessment of environmental costs, and an imperfect internalization of externalities
4 Like the Superfund program did in the United States.
imposed by regulatory regimes. However, even when these failures are addressed,
CP investment may not compete favorably with purely productive investments. The
opportunity cost may vary significantly across economies because of the lack of capi-
tal in developing countries and the competition with more profitable investments in
economies with high economic growth. On the other hand, the poor maintenance of
processes may decrease the marginal cost for pollution abatement in these countries.
Because classical economics are only considering the feasibility domain bounded
by production functions, one could ask whether environmental performance could
become an endogeneous variable for process and product optimization. Obviously,
pollution is a waste to the enterprise in terms of profitability and therefore, any waste
minimization or recycling technique 5, is likely to generate non-zero financial benefits
to the enterprise. This is especially true in developing countries where processes tends
to be less optimized because the main economic advantage is a very low labor cost.
This whole idea of linking productivity and environmental performance is captured
by the new concept of 'Eco-efficiency' ([120]) which recognizes the possibility of in-
creasing value added while decreasing pollution and resource use. Moreover, recent
surveys seem to prove a correlation between good environmental management and
corporate success ([85]). However, this might be a cost of capital effect rather than
being due to an intrinsic process improvement, and it seems to depend highly on the
level of competition in the industry. Overall, it is concluded that most environmental
projects in spite of a positive correlation with productivity, are not attractive enough
due in particular to their costs. Exceptions include major technological breakthroughs
introducing both cleaner and financially attractive new processes or products.
In certain cases, more productive investments result in more environmentally
friendly enterprises. Waste minimization through the adoption of cleaner technologies
or good housekeeping practices, is a common effect of overall innovation especially in
5 Unlike end-of-pipe equipment which usually have no financial benefit unless the sludge can be
sold as a by-product.
very competitive industrial sectors where a marginal improvement of processes can
have a tremendous financial impact due to the large quantities produced. The so-
called Total Quality Management (TQM) concept, very popular in highly competitive
industrial sectors such as car manufacturing, includes an environmental component
in particular by promoting good housekeeping practices. For companies such as 3M
with a rapid turnover of capital and thousands of different products, productivity and
environmental performance are closely linked due to the large spectrum of alterna-
tives. For single-product industries such as steel plants, the situation might be very
different and 'Pollution Prevention' might not always pay ([120]).
This simple evaluation of the return of environmental programs in industry, should
be completed by assessing long-term benefits to the firm. Properly designed envi-
ronmental regulations may stimulate growth and competitiveness, as established by
Ashford ([51, 55, 49, 50]) since 1979. In his 1995 publication in the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives ([116]), Michael Porter reinforces the hypothesis and mentions
that "properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may
partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them". This is sup-
ported by the observation that internationally competitive companies are not those
with the cheapest inputs or the largest scale, but those with the capacity to improve
and innovate continually. However, such a long term strategy of firms may not take
place readily in the absence of a well-designed regulatory environment due to a "my-
opia" effect, particularly for small corporations.
2.1.4 The role of governmental institutions
Rationale for government intervention
For all these reasons, CP may not be implemented without external stimuli. These
could be demand-driven as environmental concerns grow among consumers, costs are
internalized through economic incentives such as taxation or pollution allowance trad-
ing, or demands be included in regulatory regimes. In practice, it is a combination of
these various factors in the proper design of policies that may increase the industry
interest for CP and factors for success.
Thus, because an enforcer is needed, governments have to be involved to set up
environmental rules. Both industry and the finance community generally agree on
this need. For example, a recent survey from UNCTAD, conducted in 1994, has
shown that 90 % of multinational firms admit that sustainability requires a partner-
ship between governments, business and societies ([120]). Moreover, George Soros,
chairman of the Soros fund and one of the most powerful representatives of the fi-
nance community, recently advocated the importance of governmental intervention
as a regulator to deal with issues such as environmental sustainability. To catalize
environmental projects, pollution has to become a good before being internalized,
and a stable and enforceable agreement has to be found among the various actors
(industry and the finance community). Governments can choose either to be involved
in an authoritarian or in a more facilitator role to target industry and/or the finance
community or promote the involvemen t o f consumers' arbitrage. The short-term
vision of classical economics due to the intensive use of discount rates has also to be
taken into account as well as the importance of a 'watchdog' mechanism to guarantee
the stability of the global agreement 6 and making sure that the environmental risk
is properly assessed before any policy is decided.
As it has been reminded in the discussion above, barriers to the implementation
of CP stand mainly in (1) information failures; (2) management difficulties within the
firm; (3) the lack of external stimuli. A relevant policy for CP should address these
three issues.
6 A voluntary agreement such as "voluntary codes" for the environment may not be stable due
to the "free rider" problem. Game theory stresses the importance of a social planner to enforce the
agreement and leave no incentive to partners to deviate, given their discount rates.
Examples of governmental policies for CP
This thesis does not aim at making a comprehensive review of existing CP policies.
However, it seems important to understand what are the various categories of instru-
ments, who they target and what has been the logic underlying them.
As for any other issue related to the environment and industrial pollution, poten-
tial targets for governmental intervention are (1) industry; (2) the finance community;
and (3) consumers and stockholders. Targeting the industry can be done through reg-
ulation or by giving economic incentives to enterprises. A policy aiming at promoting
CP should consider the competition between preventive and reactive approaches and
try to give extra incentives for prevention.
Through the "command and control" approach, this can be done by imposing the
adoption of cleaner technology by requiring that the best or a reasonably good technol-
ogy be adopted by enterprises. However, as such, this does not give any incentive for
companies to innovate and it is the reason why regulations have been often accused of
"static efficiency" as opposed to "dynamic efficiency" in which available technologies
are constantly improving. On the contrary, if statutes include mechanisms promoting
innovation such as innovation waivers ' for example, then the "Command and Con-
trol" approach may become dynamicly efficient as well.
Most environmental statutes have included the notion of prevention. For exam-
ple, the 1990 Pollution Prevention Act in the United States, introduces the notion of
source reduction 8 as any practice which -
(i) reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant en-
tering any waste stream or otherwise released into the environment (including fugitive
7These are used in the United States and are granted to companies willing to develop technologies
that could prove to be better than the existing technology standards.
8 See PAA, S. 6603.
emissions) prior to recycling, treatment, or disposal; and
(ii) reduces the hazards to public health and the environment associated with the re-
lease of such substances, pollutants, or contaminants.
This act includes implementation measures such as grants to states for state tech-
nical assistance programs (S. 6605), a source reduction clearinghouse (S. 6606), and
a mechanism to collect source reduction and recycling data (S. 13106). The latest
measure is particularly aiming at toxic chemical release.
The 1989 Chinese Environmental Protection Law addresses in the same way pol-
lution prevention and control 9. Implementation measures include in particular, the
"three simultaneity" program described in Article 26:
Installations for the prevention and control of pollution at a construction project
must be designed, built and commissioned together with the principal part of the
project.
Such a measure targeting new plants is more likely to promote prevention rather
than pollution control, because cleaner alternatives for technologies can be consid-
ered before the plant is built. On the contrary, once the process is installed, "end-
of-pipe"equipment is easier to implement and is often more economically interesting
([142]).
Various economic incentives can be used to promote CP. Effluent or indirect tax-
ation 10 internalize at least in part, the social cost of pollution in enterprises' ac-
counting. To reduce the burden of levies, enterprises theoretically invest in pollution
abatement until the marginal cost of pollution reduction equalizes the level of tax-
9See Chapter IV, "Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution and Other Public
Hazards".
10 Thesc will be further discussed in Chapter 3.
ation. If the level of taxation is properly fixed and remains constant over time,
enterprises have a constant incentive to innovate and to invent new technologies re-
ducing the burden of taxation. Other market mechanisms such as subsidies 11 or
allowance trading 12 may have a similar effect on the decisions of firms to invest
in environmental protection. However, several assumptions condition the success of
policies based on economic incentives: such mechanisms are very sensitive to market
failures that may be particularly observed for SMEs and may be politically unaccept-
able in countries where, for example, environmental taxes are rejected by industry.
Moreover, these mechanisms as such do not promote specifically CP unless there are
no market failures and the marginal cost of pollution reduction by prevention is lower
than by implementing an "end-of-pipe" technology. Certain market mechanisms do
even clearly promote end-of-pipe technology by granting favorable tax depreciation
for such equipment.
The solution that is explored in this thesis is a governmental mechanism combin-
ing effluent taxes redistribution, with technical assistance to enterprises investing in
pollution abatement. Depending on the disbursement policy for granting subsidies
and the orientations for technical assistance, such a mechanism can put emphasis on
prevention rather than reaction.
However, if considering the original list of potential targets for governments to
promote CP, such a "banking" mechanism may compete with the role of the finance
community. Policies targeting directly private investors by regulation, economic in-
centives, or education 13 could raise private capital capable of financing at least certain
"Subsidies theoretically have the same impact of taxation but contradict the Polluter Pays'
Principle.
12The regulator fixes the total amount of pollution permissible and allows firms to trade among
themselves the "rights-to-pollute": large enterprises will implement clean technologies because the
marginal cost of depollution will be lower for them, and sell allowances to small firms which cannot
make such economies of scale. It is the dual problem to taxation: the regulator fixes the quantity
and let the market determine the price.
13See the success of "ethical funds" taking into account human rights or environmental issues in
their investment strategy.
categories of pollution reduction projects. In market economies, governments should
not try to compete with these private institutions but on the contrary catalyze their
emergence and identify where governmental intervention is actually necessary to com-
pensate for the current lack of private initiative. For example, if private capital can
be found to finance CP technologies with high economic returns, public financial sup-
port should not be necessary for this category of technologies. However, information
failures concerning the same technologies may require governmental intervention to
favor diffusion.
Policies targeting the other actors, namely investors, consumers and stockholders,
are beyond the scope of this thesis. Until today, education efforts geared towards
industrial pollution, eco-labelling, and information about risks and liabilities, remain
the main instruments without any emphasis being put on CP in particular. The
recognition of prevention in the new eco-standard ISO 14,000 or reporting mecha-
nisms such as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in the United States, may, however,
increase the information available to actors, and have stockholders, consumers, and
investors require more prevention of pollution from the industry.
2.2 Specific Issues for Implementing CP in De-
veloping Countries
In developing countries, barriers for implementing CP are more difficult to overcome
due to the worse economic situation in enterprises and a weaker institutional back-
ground. External support is therefore needed at the local level through technical and
financial assistance as well as at the national level to help improve the national en-
vironmental policies. Institutions such as development banks have been established to
address both of these issues.
2.2.1 Difficulties met by enterprises to address industrial
pollution
The situation of industrial pollution in developing countries is in some ways similar
to what happened to many industrialized countries thirty years ago. This makes
CP even more relevant to them as these countries can benefit from the lessons
of the history of environmental policy, instead of replicating the sub-optimal dilu-
tion/disposal/treatment/recycling/prevention pattern.
There is also extensive evidence of the failure to implement end-of-pipe approaches
in developing countries' enterprises. Many consultants involved in environmental
projects in China reported, for example, the existence of many modern waste water
treatment plants that had been closed by enterprises because they did not know how
to operate them properly or because the operating cost was higher than the local
effluent levies. On the contrary, clean technologies, because they are part of the pro-
cess, are more likely to remain in use.
Another issue strengthening the potential of CP in developing countries is the
poor maintenance of processes which increases the potential benefits of implement-
ing a clean technology. Because developing countries are very competitive in labor-
intensive industries due to very low wages, the issue of optimizing processes and
reducing waste and material or energy consumption is not as critical as it can be
in industrialized economies for which process optimization is a strong competitive
advantage. Moreover, developing countries' enterprises do not have the same access
to information about the latest technical innovation nor the technical capabilities to
implement such technologies. Therefore, there exist a large potential for improvement
and waste prevention with, in certain cases, substantial economic benefits to be made.
By implementing a centrifugation system to recover the product in its final waste, a
Chinese brewery managed for example to increase its production by almost 1% with
the same quantity of input and a significant reduction in Chemical Oxygen Demand
in its waste water ([48]).
The technological risk is therefore much lower for developing countries' enterprises
especially as concerns the potential achievable only by diffusion of demonstrated tech-
nologies. The factors which could make industrialized countries' firms reluctant to-
ward CP, should not exist in developing countries where CP offers therefore both
higher economic returns and higher certainty for success.
Finally, implementing CP in developing countries is not only capital-intensive;
there is also an enormous potential for very simple low- or no-cost good housekeeping
measures. A recent study in the case of China ([73]) has measured a cost-effectiveness
ratio and a return on investment - measuring respectively the environmental and the
economic benefits of the technology, several times higher for these inexpensive options
compared to major technological changes 14. A policy aiming at promoting CP in
developing countries should try to focus on both the issue of technological up-dating
and good housekeeping behavior in the firm.
2.2.2 Weaknesses of governmental environmental institu-
tions
A main reason why the implementation of end-of-pipe equipment in developing coun-
tries' enterprises turned to be a failure is the lack of enforcement of emission standards
and the low level of economic incentives. This strengthens in particular the obser-
vations made at section 2.1., that governmental intervention was necessary to ensure
the implementation of environmental policies.
Because environmental institutions may have been created recently and may have
14This result is however controversial because cost-effectiveness took only into account the reduc-
tion of a single pollutant (the Chemical Oxygen Demand or pollution by organic substances).
to undergo the traditional inter-administration conflicts with other ministries (in par-
ticular the ministry of industry), a policy based on environmental taxation may con-
tribute to a quick reinforcement of environmental agencies. If the regulatory back-
ground is weak, corruption distorts equitable enforcement,or environmental agencies
have a too limited budget to guarantee reliable monitoring of industrial pollution,
taxation may be preferred because it is easier to enforce than a technology-based
standard policy requiring a precise technological understanding of processes, is more
transparent if the calculation of levies is simple enough, and can help raising substan-
tial funding for the operation of a reliable environmental network. On the contrary,
it may create rigidities in the administrative system if environmental agencies be-
come too powerfull institutions. These issues will be further discussed in chapter 3
when the model of environmental fund will be presented. The purpose of this dis-
cussion is to reinforce the idea that economic mechanisms may be preferred in the
case of developing countries at least in a first stage, because a sophisticated enough
"Command-and-Control" policy requires a very efficient administrative network, a
well design regulatory background for enforcement, and sufficient national budget to
pay for it.
However, as environmental institutions become increasingly reinforced, regulatory
instruments should be considered and complement failures of market instruments. As
a second step, and once institution building is advanced enough, the debate between
regulation and economic incentives still continues, and both alternatives should be
considered for policy purposes.
2.2.3 The need for external assistance and the role of de-
velopment banks
The financing scheme of taxation/redistribution for the environment does not account
for the lack of capital in developing countries thal will prevent them from using a
high taxation level and therefore generate a small amount of subsidies to finance pol-
lution abatement projects. This justifies the involvement of foreign aid agencies and
of multilateral development banks in helping financially, and sometimes technically,
to promote CP programs in developing countries.
The financial assistance can take two forms: either the external partner chooses to
act as a direct provider of private capital available for enterprises for the environment,
or it may chose to reinforce existing institutions (usually governmental) playing that
role. In the first case, the national government establishes its own environmental
policy and enterprises can benefit from the capital offered by the external financial
institution. In the second, the external financial partner uses existing local govern-
mental institutions to channel its financial aid, and contributes to the reinforcement
of these institutions by acting as a catalyser. These two alternatives will be discussed
in the next section.
In addition to this financial component, the role of foreign aid agencies and of
multilateral development banks in developing countries should include a technical
component to facilitate the diffusion of clean technologies (this is usually referred
to as "technology transfer"), and a role of policy adviser to help designing accurate
environmental policies promoting CP (referred as "capacity building"). In practice,
these three components are not distinct, but are simultaneously integrated in the
strategy of development banks and aid agencies. For example, in 1996, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency of the state of Illinois (IEPA) designed a CP program in
China with the financial support of the American aid program (USAID), including
the training of governmental employees to CP auditing procedures, a grant to imple-
ment clean technologies provided by Illinois' enterprises, and seminars presenting CP
technical alternatives in a few industrial sectors.
2.3 Financial Alternatives for Externally-Supported
Environmental Projects Aiming at Reducing
Industrial Pollution
When designing environmental projects, development banks can choose to target sev-
eral actors involved in the management of industrial pollution. This strategy is jus-
tified by the evaluation of the environmental as well as financial and institutional
(capacity-building) performance of the various options. The classical "line of credit"
approach still seems to be dominant, although the new financing mechanism of revolv-
ing fund is now also used in World Bank's projects.
2.3.1 Actors related to industrial pollution that can be tar-
geted
Development banks (or aid agencies) aiming at promoting industrial pollution in de-
veloping countries can target various categories of actors, in the same way as govern-
ments do when designing environmental policies. These strategies may be particularly
sensitive to the fact that financial aid is a grant (usually the case for aid agencies)
or as a loan (almost always the case for development banks). An institution giving a
loan for environmental purposes to a developing country will be more risk-averse and
try to minimize the financial risk compared to an agency giving a grant for the same
purpose.
Actors that can be targeted can be (1) industries; (2) governmental environmen-
tal institutions; (3) local governments running water treatment plants in the case of
water pollution; (4) local financial institutions; and (5) consumers and stockholders.
The following discussion will not address the last alternative although programs
promoting education, information, or the strengthening of the NGO community may
play an indirect role in the promotion of CP. Several remarks should be made about
the four other potential targets:
* Industries: Industries are the natural target for a program aiming at promoting
CP. They are the immediate beneficiaries of the financial and technical assis-
tance and therefore it might be easier and more reliable to design development
strategies targeting directly this category of actors. This can be done for ex-
ample by identifying the top polluters in a given area and providing them with
technical and financial assistance to conduct a technology options' assessment
and help implementing cleaner technologies. However, it has the disadvantage
of having a limited impact in time (it does not address the issue of future top
polluters), and of having a high financial risk if the financial assistance is a loan
(companies can go bankrupt and not be able to repay the loan).
* Governmental Institutions: Such a strategy may contribute to capacity-building
and to the design of more efficient and durable environmental policies toward
CP. Practically, it can be done by financing studies or demonstration programs
involving governmental agencies and testing various policy alternatives. When
financial mechanisms or technical information structures already exist and be-
ing handled by government, they can be used to channel external financial
and technical assistances. For example, if there exists a mechanism of tax-
ation/redistribution for the environment, it can be used to channel financial
assistance. In certain countries, National Cleaner Production Centers (NCPCs)
have been set up with the support of UN agencies (UNEP and UNIDO); they
could also be used to channel technical assistance and facilitate the diffusion of
clean technologies. The IEPA project previously mentioned has used the Chi-
nese NCPC for this purpose. If the financial assistance is a loan, the financial
risk can be negotiated between the government of the developing country and
the external funding institutions.
* Local governments: Local governments can be targeted in the same way as gov-
ernment.al institutions to assist in designing CP policies at the local level. An
alternative to address the problem of industrial pollution is to help local gov-
ernments to finance large waste water treatment plants. This approach presents
the advantage of being the easiest, of creating gains from economies of scale,
of facilitating the control, and of having a low financial risk. However, it con-
stitutes the "end-of-pipe" alternative, with the risk of the facility being badly
maintained, the use of pretreatment for hazardous wastes, the high cost of the
related necessary sewage system, and the problem of guessing an accurate size
for the facility in countries with high economic growth. For all these reasons, it
should remain the second best solution after CP, to treat the remaining waste
when prevention is not possible.
* Financial institutions: Financial institutions can hardly be targeted directly to
promote CP. However, they can be associated within a strategy targeting one
of the above actors to reduce the financial risk. For example, when giving a
loan to an enterprise, the external funding partner can request that a financial
appraisal.be conducted by a local institution which could also handle the reim-
bursement of annuities. Such local financial institutions, referred to as "agent
banks", are frequently used by development agencies. By being involved in a
CP program, they may also become more familiar with the financial manage-
ment of environmental projects, what could facilitate the emergence of private
capital for this purpose in developing countries.
In practice, development programs promoting CP do not target a single actor
but involve several of these various institutions or communities. Depending on the
strategy choice, the nature of the external donor or lender, and the objectives of the
program, a synergy between these various actors may be more suitable. The "end-
of-pipe" strategy has been widely used in the past by aid agencies and development
banks. For the past decade, more comprehensive programs aiming at preventing in-
dustrial pollution as well, have become increasingly used. Thus, the transition from
"reaction" to "prevention" which had been described previously, can also be observed
in the development strategy for the environment.
2.3.2 Criteria to be considered to measure the performance
of a CP project
The primary objectives of all environmental projects are to protect the health of hu-
man beings, and/or the existence of natural species. This appears for example in the
UNEP IE's definition of Cleaner Production: "(...) to reduce risks to human and the
environment". Because the causal link between these objectives and the pollution
by specific substances is not perfectly understood, a proxy for this ultimate goal has
been to set up health-based standards for substances recognized as being hazardous 15
Measuring the performance of a CP program should not forget these primary
objectives even if the temptation to establish aggregated cost-effectiveness ratio is
strong. The World Bank has for example designed industrial projects in China for
which the screening of technological options is done in part by using an aggregated
ratio of pollution reduction divided by the investment. This approach is commonly
used by Chinese environmental institutions to rank enterprises and establish a "black
list" of top polluters. The principle is based on an equiscalar index adding for several
pollutants, the ratios of the actual emissions divided by the corresponding standard.
Refinements introduced by World Bank consultants to rank technologies allow to ag-
gregate air, water and noise pollution,and to take into account the population living
close to the enterprise, the amplitude of the nuisance reported by this population,
and the economic returns from the technology.
Such an evaluation scheme is likely to lose completely the primary objectives of
CP. For example, toxicity is far from being linear and therefore, the ratio emission
divided by standard may not be an accurate proxy for the health impact. Mathe-
matical counterexamples can be built for which the health impact of a technology
can be very negative while it still remains unattractive when the index is used. The
1 5These are only proxies for several reasons including unknown variations in sensitivity between
different categories of the population, and potential non-linear toxicity when adding substances.
population weight may create dilution effects and penalize a very toxic process in a
small town. Moreover, occupational risk is not taken into account.
Therefore, such an aggregated index seems too controversial to be applied to the
evaluation of a CP program. For the purpose of this thesis, environmental benefits
will be identified for each technology and each pollutant but no aggregated cost-
effectiveness will be used. The discussion on environmental performance will try,
when possible, to address the pollution reduction achieved on this case-by-case basis.
It is to be noted that in the case of China, some authors ([73]) have calculated a
single pollutant cost-effectiveness ratio based on organic pollution (Chemical Oxygen
Demand). Such an approach may be reliable when technologies produce pollution
abatement for this pollutant only. When other environmental benefits are observed,
as it is the case for most technologies studied here, it becomes inapplicable.
2.3.3 A classical World Bank approach: a line of credit for
industrial pollution
Following the direct strategy targeting industries that has been previously described,
the World Bank approach has often been to design a "line of credit for industrial
pollution". Under this model, top polluters, with a good financial performance to
guarantee the repayment of the loan, are previously identified and receive a loan to
implement one or several clean technologies. Reimbursement from enterprises are
used to repay the World Bank's loan. A local implementing agency is involved to
insure financial procedures with borrowers 16
This direct approach allows development banks to keep an entire control on the
use of the financial assistance they provide. Disbursement is usually made after re-
ceiving receipts of pieces of equipment bought by the enterprise, which guarantees
16Usually a local bank or a coalition of banks ("superbank").
full transparency. On the other hand, the procedure is long and complicated (bids
should involve three different suppliers) and becomes attractive for only sufficiently
large enterprises. Similarly, the cost of monitoring such projects for the development
bank is high, what reduces dramatically the number of enterprises that can be tar-
geted. Thus, typically, a line of credit will target a few large polluters and conduct
a comprehensive pollution abatement program with the implementation of several
cleaner technologies. With such a procedure, SMEs are necessarily forgotten, and
although the project can include some "capacity building" by involving local environ-
mental institutions, it does not provide a sustainable financial mechanism for future
CP projects.
2.3.4 The revolving fund model, an indirect financing scheme
An alternative is to use - when it exists, a local financing mechanism such as the
taxation/redistribution mechanism previously described, to design a revolving fund.
This model implies that the amount reimbursed by enterprises can be used again
several times before the global loan is reimbursed to the lending agency.
This approach has been used for example by the European Commission (PHARE
program) which gave a substantial grant to an existing taxation/redistribution mech-
anism, the Polish national environmental fund. The World Bank used a similar
approach by lending small long-term loans to several Chinese environmental funds.
However, in that case, the initial disbursement followed the model of a line-of-credit
with an ex-post disbursement after receiving equipment receipts and the same bid-
ding procedures. Thus, the World Bank in the design of these programs, may have
kept the disadvantages of the line-of-credit model, without gaining the advantages
of revolving funds. Moreover, because they are new financial models that necessi-
tate a clear understanding of the existing financial structure, revolving funds require
more preparation work and longer negotiations between the development bank and
the local counterpart institution. For all these reasons, associated with their lack
of transparency compared to the line-of-credit model, institutions such as the World
Bank still remain suspicious toward these approaches to address industrial pollution
in developing countries. Significantly, most revolving funds that have been established
by the World Bank in China have received very small financial support compared to
the size of normal World Bank projects. Guarantees required by the Bank to establish
this type of financial mechanism may as well give negative incentives to counterpart
institutions in developing countries to engage in this type of agreement.
At the same time, the "participative" feature of revolving funds and the recog-
nized importance of designing sustainable financial mechanisms promoting CP not
only in large enterprises but also in SMEs, makes them the only alternative to the
unsatisfactory line-of-credit approach. This thesis intends to use the experience of
existing revolving funds in various economies, to propose recommendations for de-
signing this type of financial mechanism to promote CP in developing countries.
It is important to note that the definition of a revolving fund used here varies
across institutions. While the World Bank uses the present terminology, the EBRD
uses the term "revolving fund" when the external financial aid is a grant which does
not have to be reimbursed by the fund. Alternatives to the two mechanisms presented
here - credit line and revolving funds - exist such as fund guarantees 17 or "two-tiered"
credit lines is. These mechanisms will not be considered in the present research.
17Fund guarantees are letter of guarantee issued to a local lending bank to create an incentive to
lend for environmental purposes by underwriting a portion of the risk.
1sA "two-tiered" credit line is channelled through several local banks. Such a structure has been
implemented for industrial lending by the EBRD in Romania.
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This chapter intends to present a few examples of funds. After a preliminary dis-
cussion about their theoretical advantages, three different situations corresponding
to industrialized, transition or developing countries are examined. Existing national
environmental funds are presented as well as strategies of various multilateral and
bilateral agencies to design externally-supported revolving funds in transition or de-
veloping economies. On the basis of these examples, a methodology is proposed to
identify probable factors affecting the success of these funds.
3.1 Theoretical Considerations for Environmen-
tal Funds
There exists a large variety of environmental funds with various models of manage-
ment and operating procedures. However, environmental funds can all he character-
ized as financial intermediaries with a input/output cash flow. Funding environmental
funds can have various micro- and macro-economic consequences depending who is re-
ally paying for them. Moreover, taxation can be a cost-effective economic instrument
to give incentives to enterprises to behave more environmentally-friendly. The redis-
tribution process may also significantly help to reduce industrial pollution by giving
extra incentives to companies.
3.1.1 Description of the policy model and alternatives for
design
Model and extent of application.
The idea to create financial mechanisms specifically dedicated to environmental pro-
tection comes from the failure of the private sector to invest in environmental projects
without external intervention. Although they have been justified by economic argu-
ments, the driving force for establishing environmental funds seems more to have
been their revenue-raising aspect and the political priority assigned to certain envi-
ronmental issues. Among various other regulatory or economic instruments aiming at
catalyzing green investments, the model of an environmental fund can be character-
ized by a double economic incentive coming (i) from its revenue-raising mechanism;
and (ii) from its policy for allocation of resources. Thus, a key principle behind the
establishment of the Water Basin Agencies in France has been that "the polluter
should be charged for the pollution he creates, whereas someone willing to invest
in pollution abatement should receive financial assistance". The institutional back-
ground allowing the accounting linkage between this potential source of revenues and
these public expenditures, is an environmental fund.
M
The OECD's "St.Petersburg guidelines" on environmental funds ([33]) provide a
more precise definition of the new financial mechanism by describing these funds as
"institutions designed to channel earmarked revenues for environmental protection
purposes". However, this definition may restrict the use of the term to the situation
in which revenues have been earmarked - which was the case in all the transition
economies examined by the OECD task force whose scope of investigation was lim-
ited to Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the definition adopted at
the Santa Cruz Forum on Environmental Funds ([16]) talks about "a variety of mech-
anisms including national-level trust funds, foundations, and endowments, sharing
the features of being (i) governed by boards of directors representing different sectors
of society, (ii) capable of receiving and managing money from a variety of sources,
and (iii) able to make grants to beneficiary organizations." This definition could be
broader then the St.Petersburg's one - with the risk of losing the economic incentive
aspect of the revenue-raising mechanism, if it did not restrict the choice for allocation
of resources to a grant policy. Although both definitions might include several types
of funds 1, the typical fund that is described differs significantly: the St.Petersburg's
guidelines describe a transitional financial mechanism raising revenues from environ-
mental charges and taxes, and with various disbursement conditions, while the Santa
Cruz definition enlarges the revenue-raising mechanism to other sources of funding
but restrict disbursement to a grant policy and talks about "long-term approaches".
The present section follows the St.Petersburg definition and addresses almost exclu-
sively the use of environmental funds for industrial pollution investments but will not
restrict the revenue raising mechanism to earmarked channels and will question the
transitional issue. In this regard, the more management-oriented definition of the
Santa Cruz report may still bring some relevant arguments to the discussion.
With this definition and following the original accounting dimension of an envi-
ronmental fund, three different components should be distinguished: (i) the sources
1Especially in Central and Eastern Europe
of revenue; (ii) the management of the fund; and (iii) the disbursement policy. This
"cash flow" description of an environmental fund should underline the intrinsic finan-
cial characteristics of this policy instrument.
* The sources of revenue should be distinguished, from the ones related to an
economic incentive such as eco-taxation, to the neutral external resources that
these funds may get from other institutions.
* The management issue should be characterized according to the linkages with
governmental institutions and national environmental policies, the legal struc-
ture, the governance, the administration, the monitoring and evaluation proce-
dures, and the investment policy.
* The disbursement policy should address the choice of recipients, the type of
financial assistance, the implementation policy, the technical support, the mon-
itoring and the reimbursement mechanism in the case of loans.
As recounted by Lovei ([102]) and the St.Petersburg guidelines, environmental
funds can be found in various economies from highly-industrialized countries to tran-
sition economies and developing countries. An OECD survey ([25]) reports that
earmarked taxes mechanisms are existing in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Swe-
den and the USA. In addition, grants or soft loans are disbursed for environmen-
tal private investments in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Japan and Norway without a
revenue-raising mechanism based on earmarked taxation. Environmental funds based
on earmarked taxes have also been established in many transition economies 2. For
developing countries, the Santa Cruz document ([16]) reports that funds based on a
grant policy have been established in Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
2For a comprehensive review, see the following surveys: Lovei ([102]): Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic (1994); St.Petersburg guidelines ([33]): Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic (1994); OECD ([25]): St.Petersburg guidelines
plus Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, M oldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (1993-1994); Lehoczki([99): Czech eublic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland (1994); Santa Cruz Ieport (i: Poland Ecofund
(1994).
bia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica 3
Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda .
Tables A.1 to A.7 present basic characteristics of several funds running in the
various kinds of economies. Sources from OECD ([25], [99], [102]) and from the Santa
Cruz report ([16]) were mixed in this survey but could be easily identified from their
definition of environmental funds. Tables illustrate the extent of application of the
environmental fund's model and the multiplicity of types of funds. Overall, its seems
that funds in industrialized countries tend to be more specific toward certain aspects
of industrial pollution (media-specificity or even focusing on a certain type of pollution
or remedial action) whereas funds in transition economies are more comprehensive.
Developing countries' funds, on the other hand, seem to combine external financial
revenues with a non-governmental institutional structure and a disbursement enlarged
to institution-building and environmental activities in a broader sense. However, this
could be a bias from the Santa Cruz sampling methodology which tended to focus on
externally-supported institutions and natural resources' conservation activities.
The following discussion will be restricted to national environmental funds (NEF)
presenting the characteristics of being (1) financed at least in part by domestic re-
sources linked to eco-taxation; (2) government-related institutions; (3) including in-
dustrial pollution as a main objective for disbursement.
Variability in design characteristics; a typology of funds
Previous tables illustrate the creativity of countries to invent fund raising mecha-
nisms for NEFs. In addition to simple governmental credit support from the general
budget (and thus from the multiple taxes financing national expenditures), domestic
3Two separate funds exist in Jamaica: the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica and the Jamaica
National Park Trust Fund.
4See also Lovei ([102]) for China, Ivory Coast, India, Colombia, Turkey and Mexico.
resources can include earmarked revenues from general taxes (income taxes, general
consumption taxes) or environmental taxes (eco-taxes). Environmental taxes could
themselves be distinguished between direct emission taxes and indirect taxes on in-
puts or products (goods and services) (see [13] for a complete survey of existing
mechanisms). Indirect taxes on inputs include fossil fuel, electricity or raw materials
taxes; taxes on goods can be water charges 5 or taxes on pesticides , while services
such as transportation, transit, tourism, or sanitation have also been considered for
raising indirect environmental taxes. Other domestic resources could include private
donations, or credits from commercial banks. However, these types of resources do
not seem to have been applied to industrial pollution investments.
A further level of distinction should address the entity from which the charge
or the tax is raised: households, farms, industry as a whole or particular industrial
sectors. In certain cases, revenues will be raised only from one type of contributor
(usually the case with direct taxes); in others, the fund will operate based on a prin-
ciple of "mutuality" where resources from various origins are all mixed in the fund 6
External sources of revenue can be provided by traditional multilateral and bi-
lateral development agencies as well as development banks under grant and loan
agreements '. Additional donations can come from large environmental NGOs and
charitable organizations, although, once again, industrial pollution is rarely addressed
by this type of financial assistance. Another original source of capital are the increas-
ingly popular bilateral debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) in which part of an international
debt is reimbursed to capitalize an environmental fund. The Polish Ecofund, funded
in 1991 with the agreement of Poland's creditor countries (the Paris Club), was based
on this principle.
sOECD's fiscal terminology ([13]) make a distinction between "charges, which are payments for
which the payer receives a benefit in return (...) and taxes, which are unrequited payments."
6This is for example the case in France. (See [93] for a complete description)7In addition to the numerous examples existing in developing countries, the German European
Recovery Program, originally financed by the Marshall Plan, is stiiil operating and has become a
self-sustained institution.
This listing of resources should illustrate not only the variety of sources but also
the logical connection (or lack thereof) between the fund-raising's origin and the en-
vironmental focus of the fund. This linkage can be non-existant (external donations),
indirect (fuel taxes) or direct (an SO02 tax).
The Santa Cruz report identifies three different fund-governing structures: (i)
funds associated with a government agency; (ii) funds with a governing board com-
posed entirely of NGOs; and (iii) funds with a mixed government/NGO governing
board. The report argues that governmental funds "can be better suited than NGO
funds for pollution management" and "can be a recipient for earmarked taxes, fines,
and permit fees" unlike NGO funds which are 'generally unable to serve as recipient
for government-levied taxes, fines and permit fees." Thus, the relationship with the
government seems necessary for the purpose of the revenue-raising mechanism if it is
to be based on eco-taxation, and if the fund needs to target industrial pollution as a
major objective.
However, the important factors for successful management of a NEF should not be
limited to the nature of its relationship with the NGO community. Examples of im-
plementing agencies such as national banks exist in various types of economies. The
financial characteristic of NEFs makes them particularly suitable for a partnership
with the finance community, particularly when disbursement is made via loans. In
exchange of bearing the credit risk and of making the financial appraisal for projects,
banks can retain one or two points of credit rate and still be able to offer soft loans.
Moreover, the undisbursed capital of funds 8 can be efficiently managed by commer-
cial banks as is the case in many existing NEFs. In certain cases, the creation of
environmental banks has also been suggested as an complement to funds 9
8Lovei reports that the unused amount of the Russian NEF was 67 percent of the total resources
9In 1993, a Volga Environmental Bank was established in Saratov (Russia). A National Environ-
mental Bank was also created by the Russian Federal Fund. (source: OE•D)
Moreover, a choice has to be made between a single national fund and a network of
local funds representing the various administrative levels as it is the case in Russia and
China for example. Alternatives include thk choice of the main river basins (France)
on a territorial basis. The terminology of a National Environmental Fund (NEF),
will be also applied in this writing to the case of funds established at the sub-national
level; the term "National" refering here to the national policy allowing their existence.
The governance of a NEF presents an opportunity to gather and represent the
multiple interests concerned with the operation of the fund: governmental (indus-
try, fiscal, environmental, infrastructure) but also from the industry community and
local NGOs, and eventually from the financial institution handling the fund. In ad-
dition, the administration of a NEF should distinguish the various components of an
industrial project's cycle (selection of candidates, financial and technical appraisal,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation) while being also involved in the financial
procedures of disbursement and eventual reimbursement.
These various factors are addressed differently by existing NEFs. Several funds
seem to neglect the "post-disbursement" part of projects, while better appraisal pro-
cedures are sometimes needed (OECD, [25]). Moreover, Lovei ([102]) observes that
several funds in transition economies allocate their resources on a "first-come-first-
served" basis and neglect any cost-effectiveness criteria in their selection of projects.
Finally, an important issue about funds' management is their reporting mechanism
to the community and to the eventual external funding institutions. Two opposite
arguments have been raised for or against NEFs about this issue. First, NEFs are
often accused of lack of transparency in their disbursement policy by external poten-
tial donors. On the other hand, earmarking of funds for specific purposes has been
sometimes justified as a more visible allocation of financial resources for environmen-
tal issues (OECD, [13]).
The range of environment-related programs addressed by NEF dealing with in-
dustrial pollution could be sorted according to the various categories of recipients: (i)
industries; (ii) municipalities; (iii) scientific institutions and (iv) victims. As already
noted, certain funds have a comprehensive approach and may finance any consistant
project proposal, while others focus on a very specific category of recipients 10. For
the two first categories of recipients. a media-focused approach is commonly used, or
a restriction to energy savings investments is made. A technical specification might
also be mentioned in certain cases: for example for clean technologies, or, on the
contrary, with a restriction for large pollution control equipement (almost a standard
feature when targeting municipalities).
The allocation of fund resources also concerns the choice of a particular pattern
for financial assistance: the most common instruments are grants, soft loans or a
combination of them but commercial loans could also be used. Moreover, this defi-
nition encompass all the various types of soft loans that could be defined by varying
financial parameters such as the interest rate, the maturity and the grace period.
Less used instruments include loans guarantees which are "promises by the Fund to
pay lenders some or all of the loan principal and interest if the recipient is unable to
pay" ([33]).
Last, the allocation of resources should not only consider financial instruments
but also in-kind technical assistance. This service could be charged, subsidized, or
offered to applicants as a package with the financial support or separately. It seems
important to measure the balance in the budget and in the disbursement policy of
NEFs between this technical component and the financial one. The case of the Japan
Environment Corporation is remarkable in that sense, with a shift toward providing
technical assistance to enterprises since the 1960-70s (Lovei, [102]).
1OFor example the Japanese Pol.ution-Rl•ated He~ th Damage Compensation and Prevention As-
sociation which gives compensation to victims of pollution-related health injuries
Important external factors to be considered when designing environmental
funds
The close interaction that should exist between a NEF dedicated to industrial pollu-
tion remediation and the industrial community, suggests that the design of such an
instrument has to be adapted to a particular industrial background, not only for the
type of assistance that may be needed (financial and technical), but also for the kind
of revenue-raising mechanism utilized. An environmental fund is similar to a market
instrument in that way it has to answer to a particular need from the industry; con-
sequently, the extent and the type of assistance that may needed should be initially
identified.
Specific funds have been clearly designed in that respect: the relationship vis-a-
vis the enterprise is therein clarified and the fund will exclusively address media or
problem-specific investments. On the other hand, the rationale behind comprehen-
sive funds is that assistance is needed in several domains of environmental activities
while a precise estimation for an optimal distribution is not possible. The risk is then
to lose some transparency and efficiency in the disbursement prioritizing process, as
discussed by Lovei ([102]) and Lehoczki([99]).
Moreover, the industrial context should also be considered when designing the
revenue-raising mechanism. Equity, as well as economic considerations should justify
a choice between the various taxation alternatives. The ability of polluters to adapt
their behavior in the long run to the charge has to be taken into account. Different
kinds of difficulties might arise in developing countries and transition economies.
Environmental funds should also be integrated as an additional policy instrument
in a global national environmental policy. At least three different issues should be
considered:
NEFs have to fit with the institutional background of the national environmen-
tal policy. The revenue-raising mechanism may in particular involve two different
administrations - fiscal and environmental agencies, and their close cooperation may
be an important element for success. In addition, the extent of effective enforcement
mechanisms may dramatically condition the choice of a direct system of environmen-
tal taxation.
The political acceptability of taxation and governmental intervention will also fa-
cilitate or prevent the political choice of NEFs as a model for environmental policy.
In the U.S. for example, Congress in 1971 voted against the Proxmire Amendment
to the Clean Water Act that proposed the introduction of effluent fees. However, the
political acceptability of environmental taxation is not equal among countries, and
may explain why a NEF strategy has been adopted or rejected in countries with a
relatively similar economic background. It is to be noticed that earmarked taxation
may increase political acceptability because resources are not diluted in a general gov-
ernmental budget but, on the contrary, obviously dedicated to green-financing. Lovei
mentions the "increase transparency and political acceptability of the system due to
the close relationship between revenue sources and the spending of the revenues."
Among other reasons for the bad political image of earmarked taxation 1 and the
fund model, doubts about governmental efficiency and legitimacy for intervention has
to be emphasized. A particular focus on a transparent management, monitoring and
reporting procedures for NEFs may improve their public perception 12
Lastly, NEFs should be consistent with a global national environmental financing
11See Case y ([69]) for an analysis in the case of the US, mentioning in particular (i) an aversion
to new taxes; (2) a perception that fees would provide the "right-to-pollute"; (iii) conviction that
regulations were the only appropriate legislative means of answering a social need; (iv) uncertainties
regarding the effect of effluent fees; and (v) strong industrial lobbying against the fees claiming that
the money taken away would otherwise be used on pollution control.
12The Santa Cruz report recommend for example that "the NEF should maintain complete and
open records or its actions on every project and proposal. It should broadcast or publish its actions
and the rationale for each.
strategy. In the absence of a coherent environmental policy framework, fund effec-
tiveness is undermined and resources can be misallocated. The relationship of NEFs
with national environmental plans, and the environmental legislation may be another
important factor for success. The St. Petersburg's guidelines mention that "funds
should support other environmental policy instruments and, overall, the implemen-
tation of a coherent environmental policy".
As there exist economies differing in their level of industrialization, there might
exist several varieties of NEFs, and funds might have to be adapted to the level of
development of countries. As a response to the evolution of the economy in sec-
tors such as public sector reform, monetary reform, fiscal policy and trade policy,
there may be corresponding changes in priorities, operations or even the existence of
NEFs. However, empirical considerations from the tables suggest that existing funds
do not differ significantly, at least in their design characteristics, among the differ-
ent economies (with the exception perhaps to the specificity or comprehensiveness 13).
A more sensitive issue seems to be the transitory characteristic recommended by
many authors at least in the case of transition economies ([33, 102, 25]), who strongly
argue that "funds should be considered as transitional financing instruments" while
"improvements in environmental management, a stronger private sector, and tight-
ened budget constraints for the public sector can gradually eliminate the need for
NEFs". Experience in industrialized countries reinforces in part the observation that
funds have been often used on a transitory basis. On the other hand, there exist
also numerous examples of NEFs that have been established on a clear long-term ba-
sis, and that have been succesfully operating for many years in some OECD countries.
Therefore, if certain NEFs prove to be a relevant instrument for a long-term
13An initially comprehensive fund could nevertheless follow an evolution toward specificity in the
long term through restructuring its policy for disbursement or separating revenues according to
media-specific sources.
environmental policy, funds established in transition economies or developing coun-
tries should be flexible enough to adapt to the evolving needs for assistance of their
"clients". OECD noticed that "there might be demands to shift resources of the
funds to other environmental priorities (such as remediation of contaminated sites)
or non-environmental purposes" ([25]) while the Santa Cruz report mentions that
"NEFs are instruments for sustained financing for environmental programs and thus
promote long-term planning". As a consequence, funds should be able to re-orient
their priorities toward specific environmental activities or on the contrary, broaden
them toward other types of green investments. However, the type of revenue-raising
mechanism might present difficulties in justifying a radical shift in the disbursement
strategy.
3.1.2 Relevance as an environmental policy instrument
Compatibility with the Polluter Pays' Principle
The Polluter Pays' Principle (PPP) was endorsed by the OECD council in 1972 and
1974 and states that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution prevention and
control measures (OECD, 1992). In practice, this has meant that polluters in OECD
countries are financially responsible for complying with the environmental require-
ments set by the relevant authorities.
A a result, the PPP excludes financial assistance and has been sometimes re-
ferred to as a no-subsidy principle. In addition, it is often extended to the so-called
"resource pricing principle" or "user pays' principle" which states that all natural
resources should be properly priced to reflect the social costs of using them.
In the 1974 OECD update of the PPP, the three following exceptions were adopted:
* when the subsidy does not introduce significant distortions in international trade
and investment
* when, without the subsidy, affected industries would suffer severe difficulties
* when the subsidy is limited to a well-defined transition period adapted to the
specific socio-economic problems associated with the implementation of a coun-
try's environmental policy
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, a common characteristic of most
NEFs is the existence of subsidies(grants/soft loans/in-kind assistance) in their choice
of disbursement policy. Although the revenue-raising mechanism may equilibrate the
global accounting, NEFs may therefore contradict the PPP.
Several cases can obviously be identified contradicting a stricto sensu PPP based
on an accounting statement between the polluter's expenses and his contribution to
the fund. These include all the situations in which, other sources of revenue than
raised on polluters are brought into the fund. Moreover, at a micro level, it often
happens that the subsidy allocated to the polluter exceeds his contribution to the
fund. However, this difficulty disappears if contributing polluters are considered as a
whole, but an equity issue might remain.
Additional contradictions appear if the "user pays' principle" is used instead be-
cause most of the time levies raised on polluters largely under-represent the social
cost of using natural resources. Under this principle, subsidies should also be granted
in proportion to the pollution abatement. On the contrary, OECD notes that "most
subsidy policies actually employed (...) are paid not in relation to abatement, but are
paid to encourage to the development or use of certain techniques or technologies".
However, the value of the subsidy could be reduced when soft loans are used. To
calculate in that case an aggregated subsidy-equivalent amount, soft loans could be
made equivalent to grants through calculating the Net Present Value of the difference
with market loans (See [25] for the formula).
As a conclusion, if the PPP is understood as a principle and not a strict accounting
statement. NEFs financed from revenues raised on polluters should conform to it,
while their conformity with the stronger "user pays' principle" is subjected to an
equivalence of the taxation and the subsidy rates and the social cost of pollution.
Zylicz ([143]), quoted by OECD, states that "the use of environmental funds for
pollution abatement subsidies may be justified under the PPP as long as its revenue
base is environmental charges, taxes and fines."
With the previous enlarged definition of the PPP, NEFs in developing countries or
transition economies would conform to the principle as long as part of their revenue
is raised from polluters. When this is not the case, the three waivers previously
mentioned could be invoked. The third "transitory" condition may not be satisfied
when referring to the Santa Cruz NEF model. However, it has been reminded that this
model of fund rarely allocates resources directly to polluters but rather to biodiversity
or NGO strengthening programs. In any case, it does not seem that a fund totally
dependent of external funding or donations and focusing on industrial pollution could
be viable in the long-term.
Environmental effectiveness: promotion of technical innovation and of
cleaner production; promotion of environmental expertise at the local level
NEFs, by acting as economic stimuli to enterprises, may as well interfere with their
technical choices of a particular environmental strategy. On the other hand, it is now
widely recognized that an efficient environmental policy should promote preventive
approaches as well as promote technical innovation toward more environmentally-
friendly technologies. Are therefore NEFs able, through their revenue-raising mecha-
nism and the type of assistance they offer, to influence the technical decisions of firms
in a positive way?
A first consideration should address the incentive provided by taxation as direct
or indirect taxation may not have the same impact on the technical decisions of en-
terprises. Direct taxes will be directed only to the very last link in the process chain;
moreover, one tax will usually correspond to a single pollutant. The firm's concern
will focus in that case on the prevention or elimination of emissions. On the other
hand, indirect taxes will direct the firm's attention to its entire process with the con-
cern of reducing the use of the corresponding input. End-of-pipe will then become
of less interest but there will be a larger uncertainty about what will be the global
environmental result of the firm's decisions. In addition, one simple indirect tax may
trigger the reduction of several pollutants while no cost of measurement and moni-
toring will be required.
Characteristics of the assistance provided may as well influence differently the
firm's technical strategy by the type of financial aid, the criteria for selection of can-
didates and the kind of technical support. The use of a database of clean technologies
or on the contrary a focus on certain pollution control equipement, will possibly vary
the impact of a NEF on existing firms. Financial parameters (interest rates, maturity
or grace period) may as well be changed to favor certain kinds of technologies.
The interaction of eco-taxation with innovation has been widely discussed in the
literature: the advantages of a dynamic efficiency effect of taxes to promote con-
stantly R&D in pollution abatement technologies has been underlined (Rajah, [118]),
while several economic models 14 and empirical studies ([106]) have tried to estimate
the extent of this effect. As previously noticed, nuances have been brought however
when indirect taxes are used and when the linkage is uncertain between the good that
is taxed and the environmental damage that is supposed to be reduced ". OECD
argues for example that a pollution tax of the indirect sort will tend to encourage
the choice of the production technology with the lowest tax base, not with the lowest
level of emissions ([13]. Corrections have been used in certain cases (e.g. Sweden)
by combining a tax on inputs with a rebate when inputs are used in non polluting
processes. However, such measures may rely exclusively on a record of existing tech-
1 4 see Magat, [103] for a discussion about the choice for allocation of the firm's resources between
R&D for production or pollution abatement new technologies
15To minimize the effect of this bad linkage, preference has often been given to an indirect tax on
energy use whose link with air pollution seems particularly strong (See [76])
nologies and may as a consequence have a negative impact on innovation 16. Similar
difficulties may appear when considering the impact of taxation on the choice be-
tween preventive and curative approaches. While indirect taxes clearly favor more
cleaner production, any rebate or refund incentives of taxation linked to end-of-pipe
technologies, should be avoided (Ashford, [53]).
The assistance provided by NEFs should be able to be tailored to the technical
and financial needs required by cleaner production and innovation. The selection of
demonstration projects for innovative technologies, as opposed to an assistance pro-
posed exclusively for end-of-pipe equipements or well-established clean technologies,
should be favored. In certain cases (e.g. the French water basin agencies), financial
parameters (ratio grant/total aid, interest rate) vary in order to provide extra in-
centives for clean technologies. Moreover, the use of Cleaner Production audits, the
maintenance of a clearinghouse of clean technologies, close partnership with research
institutions are various examples of information-based management measures that
could enhance the role of NEFs to promote innovation and prevention. Lastly, an
innovation-based strategy of NEFs could enlarge their knowledge of firm's technical
decisions and improve in some cases the linkage between an indirect source of revenue
and the environmental benefit that is wished.
Another potential advantage of NEFs is their capacity to develop capacity-building
in developing countries and transition economies. While part of the revenue raised can
be used to operate a necessary but often new and fragile environmental administra-
tion 17, pools of technical expertise (e.g, national or local cleaner Production centers)
can be created and promote diffusion of existing technologies, training about good
management practices and spread the methodology for cleaner production auditing.
Potential gains from such a development strategy may include the improvement of
16This seems to be a common bias of tax depreciation instruments (see Ashford, [53]).
"'This is the case in China where 20% of the levies collected are used to operate a decentralized
nctwor 1of local environmental protection bureaus.
cost-effectiveness in the use of resources, and a catalyzing role toward the promotion
of preventive environmental practices.
Relationship with the policy debate between economic instruments and
the Command and Control approach; the issue of cost-effectiveness
Because a policy based on NEFs is essentially relying on the effectiveness of the eco-
nomic instruments that are taxation on the one hand and financial and technical
assistance offered to enterprises on the other, their position in the debate between
regulatory approaches and economic incentives is not neutral. A lot has been written
on the comparison between the two policies but, as noticed by Helm and Pearce ([88]),
"the universal pursuit of taxes or Command-and-Control regulations is suboptimal
and sometimes perverse. There is no escape from pragmatism: the application of
empirically-based cost-benefit analysis to the evaluation of alternative policies. Mar-
ket and government failure vary on a case-by-case basis and so inevitably must the
solutions."
In general, arguments brought in favor of economic instruments invoke theoretical
cost-effectiveness 18, while defensors of regulatory policies argue the higher certainty
(Rajah, [118]) of Command-and-Control. Other arguments address the issue of inno-
vation 19
Bringing all arguments in favor of the two policies is out of the scope of this writ-
ing. However, it seems important to stress that due to the inertia of policies and the
social cost of modifying a well-established environmental policy, the initial situation
18See in particular Tietenberg ([126]) and Oates and Strassmann ([108]) for a less idealistic situ-
ation with "deviations from competitive behavior".
19Rajah stressed the possible superiority of economic instruments for dynamic efficiency toward
innovation ([118]) but Ashford, Ayers and Stone proposed a design for CAC policies in order to
be also able to promote innovation ([49]) 20. Using a model, Magat has shown that unless labor
substitutability is very high, no difference could be observed between economic instruments and
regulations ([103]). Recent empirical studies would favor economic instruments in specific cases
([106]).
relative to the reliance of countries on tradeable permits, regulation or taxes might
be determinative in the choice of a new instrument.
Most countries tend now to adopt a mixed approach with a combination of both
regulatory and market instruments. Helm and Pearce mention that there could even
be a complementarity between the two approaches, in which the role of the state
would be to regulate through CAC procedures in setting maximum pollution levels
while the role of the market would be to find the best method of achieving them
([88]). The OECD's guidelines remind that taxes cannot be a complete substitute for
regulation and that they should operate "against the background of and as a com-
plement to a regulatory framework" ([13]).
NEFs may become a mixed instrument in that regard and could exist in a gen-
eral Command-and-Control context. While a taxation rate set at the right level plus
the use of subsidies calculated according to the amount of pollution abated, would
turn a NEF into a textbook's economic instrument, taxes used mainly for revenue-
raising and financial and technical assistance could become a useful complement to
a regulatory approach: the regulator could require the assistance of a NEF to help a
firm conform to a standard, or use its technical expertise to figure the technical and
economical feasibility of the implementation of a technology-based requirement. In
addition, in countries where enforcement is poor, if properly used, NEFs may allow a
cost-effective distribution of resources through an appropriate selection of prioritary
projects, and contribute to increase the economic efficiency of national environmental
policies.
3.1.3 Economic consequences of environmental funds
The economic impact of eco-taxation
A lot has been written about the best possible use of eco-taxation. The OECD guide-
lines ([13]) advise that an eco-tax should conform to general fiscal principles (equity,
neutrality, administrative efficiency) and propose three alternatives to governments:
(i) emission taxes or charges; (ii) introduction of new incentive structures into indirect
taxes; and (iii) provision of subsidies.
Neutrality 21 can seem contradictory with the most basic principle of eco-taxation
and in particular its incentive characteristic 22. This apparent contradiction however
disappear when externalities are taken into account and when the economic efficiency
definition of neutrality is used.
There does not seem to exist an obvious hierarchy between direct 23 and indirect
taxes. Based on pure economic theory, Koltermann ([96]) has shown that the Pareto
optimality can be obtained by either direct or indirect taxation. Although particular
attention should be brought to strengthen the linkage between indirect taxes and po-
tential environmental benefits in order to have the economic incentive play its normal
role, Rajah mentions that, in general, it is more efficient to focus on indirect taxes
as proxies for environmental taxes (Rajah [118]). Eskeland ([76]) strongly argues in
favor of input taxation although a large part of the argumentation holds mainly for
mobile sources. The OECD guidelines ([109]) advise that emission taxes and charges
be applied specifically for stationary polluting sources and when environmental tax-
ation can apply directly to discharges (air, solid, water or noise). Logically, direct
21OECD ([13]) notices that there exist three different definitions of tax neutrality: (i) identify-
ing tax neutrality with economic efficiency; (ii) equating it with uniformity in taxation; and (iii)
interpreting tax neutrality to mean that the design of the tax system should be influenced only by
tax considerations, implying that it should not include provisions to encourage or discourage certain
activities.
22Ashford ([53]) argues that the three purpose of taxes should be (i) to create incentives and disin-
centives to guide industrial activity; (ii) to raise revenue; and (iii) to address equity considerations.
23 Pigouvian taxes ([115])
taxation will be strongly handicaped when monitoring of emissions is technically or
economically non-feasible.
The choice of a particular instrument should be made in order to simplify the
overall taxation policy. A too complex taxation scheme may be difficult to apply and
make the coordination with other environmental taxes difficult 24. Other important
recommendations should include consideration of the transparency and the monitor-
ing of the taxation policy.
Earmarking is a common feature of many NEFs and one of their most contro-
versial from the economic point of view if they are to be used as a long-term policy.
The conventional view of public economics is that earmarking is a potential source
of inefficiency in fiscal decision-making as there should exist no reason why the need
for resources should match revenues raised by taxation (OECD, [13]). However, this
would be the case in the ideal situation where subsidies are allocated according to
the amount of pollution reduced. This type of rebate should be distinguished from
earmarking because it still complies with economic-efficiency.
Moreover, earmarking presents the potential danger of distinguishing environ-
mental taxes from the general fiscal system and thus, of preventing an integrated
environmental approach. It also may distort budgetary decisions by influencing the
choice of a taxation rate according to revenue-raising issues rather than to environ-
mental and economic efficiency.
But earmarking also offers several advantages that may explain its wide adoption
as a fiscal measure. Its potential positive impact on the transparency of NEFs and on
the political support for this type of policy or to facilitate the adoption of new taxes,
has already been mentioned. It may also facilitate the financing and budgetary man-
24The Dutch environmental taxation system was recently modified to combine severni taxes in a
single one to ease its implementation.
agement of local governmental institutions by increasing the predictability of their
revenues (OECD, [13]). OECD concludes by characterizing earmarking as a second
best and transitory solution when environmental taxes have not yet reached their
efficiency level enabling the achievement of environmental objectives.
It seems also important to note that the extent of the use of earmarking can be
partly controlled by a mixed approach combining rebates to enterprises with partial
earmarking. The French water basin agencies have used this system in order to in-
crease the flexibility of their expenditures' management.
In most countries, the use of environmental taxation from a quantitative point
of view is still limited compared to other fiscal measures and therefore, their poten-
tial macro-economic consequences are likely to be neglectible. However, as economic
instruments are becoming increasingly considered by environmental policy makers,
the double impact of additional fiscal charges on certain society's economic agents
and of extra revenues for the government, may trigger important effects on the global
economy.
These consequences may concern in particular the competitiveness and location
of enterprises, the level of unemployment, the price of goods, the exchange rate and
the balance of payments. However, due to the multiciplicity of additional factors of
larger importance, there seems at present to be little evidence that eco-taxes influence
significantly industrial relocation or impair competitiveness (Barde, [58]).
Moreover, many authors have argued that the integration of eco-taxation in the
general taxation scheme may be used to reduce the negative effects of distortionary
taxes. Most conventional taxes create distortions in the economy by influencing the
taxpayer behavior without charging a polluter for the true opportunity cost of the
resource being polluted (Terkla, [124]). On the contrary, eco-taxes are correcting
these market distortions and therefore could be used to raise revenues instead of dis-
tortionarv taxes. This 'double-dividend' concept has in particular been mentioned by
Pearce in an article proposing a new carbon tax scheme to adjust for global warming
([113]). The quantitative welfare gain from substituting exo-taxation to corporate
or personal income taxes could then prove to be very substantial (Terkla, [124]).
However, a secondary impact on the unemployment level may depend on economic
characteristics of labor supply (Van der Ploeg, [132]). Overall, the 'double-dividend'
advantage of eco-taxation seems to be widely supported in the literature.
For NEFs, this economic advantage may have several consequences: if earmarking
of eco-taxes is only partial, part of the revenue that is raised could be put into the
general budget and be used to reduce distortionary taxes. Another possibility could
be to replace environmental expenditures from the general budget by financing them
with earmarked revenues from eco-taxes.
Another important macro-economic consequence of eco-taxes may concern their
distributional impact on the global economy, by favoring or constraining differently
groups of producers or households. The case of energy taxes has been particularly
discussed in the literature and a potential regressive distributional impact has been
mentioned due to the importance of energy expenditures in the budget of poorer
households (Pearson and Smith, Poterba [114, 117]). Secondary effects of eco-taxation
may be difficult to predict in the case of indirect instruments, but also with direct
taxation on enterprises' emisions which may trigger a possible increase of the price of
goods. In certain cases and after careful assessment, a trade-off between equity and
efficiency may be considered through offsetting policies, by using part of the 'double
dividend' benefit for correcting purposes (OECD, [13]).
Management of NEFs and allocation of resources
The use of resources collected from eco-taxation to grant subsidies to enterprises will-
ing to invest in pollution abatement can be controversial if a strong version of the
Polluter Pays' Principle is invoked. Moreover, such a policy may also have a negative
impact on the behavior of the market as subsidies may reduce the rate of exit (i.e.
bankruptcies) of enterprises from the economy. Experience from a U.S. case study
tends to prove that financing subsidies from environmental taxes may distort desirable
signals about the appropriate level of activity in the sector and lead to a higher level of
activity than desirable (therefore possibly increasing the aggregate level of pollution)
(OECD, [13]). However, this result may depend on the level of economic development
and could be modulated by designing a policy in which financial assistance would be
disbursed in priority under soft loans rather than grants (thus reducing the level of
subsidy) and after a financial audit is made, aiming at avoiding to subsidize marginal
companies about to exit. The balance revenue raised by taxation/subsidies disbursed
could also be used, through partial earmarking, to control the aggregated level of
activity.
Moreover, as a main difficulty of raising eco-taxes at an appropriate level in order
to give sufficient incentives to enterprises to abate pollution, is that the tax level might
be politically unacceptable, the use of subsidies may represent a second best solution
for policy-making. Rajah ([118]) argues that the combination of tax plus subsidy may
prove to be the only realistic solution for implementation but only examines subsidies
as tax incentive measures, not through environmental funds. In addition, funds could
be used to compensate for the informational market failures that prevent efficient dif-
fusion of new technologies, due to the technical assistance they could provide. Last,
NEFs could be the proper instrument to address the possible regressive distributional
effects of eco-taxation and decide to adopt an equitable disbursement policy where
large enterprises as well as Small and Medium Sized Enterprises are both targeted.
A specificity of eco-taxation compared to another economic instrument such as
tradeable permits, is its greater interaction with public sector management as mech-
anisms of raising revenue and of redistributing resources have to be established. This
may have several economic consequences in terms of cost-effectiveness due to the po-
tential increase of administrative costs. To reduce this potentially negative effect,
the use of the existing tax administration and structure may minimize cost and com-
plexity (OECD, [13]). Such a consideration implies to integrate environmental taxes
in the general taxation system and is an argument against earmarking. However,
when the transparency of the policy is to be increased and when capacity-building
is needed at the local level - as it is often the case in developing countries, cost-
effectiveness may be better achieved by using a separate administrative entity (e.g.
decentralized bureaus of the ministry of environment). This could also be justified
in the case of lack of cooperation between the fiscal and the environmental admin-
istrations (necessary for an optimal disbursement policy), and when a network of
environmental institutions is already existing at the local level. Moreover, a direct
taxation system will require monitoring and enforcement that is usually operated by
the environmental institutions. It seems important that a close relationship exists
between the one collecting the tax and the one measuring the level of emissions; the
easiest way to achieve this being to have one single institution doing both procedures.
The cost of enforcement is a second issue that appears with direct taxes and may
influence the optimal taxation strategy. Lee ([98]) distinguishes two compliance en-
forcement cost for the purpose of a global welfare economical analysis: (i) the direct
cost of enforcement; and (ii) the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement. Results
show that the optimal level of taxation differs differently from the Pigouvian tax rate,
depending whether or not the second cost is omitted in the calculation 25. Similar cal-
culations when the initial tax rate is sub-optimal (which is the case most of the time),
and possibly taking into account the monitoring of the implementation of pollution
abatement technologies, could be done to guide NEFs in their enforcement strategy.
25If only the direct cost of enforcement is taken into account, the regulator should increase the tax-
ation rate and reduce enforcement. On the contrary, if the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement
is added, the regulator should decrease the taxation rate and increase enforcement.
Economic development, international relations, and emergence of new en-
vironmental policies
Finally, these considerations about the economic impact of NEFs may vary signif-
icantly according to the level of economic development. The design of funds and
especially of the revenue-raising mechanism could for example be highly dependent
on the stability of the inflation rate. The interaction of funds with other part of the
national economy is also very likely to be sensitive to the existence of a market econ-
omy. Informational failures as well as the presence of large state-owned industrial
sectors may influence in both ways the positive or negative consequences of NEFs.
Enterprises may not be aware of the potential benefits they could get from the NEF's
assistance, or on the contrary, the development of NEFs could be facilitated by a
higher control of the state on industry. Moreover, the negative consequences of sub-
sidies may not exist in the situation in which the economy is growing at a fast rate
(characteristic of many current transition economies). Overall, most authors argue
that a NEF model is particularly relevant in transition economies, at least on a
transitory base (Lovei, OECD, [25, 102]). The situation might be also favorable in
certain developing countries, where cost-effectiveness is better achieved for the im-
provement of public goods and environmental quality through a control of capital by
governmental institutions (Banerjee, [57]). Moreover, although NEFs could influence
investments in clean technologies but also slow down the rate of growth in polluting
activities, the use of the "double dividend" may provide a "supply-side"stimulus to
economic growth (OECD, [13]).
A wide adoption of NEFs models especially in large transition countries may also
have some consequences at the international level. The spreading of eco-taxation
practices could favor the establishment of international eco-taxes as it has been pro-
posed for example in the case of carbon dioxide (Pearce, [113]) and the adoption of
other economic instruments. Multilateral environmental funds addressing industrial
pollution have already been established (Montreal Protocol fund, GEF, United Na-
tions Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration [9]) and could be promoted
by success stories multiplying at the national level. By keeping a record of public en-
vironmental expenditures, NEFs could also be useful in solving international disputes
about transboundaries issues.
However, the combination of eco-taxes plus subsidies could become controversial
if NEFs were used to provide subsidies to national economies or for trade protection-
nism (Rajah, [118]). Coordination of national policies, possibly influenced in develop-
ing countries and transition economies by development institutions, could help avoid
these bias. International cooperation may be particularly influenced by factors such
as transfrontalier and global spillover, risks of specific competitive effects and trade
distortion (OECD, [13]).
A last issue that may influence the development of NEFs in the long-term, is the
emergence of new environmental behaviors in industry and in the finance commu-
nity. The multiplication of green financing initiatives and of voluntary agreements
(Schmidheiny, [120]) could either be slown down by a parallel system of NEFs or on
the contrary be leveraged through a successful partnership. In particular in transition
economies but in general in all countries where funds have been established, NEFs
should try to move the finance community toward more environmentally-sound prac-
tices. Partnerships such as involving a commercial bank in the financial appraisal
of candidate enterprises, or the use of loan guarantees as a type of subsidies, could
facilitate this evolution.
3.2 Presentation of Three Various Models and
Development Strategies
This section presents the situation in three different economies where national envi-
26Etablissement Public de l'Etat.
ronmental funds have been established. In developing countries and transition economies,
examples of multilateral development institutions' strategies to design externally-supported
revolving funds are also described on the basis of project documents and feasibility
studies.
3.2.1 The case of an industrialised country: the French wa-
ter basin agencies
Presentation of the French water basin agencies and of the Agence de l'Eau
Rhin-Meuse
The French water agencies were set up in 1964 under the Water Act, and have been
at the heart of water policy in France for more than twenty years [12]. The coun-
try is divided in six major hydrographic basins (Seine-Normandie, Loire-Bretagne,
Adour-Garonne, Rhone-Mediterranee, Rhin-Meuse and Artois-Picardie). With 3.6
billion FF disbursed during the 6th strategic plan (1992-1996) and 164 employees,
the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse ranks 4th in terms of personnel and budget. Since
the new Water Act of January 3rd, 1992, the priorities of the water agencies are (1)
"to ensure compliance with new European directives relating mainly to the collection
and clean-up of domestic and industrial wastewater"; (2) "to guarantee adequate
water reserves to meet everone's needs"; and (3) "to engage, alongside the farming
community, in the control of pollution arising from agriculture.".
Although the agencies are under the authority of the Ministry of Environment
(Water Directorate), they have a particular status 26, which makes them an indepen-
dent legal body with a separate budget. The water agencies are governed by a board
of directors which includes about 20 representants from local governments, state ad-
ministrations, and users. A "water parliament" or River Basin Committee, gathering
about 200 representants, approves the propositions of the board of directors concern-
ing the operating procedures of the agency. Finally, each agency is controlled by a
local bureau of the Ministry of Environment (Regional Environment Office).
The missions of the agencies are the same as of any environmental funds - collect-
ing levies from polluters according to the Polluter Pays' Principle, and redistributing
them for environmental purposes as grants or soft loans. As such, the agencies col-
lect levies from households, enterprises and agriculturers 27, and they aggregate these
revenues before redistributing them. In that sense, the earmarking of revenues still
allows flexibility for redistribution. In addition to the financial support, the agencies
provide technical and training assistance and help financing environmental research
projects 28
The various agencies differ significantly in their operating procedures. More par-
ticularly, the disbursement policy varies between agencies like Agence de I'Eau Seine-
Normandie that gives a combination of soft loans and grants to enterprises, and others
like Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse that disburse only no-interest loans. These differ-
ences are the consequences of the various policies of the agencies' governing bodies.
The activity report of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse for 1995 [1] indicates that
levies collected from households reach 535 million FF, and 185 million FF for enter-
prises. For the Agence de l'Eau Seine-Normandie in 1994 [15], these figures become
respectively 2,416 and 364 million FF. With a redistribution of 3,615 million FF for
local governments and 432 million FF for enterprises for Seine-Normandie, it appears
that industry seems to receive a slight subsidy which is confirmed by figures from
other agencies. Therefore, the flexibility offered to agencies from the aggregation of
revenues, is commonly put into practice.
The operating cost of agencies can be estimated in different ways. The Agence
27 This category of users is not targeted by all agencies. For example, the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-
Meuse does not collect levies from agriculturers although they receive subsidies from the agency.
2 8The Agence de !'Eau Seine-Normandie gave 75 million FF in 1994 to finance research projects.
de l'Eau Seine-Normandie retains for example about 4% of collected levies for this
purpose. In the case of Rhin-Meuse, the ratio of the personnel expenses on the annual
budget for financial assistance, gives the same figure of 4%. Finally, the default rate
(non recovery of loans) of the agencies is close to zero in spite of a deliberate policy
of the agencies not to consider financial data from the enterprise before granting as-
sistance. These financial indicators are summed up in Table A.34.
Economic incentives of the French water basin agencies; current achieve-
ments and perspectives for the future
Levies are charged directly on the price of water and in relation to the amount of
pollution produced on an ordinary day in the month of maximum discharge. The
pollutants considered are: (1) MEST (suspended solids); (2) MOX (oxydable com-
pounds); (3) MI (toxic substances); (4) Salt; (5) Phosphore; (6) Azote; (7) Metals;
and (8) AOX (organochlorines). The calculation of the levies comes from the dif-
ference between the initial pollution load (before treatment) and the final one (after
treatment). Refinements include a bonus based on the successful operation of the
water treatment plant in the past, a geographical coefficient reflecting the natural
sensitivity of the area, and the presence of fugitive emissions. The monitoring is
implemented through regular measurement campaigns, but the enforcement is the
responsibility of another administration 29
Within the organization of the agencies, the persons in charge of identifying
projects and following their implementation are called the ingenieurs charges d'affaires.
Specialized in a few industrial sectors, they constitute the contact point between the
agencies and enterprises and, as such, they play a critical role to influence pollution
abatement investment decisions. It happens that a "charge d'affaires", focuses on a
very specific industrial corporation and systematically provokes the installation of a
"T •he D tRIEs which are the local bureaus of the ministry of industry. The DRIREs and the water
basin agencies work in practice in close cooperation and share information concerning enterprises.
particular equipment in all enterprises in the area.
The level of financial assistance is calculated as a function of the type of pollutant
targeted, the type of technology, and the level of pollution abatement. Roughly, this
takes into consideration the economies of scale realized 30 On that basis, the Agence
de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse usually finances 75% of the total estimated cost through a no-
interest loan with a maturity of 11 years including one year of grace.
The selection of enterprises follows a procedure including the fact that the enter-
prise must (1) have contributed to the fund 31; (2) be located in an area previously
identified for non-compliance with the ambient water quality standards; (3) have
discharged pollutants identified for their negative health impacts; (4) propose the
implementation of a technology producing a significant pollution abatement. It is
important to notice that no financial nor economic criteria enter in this methodology.
The agency provides assistance to all enterprises regardless of their turnover or their
economic performance. Of course, an enterprise obviously about to go bankrupted
will however not be selected. In addition to this principle, the water agencies chose
not to finance projects with high economic returns (typically payback period of less
than 3 years) on the basis that enterprises should have no difficulty to find private cap-
ital for this type of investments. When projects trigger substantial economic benefits
although these may not justify a spontaneous self-investment on behalf of enterprises,
the agency may reduce the maturity of the loan (3 to 7 years).
It seems that the agency is focusing today more on assistance to local governments
rather than enterprises due to the high level of pollution abatement reached in the
past especially in large enterprises, although it has been reminded previously that
enterprises receive more assistance than what they contribute to the fund. A large
3 0The maximum loan as a function of the level of pollution abatement, is a continuous, linear by
parts, increasing curve with decreasing rates of return.
31 This excludes in particular all the enterprises that are connected to a Publicly-Owned Waste
Water Treatment Plant POWWTP.
proportion of the financial support is used for maintenance purposes while only a few
new industrial water treatment plants are built. On the contrary, the requirements of
the latest European water regulation, create many opportunities for pollution treat-
ment plant for local governments. In the future, the agencies plan to increasingly
target small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs). Large enterprises today are often
not paying any levies any longer and do not qualify to receive financial assistance
from the agencies.
Finally, the French environmental taxation system proved to be an effective eco-
nomic incentive for enterprises. In the case of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse
for example, a sudden increase of the levy for toxic substances used to treat wood,
forced, within a few years, all wood processing enterprises in the region, to install
equipements preventing leaks. Moreover, the bonus granted in case of a good oper-
ating of the treatment plant is significant enough to force good operating practices
in industry. However, a recent study [2] reported the following descrepancies: (1) for
conventional pollutants, the level of taxation is below the marginal cost of pollution
abatement; (2) enterprises complain about the unpredictability of the level of taxa-
tion; (3) the taxation level is not uniform geographically and among certain categories
of polluters; and (4) the monitoring campaign are not reliable enough.
The "Clean Technologies" component of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse
A specific line of credit (no. 130) of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse is dedicated
to the financing of Clean Technology projects. In 1995, this line of credit represented
32% of the total investment of the agency for industrial pollution abatement purposes.
The definition of a clean technology adopted by the agency is "any internal operation
performed by the enterprise itself, to manage water, by-products, and wastes, as well
as any operation dealing with the process which has a positive impact on the level of
pollution" [3].
A move toward the financing of clean technology projects has been initiated since
a few years under the pressure of the Ministry of Environment. This tendency is con-
firmed by the existence of many clean technology publications presenting case studies
and success stories.
However, the policy of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse toward clean technologies
may restrict the choice of this technological alternative. Firstly, the agency refuses
to finance process modifications with substantial economic benefits, considering that
enterprises do not need support in that particular case. Secondly, clean technology
projects that have positive economic returns but not enough to justify self invest-
ment, receive loans with shorter maturity. Finally, the amount of financial assistance
is calculated using the marginal abatement cost of a new waste water treatment plant.
This last issue gives however an extra-incentive to develop technologies with better
cost-effectiveness than the end-of-pipe equipements.
The Agence de I'Eau Rhin-Meuse also included innovative technologies in its ty-
pology. However, the agency rarely encourages enterprises to engage in an uncertain
technology and considers that the technological risk must be perfectly mastered by
companies. Nevertheless, the agency can finance studies and pilot projects. In prac-
tice, there is no example of technology categorized as innovative, that were financed
during the 6th program. In that sense, the technological policy of the agency is more
toward the promotion of diffusion of technologies rather than innovation.
The identification of potential technological changes within the enterprise is not
done through a formal technical options' assessment. However, the agency may fi-
nance preliminary studies to assess the feasibility of implementing a new technology.
Recently, the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse started to include a multimedia approach
in its selection methodology. Projects have been financed, that controlled air pollu-
tion for which toxic particulates could potentially fall on the ground and cause water
pollution in the entreprise's neighborhood. This multimedia approach would however
not be applicable to the emission of S02 in spite of the risk of acid rains.
Finally, industries tend to define the role of the water agencies as technological and
financial partners. Agencies are seen as a technical referential, and the demand for
technical consulting and monitoring is increasing, especially in small and middle-sized
enterprises [2]. The role of proactive "charges d'affaires" being aware of new technical
states of the art, may be essential to promote the diffusion of clean technologies.
3.2.2 Transition economies: Eastern Europe's national en-
vironmental funds; design of revolving funds by Eu-
ropean multilateral institutions
A typical Eastern Europe NEF: the Polish National Environmental Fund
As previously mentioned at section 3.2., the NEF model has been widely used in
transition economies 32. The Polish fund has been one of the first NEF created 33
and is similar in many aspects to the other funds that have been established since
1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. However, a significant difference is the fact that
the Polish NEF has an independent status as opposed to the other NEFs which are
based within the administrative structure of the respective ministry of environment.
Moreover, the Polish fund is one of the largest with revenues in 1993 achieving 284
million USD and accounting in 1994 for 58% of total national environmental expen-
ditures [25].
The management of the Polish fund includes a supervisory board for project ex-
ceeding 225,000 USD 34. This board also plays an advisory role and offers an op-
portunity for public participation in decision making through membership in the
32See table A.10.
33It was created in 1989.
34Project under 225,000 USD can be funded as a decision of fund directors.
supervisory board. The administration of the fund involved in 1993 a total of about
one hundred full-time staff. Although the fund is independent, the basis of long-term
spending strategies is directly related to the Polish national environmental policy.
Resources of the fund include foreign aid from bilateral and multilateral institu-
tions, as well as pollution levies collected from enterprises. In 1993, this last category
of resources included (1) air emission charges; (2) wastewater charges; (3) water use
charges; and (4) waste charges. The source of revenues differ significantly for NEFs
in other transition economies, which are financed in part by other type of levies (e.g.
fuel taxes in Hungary), user charges (e.g. import tax on used cars in Bulgaria), pol-
lution fines, or even from the state budget (e.g. Slovak republic).
The disbursement strategy was made in 1993 essentially as soft loans (accounting
for 77% of the total expenditures), grants (17%) and interest subsidies (6%). As all
other funds in Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish fund is comprehensive. The
repartition among the various media was in 1993: 47% for air, 35% for water, and
(18%) for soil, nature protection, monitoring, education and emergencies.
The PHARE strategy for the environment in transition economies
The PHARE program is a European Union initiative which "supports the develop-
ment of a larger democratic family of nations within a prosperous and stable Europe"
[111]. It aims at helping the countries of central and eastern Europe rejoin the main-
stream of European development and build closer political and economic ties with
the European Union.
PHARE provides grant assistance to countries to support the process of economic
transformation. In its first five years of operation to 1994, 4,284 million ECU have
been made available to 11 partner countries. In addition to the financial support
which acts as a catalyst by stimulating investment and responding to needs that can-
not be met by others, Phare provides know-how from a wide range of non-commercial,
public and private organizations to its partner countries.
Between 1990 and 1994, Phare financed several hundred environmental projects
accounting for 337 million ECU (almost 10% of the total Phare budget for that pe-
riod) in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. It is estimated that the need to substan-
tially raise the quality of the environment in Central and Eastern Europe, reaches
300 billion USD over the next 15 years. Gradual long-term approaches are being
implemented with a focus on (1) cleaning of contamination inherited from the former
communist period; (2) introducing cleaner and environmentally sustainable practices;
and (3) harmonising environmental policies and specific legislation.
To meet the financing challenge and to be able to act as a catalyst for green financ-
ing, the PHARE program relies heavily on existing NEFs to channel its own grants.
For example, the 1991 pan-European Environmental Ministers conference in Dobris
has adopted a European-wide environmental strategy with a particular focus on capi-
tal investments in areas with high pollution levels. Such a strategy acknowledged that
new financing mechanisms such as Environmental funds should be developed to raise
more money and to channel funds more cost-effectively [111]. Phare's new strategy
defined in 1995 focuses on developing environmental financing especially in (1) facili-
tating the development of new financing instruments with an emphasis on the private
sector; (2) supporting the development of key financing institutions such as EcoFunds;
and (3) using Phare grants to unblock harder government, IFI or commercial funds
on otherwise too risky environmental projects. This implies the cofinancing of en-
vironmental investments - either as revolving credit schemes or the most traditional
cofinancing of capital investments - and the development of environmental financing
institutions. In addition, innovative financing mechanisms such as green equity of
environmental credit schemes for industry should receive financial and institutional
strengthening support [137].
In the case of Poland, the Phare strategy has identified critical focal points for fu-
ture environmental initiatives, namely major capital investments in water treatments
and in the improvement of air quality, in institutional strengthening, the raising of
awareness, in training, and clean technologies. For this purpose, major support should
be provided for enforcement agencies and for new agencies such as the National Fund.
Recently (November 1995), the Phare management Committe has approved a sup-
plement of 18 million ECU for environmental purposes (essentially capacity building
35) to be implemented by the Polish NEF [91].
Finally, the Phare action plan to the year 2000 includes (1) ongoing support for the
establishment and augmentation of environmental funds and eco-banks, as these or-
ganizations offer the greatest opportunity of boosting the financial resources available
to the environmental sector; (2) further support to widen the environmental revenue
base and to improve revenue collection systems; and (3) support for new financing
mechanisms in the environment, such as revolving credits in local commercial banks
which will supply soft loans for micro-environmental projects. In addition, training
activities will concentrate in the future specifically on the new environmental institu-
tions such as NEFs and eco-banks.
In conclusion, the whole strategy of the Phare program has fully acknowledged
that the channelling of implementation through national environmental funds "raises
efficiency levels and the rates of return on environmental investments through more
extensive and effective coordination, planning, specialization and improved economies
of scales" [111].
35The project includes demonstration projects for regional waste management, establishing a na-
tional cleaner technology center, protecting biodiversity in a national park, waste treatment projects
in selected sectors, protective measures against traffic noise and constructing a maritime waste treat-
ment complex.
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The case of Romania illustrates the rationale which leads development banks to pre-
fer credit line schemes to the use of an existing fund. Romania had in 1994 several
extra-budgetary (i.e. with earmarked revenues) funds: a research and development
fund (dedicated to scientific research, financed by 1 per cent of enterprise after-tax
profits), an education fund (for educational materials, financed by fees on foreign stu-
dents), an health fund (financed by social insurance contributions), a border controls
fund (for infrastructures, financed by border collections), an energy systems fund (for
capital construction, financed by tax on electricity and heat), a public roads fund
(for material and construction, financed by a 5 per cent tax on fossil fuels), a water
fund (for infrastructures, financed by 5 per cent of water supply), etc. Following this
tradition for public funds, the creation of an environmental fund was debated in 1995
by the Parliament of Romania ([25]).
At the end of 1995, the EBRD investigated what would be an optimal design for
an energy conservation financing scheme. This was motivated by the existence in Ro-
mania of a market failure for energy efficiency investments, as financing resources were
lacking for technically feasible and financially attractive energy efficiency projects in
enterprises with solid financial footing. The EBRD investigated particularly options
involving the creation of a fund or the use of an existing fund, versus the use of a
credit line approach.
The conclusion of the study emphasized the superiority of the credit line approach
in partnership with a local bank, compared to the use of a fund that would be man-
aged by the Ministry of Industry which was the logical partner. As previously stated,
there exist in Romania a fund dedicated to energy investments, the Specific Fund for
the Development of Energy Systems (SFDES) created in 1994. SFEDES is managed
by a department of the Ministry of Industry's Office of Economic reform, Industrial
restructuring and International Relations (ARCE), whose role is to co-ordinate energy
The EBRD approach in Romania
efficiency actions in all sectors of the economy and, through technical and financial
support, to develop and implement programs encouraging energy efficiency. As a
consequence, ARCE's competencies tend to be more technical rather than financial.
With a regional network, its knowledge of end-users, and its technical skills, ARCE
is a unique example in Central and Eastern Europe, of a specific agency dedicated to
energy efficiency.
The current disbursement strategy of the SFDES is grants to medium size in-
dustrial enterprises for energy efficiency investments. Supplied by a 12% tax on all
electricity revenues and 3% on heat revenues, the fund size was estimated in 1995 to
1 billion lei (500,000 USD), and was considering a pipeline of 12 projects. During
the period 1991-1993, a prior version of SFDES, which was also managed by ARCE,
disbursed 500 million lei on 25 projects. Grants covered on average 30% of the total
investment with the recipient firm covering the remaining 70%.
The rationale for choosing the credit line approach with a local commercial bank
clearly shows that the EBRD made a tradeoff between financial and technical com-
petence. While ARCE had a strong technical expertise but few financial competence
due in particular to the choice of a grant strategy, the local bank on the contrary
was familiar with credit, thus improving the speed of implementation and reducing
the financial risk, but had only little familiarity with the Romanian industrial sec-
tor and with the assessment of the profitability and the validity of energy efficiency
investments. The choice of the credit line approach was in fact obvious given the
methodology which has been used: 65% of the criteria considered were related to the
financial performance, 23% to the internal management and the ease of implementa-
tion, and only 12% to the technical competence.
3.2.3 A developing country: China's Environmental Pro-
tection Bureaus' funds and the World Bank strategy
to establish revolving funds
The Environmental Protection Bureaus' funds
Local governmental institutions involved in environmental protection are organized in
China in hierarchical lines at the various decentralized levels (provincial, municipal,
district/county). In addition to the environmental divisions affiliated to local indus-
trial bureaus under the authority of the industry ministries (e.g. ministry of chemical
industry), three hierarchical lines can be identified: (1) under the National People's
Congress, and related to the local People's Congresses; (2) under the Environmen-
tal Protection Commission (EPC) of the State Council; and (3) under the National
Environmental Protection Agency with provincial, municipal and district/county En-
vironmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs).
The function of EPBs is to implement national and local environmental regula-
tory programs and to enforce environmental laws and regulations. As described in a
1982 State Council regulation 36, EPBs have the responsibility of collecting pollutant
discharge fees for industrial waste gas, waste water, and industrial solid waste, and
to earmark them to subsidize pollution abatement at industrial enterprises that have
paid the fees. This program has been a major source of funding for pollution control.
Sub-provincial level EPBs have the responsibility to collect fees from enterprises
and to prepare a plan for the use of revenues. The local Finance Bureau at the corre-
sponding EPB's level is then responsible to examine and approve this plan. Usually,
the fund itself is managed by a local branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank.
The bank is in charge of disbursement and recovery of loans. If necessary, the bank
is also authorized to impose a fine in case of mis-use of loans or late repayment. As
36 The Provisional Meuasures for Collecting the Poiiutant Discharge Fee (State Council, 1982).
subsidies from the fund usually represent only a small portion of the total investment,
a close partnership between enterprises, local banks and the fund allows to raise ad-
ditional resources.
The pollution levy system in China is a noncompliance penalty system implying
that fees are over-standard fees. It has been designed with the dual purpose of an eco-
nomic incentive for industrial enterprises to meet the standards and to raise revenues
for pollution control and self-construction of NEPA's environmental institutional net-
work. Several discrepancies of the Chinese levy system have been noted in previous
studies. These include: (1) the fact that discharge standards are only concentration-
based and therefore do not limit quantities of pollutants discharged; (2) the fact that
fees are much lower than the marginal costs of operating and maintaining treatment
facilities; (3) their limitation to the pollutant that exceeds the standard by the great-
est amount; and (4) their main focus on state-owned enterprises relative to their
share in total industrial output. In practice, there seems to be a high default rate for
payment of levies and a large proportion is paid by a few top polluters 3. According
to the 1982 legislation, EPBs keep 20 percent of the total amount of fees collected,
plus the totality of the fines 38, to finance their operating expenses (environmental
monitoring, research, training, and awards). As reported by Spofford, Ma, Zou and
Smith ([1221)in the case of Jinan municipalities, this resulted in a very significant
increase of the ratio of penalties to total fee collected since 1991 (in 1993, EPB's
self-construction resources exceeded resources for the fund) while the part dedicated
to the fund increased slowly.
A typical order of magnitude for a municipal EPB's fund ranges from one to ten
371In the case of Yunnan province in 1994 for example, it has been reported that the top 2%
polluters pay about 40% of all levies collected and that globally, enterprises pay only about half of
what the regulation stipulate. In Liaoning, contribution from the top 100 polluters reaches 75% of
the total fees collected (1994).
38 Fines include (1) continuous noncompliance with the effluent and emission standards (beginning
in the third year); (2) shutting down an existing treatment facility without EPB's permission; (3)
charge for late payment; and (4) illegal discharges (Spofford, Ma, Zou and Smith, [122]).
million yuan, whereas the total amount collected from discharge fees at the provincial
level exceeds one hundred million yuan 39. Resources are then used as grants or loan
to finance industrial pollution abatement.
Enterprises eligible to the fund are indicated in the EPBs annual disbursement
plan. Almost exclusively state-owned and chosen among contributors to the fund,
this lack of flexibility may reduce the cost-effectiveness of resource allocation. Theo-
retically, they should be chosen among the main polluters; in practice, the choice of
eligible companies has been reported to be influenced by political matters ([122]). The
ratio of self-raised funds plays also a determinant role in the selection of candidates
(a ratio of 40% is required and 60% preferred). The program seems to emphasize
more on pollution control rather than pollution prevention.
Before 1990, subsidies consisted exclusively of grants until a 1988 State Coun-
cil regulation 40 was promulgated. The new regulation required a 20 to 30% use
of EPBs' funds for loans for pollution control. In 1996, loans were reported to be
far more common than grants in EPBs' disbursement schemes ([122]). However, if
the enterprise can prove that it has financial difficulties, exemption from repayment
may be allowed. In practice, Spofford, Ma, Zhou and Smith reported in the case of
Jinan municipalities a default rate of about one third. A main explanation seems
to be the resistance of the industries to borrowing for what used to be free. Ex-
perimental programs where 100 percent of the part of the levies has been turned to
loans are currently been running in several municipalities 41. Financial parameters
such as interest rates, maturity and grace period are still undefined in the new pol-
icy (a fund in Tianjin municipality has been reported to apply an interest rate of 4%).
Nevertheless, the number of projects funded under EPBs' funds is significant, as
39Spofford, Ma, Zhou and Smith report a total of 30 million yuan in 1994 for the city of Jinan,
capital of Shandong province.
40 Temporary methodology for repayable use of the pollution levy fund (State council, 1988).
41Shenyan and Dandon in Liaoning province for example.
42Liaoning Environment Project, 1994.
well as the global environmental impact. A World Bank's appraisal document 42
reports for instance that in Liaoning province, during the 1986-1990 period, about
6,616 industrial pollution control projects were supported by such funds, accounting
for about 42 percent of the total investment. Projects completed increased the an-
nual industrial waste water treatment capacity by 104 million m3, waste gas emission
treatment by 70.6 billion m3 and solid waste treatment by 2.8 million tons.
Additional operating features have been reported such as the use of earmarked
levies for non-industrial environmental purposes (roads, municipal waste water treat-
ment plants), the poor enforcement in case of late payment of effluent fees, or the use
of self-construction resources to pay for staff salaries and bonuses.
The World Bank's externally-supported industrial pollution revolving funds
in China
There exist at least nine of such funds that have been established in China by the
World Bank since 1990 and two others were under preparation in 1996. These funds
differ in their design characteristics and interact differently with the existing EPBs'
funds. Distinctive features about these funds are described hereafter on the basis of
the official World Bank project documents:
* Changzhou and Shashi
These two funds were established under an IDA Medium-Sized Cities Devel-
opment Project which intended to assist three beneficiary cities "to improve
overall and sector planning and management, formulate and implement policies
that better utilize existing facilities, reduce waste in the design of new invest-
ments, provide more appropriate financing mechanisms for local development,
The pollution control component associates a 7.2 million USD line of credit to
finance purchases of pollution control equipment by industrial enterprises with
the establishment of a revolving fund in Changzhou and the expansion of an
existing one in Shashi.
Funds are administered in the two cities by municipal governments who dele-
gated their authority to the local EPBs and Finance Bureaus. Technical ap-
praisal of projects is performed by the local EPB on the basis of least-cost
criteria. Local Finance Bureaus determine the terms of loans but the financial
appraisal - which focuses on the borrowers' ability to reimburse the sub-loans,
is performed by the local branch of the People's Construction Bank of China
(PCBC)..
The Bank Group line of credit was designed to cover between 40% and 80%
of the total cost of each subproject. Sub-loans exceeding 500,000 USD were
to be reviewed by the World Bank. Municipal governments were expected to
finance under grants up to 20% and on average 10% of the total cost. The fund
itself draw its resources from (1) at least 25% of the total effluent fees collected
by municipal EPBs; (2) interest and principal repayment on its loans; and (3)
liquid reserves and returns on these.
The design of these two earliest funds has mainly focused on financial proce-
dures and made little mention of the types of projects to be financed and of
enterprises that are eligible. Implementation followed the design of existing
EPB's funds with similar attributions of roles to the EPB, the Finance Bureau
and the local bank managing the fund. Supervision missions reported the diffi-
culties of repayment of loans.
and promote water pollution control at the industrial enterprise level".
* Tianjin
The Tianjin fund was a component of an IDA Urban Development and Environ-
ment Project which aimed at "helping industrial enterprises undertake waste
minimization or other cost-effective pollution reduction measures" by establish-
ing a "sustainable, market-oriented mechanism for industrial pollution control".
Bank's contribution to the project reaches 19 million USD. Counterpart re-
sources came from at least 40% of pollution levies and reflows from its loans.
At the time of its appraisal, the fund was expected to grow at the rate of more
than 15% a year and support over 100 million USD in total investment during
the period 1992 and 2000.
The Tianjin fund is managed by an autonomous entity governed by a seven
members' board (three nominated by the EPB; two by the local Economic
Commission; and two by the Finance Bureau). The day-to-day management
was scheduled to be handled by a full-time office of 25 staff members. The local
branch of PCBC has been chosen as the agent bank to handle actual disburse-
ment and assist in financial and economic appraisal of projects.
Projects to be selected include financially viable investments as well as pollution
abatement from existing plants. The fund was to focus on "waste minimization
measures, modification of or addition to existing industrial plants to reduce or
re-use the wastes generated during the production processes". To achieve this,
projects are to be ranked on the basis of the cost-effectiveness in pollution re-
duction using an equiscalar pollution load index 43
43The ranking system adopted by most of the World Bank-supported revolving funds in China is
based on a formula similar to the one that had been discussed at subsection 2.3.3.: the eauiscalar
concentration-based indicator is multiplied by a weighted quantity of waste water or gaz discharged,
The disbursement strategy is primarily market-rate loans with a small part in
grant (up to 30%, on average 10%). The fund can finance between 35% and
90% of the total cost of projects. Loans' maturity ranges from 3 to 7 years,
including 1 to 2 years of grace. Projects should be small scale (up to 3 million
USD).
The Tianjin fund has been the largest of this kind established in China un-
der World Bank assistance. His focus on waste minimization and on selection
procedures has to be emphasized. However, although capturing a large part of
effluent fees, the relationship of the Tianjin fund with existing EPBs' funds is
unclear: the fund office is officially autonomous but there has been a significant
involvement of the EPB and the Finance Bureau in the project.
* Suzhou and Wuxi
These two funds are part of an IBRD Environmental Protection Project in
Southern Jiangsu. The project aims at supporting "high priority and cost effec-
tive pollution abatement investments as well as strengthening the institutional,
regulatory and environmental management capabilities of the local EPBs and
targeted project entities".
For this purpose, a World Bank's line of credit ( 199 million USD) was provided
to finance large scale (well above two million USD) pollution abatement subpro-
jects, as well as small scale and TVIEs projects. Two environmental revolving
funds were also set up by Suzhou and Wuxi municipal governments to chan-
nel their own funds and recycle repaid loans from the small scale sub-projects
divided by the difference between the initial investment and the annual economic benefits, and
multiplied by factors characterizing the location of the plant (population density, etc.).
(up to 500,000 USD) and the TVIE "4 ones (between one and two million USD).
An initial pipeline was designed to target projects with "both pollution reduc-
tion and improvements in operational efficiency through structural transforma-
tion to efficient and low polluting technologies, waste minimization/reuse, and
as appropriate, product upgrading". Emphasis was put on cost-effectiveness.
The management of these two funds is handled by a Project Management office
(PMO) responsible for the operations for the environmental revolving funds.
The PMO include representatives of four local governmental agencies (munici-
pal planning commission,municipal planning commission, municipal finance bu-
reau, municipal EPB, and of the local agent bank (China Investment Bank, CIB
Jiangsu Branch). CIB is in charge of the financial and economic appraisal of
projects an of disbursement/repayment of subloans. The technical appraisal
agent is the Nanjing Environmental Research Institute, an EPB-affiliated insti-
tution.
Selected enterprises should (1) be significant polluters; (2) have contributed to
the fund (through pollution levies); and (3) self-raise 10% to 30% of the total
investment. Projects should (1) comply with the municipal environmental ac-
tion plan; (2) relate to pollution prevention; and (3) reduce pollution enough
to allow compliance with effluent discharge standards.
Onlending interest rate is at the commercial level, with a maturity of 3 to 5
years, including 1 to 2 years of grace.
44 Town and Village's (owned) Industrial Entreprises by opposition to state-owned enterprises.
TVIEs are usually small and medium sized enterprises.
The design of these two funds was closely influenced by a line of credit for large
scale subprojects. An initial pipeline was extensively prepared and the main
actor for the management of the fund (CIB) was both in charge of the large
scale line of credit and for the fund. Interaction with existing EPB's fund is
slight (the proportion of effluent levies put into the fund is not defined) and the
management board is inter-agency rather than dominated by the EPB.
* Zhejiang
The Zhejiang fund as been established as a component of the Zhejiang multi-
cities development IDA project which was designed to "support improvements
in water supply, land development, environmental pollution control and traffic
management" in several municipalities in Zhejiang province. A 4.3 million USD
World Bank loan was proposed to establish a revolving fund as "a sustainable
mechanism to finance pollution control measures for small and medium-sized
industrial enterprises".
Resources of the fund also include a half million USD counterpart funding from
Zhejiang EPB. Additional sources of revenue include foreign grants and pol-
lution levies (Zhejiang provincial government allocates 20% of the total levies
collected during the first 3 years and 40% afterwards to the fund).
The fund is administered by an autonomous, non-profit organization hosted by
Zhejiang provincial EPB but the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC),
Zhejiang branch, is responsible for the financial, economic and technical ap-
praisal of subprojects. The technical appraisal is subcontracted to a local quali-
fied design/engineering institute. A board of directors from the provincial EPB,
the Planning and Economic Commission,and the Finance Bureau, is in charge
of defining operating rules for the fund and decide on the financing of subpro-
jects.
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Enterprises are submitting project proposals to local EPBs before transmitting
them to the fund. Selection is done on the basis of a comparative pollution load
index system (equiscalar, see subsection 2.3.2.) to evaluate the cost-effectiveness
of proposed pollution reduction projects. Environmental audits are conducted
during project implementation "to develop true economic measures of pollution
control".
Up to 30% of the total loan to subproject can be financed as grants from the
fund counterpart resources (on average 10%). A subloan can finance up to 80%
of the total cost of a subproject and are limited to i.5 million USD. The ma-
turity varies from three to five years, including two of grace period, and the
interest rate is set up at the commercial level.
Liaoning
The Liaoning fund is one component of a bigger IBRD project aiming at "sup-
porting a sustainable environmental setting for the long-term and social de-
velopment of the Province". The fund itself has been established to provide
"short-term finance for focused high environmental impact investments of in-
plant clean technology process change, supporting the core investments in air
and waste water management". Another purpose is to "reform and strengthen
the existing waste discharge fee management system institutionally, financially
and technically".
The fund's primary sources comprise of effluent fees (6 million yuan annually)
and of a 10 million USD input from the World Bank.
The fund is managed as an autonomous, non-profit organization. However, the
Management Office is established in the provincial EPB. A board of directors
gather five representants: three from the EPB, one from the finance commission
and one from the finance bureau. Primary reviewing of application is done by
EPBs while the financial appraisal, disbursement and repayment recollection
are handled by a local agent bank. Technical appraisal is prepared by local
engineering design institutes.
Projects are selected according to cost-effectiveness and financial viability. Pref-
erence is given to waste minimization measures by process change or renovation
or internal recycling.
Grants can constitute up to 30 percent of the total project cost, with an average
of 10 percent. Loans offer a commercial interest rate, a maturity of three to five
years with a maximum grace period of two years.
The Liaoning fund focuses on waste minimization and closely interact with an
existing EPB's fund. Managed by the EPB, although being autonomous by
statute, it was designed with of purpose of capacity building and institution
strengthening.
* Hubei
The Hubei fund is one component of the IBRD Hubei Urban Environmen-
tal Project designed "to improve environmental conditions and management in
Hubei province". For this purpose, an environmental pollution control fund has
been established "to finance high environmental impact investments in small
scale industry", as well as a line of credit for industrial pollution control "to
assist selected large-scale industrial enterprises to carry out works for pollution
abatement in order to comply with environmental regulations." The fund was
supported by a 5 mln USD loan and the line of credit by a 130 mln USD loan.
The fund is managed by a non-profit organization under the Hubei EPB. The
official purpose of establishing the fund is to "strengthen the existing Hubei
pollution prevention program with a technically, institutionally and financially
sustainable mechanism". The board of directors includes five members from
the EPB, the Planning Commission, and the Finance bureau.
Financial appraisal is handled within FMO while the technical relies on industry-
specific consultants. A local Bank is in charge of managing the fund account,
disbursing and collecting reimbursement of subloans to enterprises.
Subloans characteristics include a maturity of three to five years with two years
grace, a commercial interest rate and a maximum amount of 1 mln USD. The
fund can finance up to 50 percent of the total project cost.
Selection of subprojects should emphasize on waste minimization measures,
modification or renovation to existing plants "to reduce waste outputs or to re-
cycle waste generated during production". The bank ex ante review is requested
for the three first subprojects only, while the next ones are only reviewed ex-
post. Selection of candidate enterprises should give preference to significant
contributors to the provincial pollution load.
Yunnan
The fund is part of a phased IDA development program of Yunnan Province
to improve environmental conditions and sustain urban services management.
The principal objective of the project is "to provide a sustainable environ-
mental framework for the long term economic and social development of the
Province, while providing a conducive foundation for industrial growth." More
specifically, the industrial pollution control component was designed to abate
industrial pollution from enterprises threatening -Dianchi Lake basin resources.
Two fertilizer plants were targeted with direct financing to a waste minimiza-
tion program based on process change and renovation. In addition, a 10 million
USD (half of it financially supported by the World Bank) was designed to abate
pollution from lower-ranked enterprises requiring smaller investments. Chinese
counterpart contribution to the fund should not be less than 14 million yuan
per year during three years and can come from pollution levies.
The fund is operated by a government facility but with segregated accounting
and special operating procedures. The fund is administered by the Yunnan Fi-
nance Bureau on the basis of operating procedures designed by the provincial
EPB. A Fund Management Office (FMO) is in charge of the day-to day manage-
ment (project planning, review of feasibility, financial appraisal and supervision
of implementation). Local EPBs are in charge of the primary review of appli-
cations with a focus on technical feasibility and environmental performance.
Selection of projects should focus on "waste minimization measures, modifi-
cations or renovations to existing plants to reduce waste outputs, or to recycle
waste during production". Financial viability of enterprises and a focus on least
cost options is also emphasized.
Loans cannot exceed half a million USD and 50% of the total project cost. Ma-
turity are from three to five years, with up to two years of grace, at a commercial
interest rate. Ex-ante review is done by the Bank for the first three projects
and for every subloan exceeding 300,000 USD.
The Yunnan fund focused on waste minimization and on water pollution. It is
independent from EPB's funds, although its resources rely probably highly on
pollution levies, and is mainly handled by the provincial Finance Bureau.
* Xiaoqing and Yantai
These two funds were still under preparation in 1996. In Mid-1996, a pre-
appraisal World Bank mission decided to cancel the Yantai fund due to the lack
of counterpart Chinese funding. Both funds were to be designed under the same
following pattern and are subcomponents of the IBRD Shandong Environment
Project.
Fund's resources include a 5 mln USD IBRD loan and an equal local contri-
bution from pollution levies. The fund is managed by a self-accounting gov-
ernment facility within the provincial EPB. Financial appraisal is handled by a
local branch of the China Investment Bank while the Fund Management Office
is in charge of the project planning and supervision as well as of the technical
appraisal after consultation of industry-specific experts.
Subproject' selection focuses on small-scale industrial enterprises to "control
pollution through waste minimization measures, modification or renovation to
existing plants to reduce waste outputs, clean technology, or recycling waste
generated during production." Selection is handled through the local industrial
bureau, planning commission and EPB. The subproject feasibility study is done
with EPB and planning commission concurrence and includes a waste minimiza-
tion audit, a financial assessment and an environmental impact assessment.
Subloans are limited to 50 percent of total project cost, and shall not exceed
1 mln USD. The maturity is three to five years with up to two years of grace,
and the interest rate is fixed at the commercial level.
The subproject cycle includes a project implementation assessment which should
compare achievements with results from the audit, and focus in particular on
the no- and low cost options implementation.
3.3 Identification of Probable Factors Affecting
Success and Methodology for Evaluating the
Three Venues
On the basis of previous examples, a typology of probable factors affecting success is
proposed. Factors are separated in (1) institutional factors related to the management
of the fund; (2) sub-project management factors related to the strategy for choosing
projects and the technical assistance that is provided; and (3) financial factors related
to the type of financial assistance offered to enterprises. A methodology for evaluation
explains how these factors are taken into account in the next chapter for assessing the
operation of the three venues. It is also applied to assess design characteristics from
the previous models.
3.3.1 Design parameters
Previous examples have illustrated the variety of NEFs and externally-supported re-
volving funds. Various design parameters have been presented as an illustration of
section 3.1. Design parameters are characteristics of a fund that have been deter-
mined before the fund started to operate. Following is an attempt to classify these
potential factors for success.
Institutional factors
Institutional factors are design parameters that describe the type of institution which
is managing the fund. A primary institutional factor is related to the relationship of
the fund with governmental institutions. This is justified by the fact that a govern-
mental status can improve the legitimacy of the fund but on the other hand, increase
the risk of bureaucratic management. The double feature of a NEF (environmental
and financial) explains why the NEF's core management can be chosen to be handled
either by a financial institution (e.g. a local bank) or an environmental institution
(e.g. an Environmental Protection Bureau).The core institution (i.e. the Fund Man-
agement Office) may be only in charge of the supervision and the global management
of subprojects, and it may subcontract specific tasks such as the technical or finan-
cial appraisals to external institutions, or on the contrary, it may choose to develop
in-house these various fields of expertise.
* Official status of the fund: Funds can be either (1) governmental entities, (2)
autonomous but strongly related to a governmental institution, (3) independent
and non-profit, or (4) private.
* Institutional origin of the Fund Management Office (FMO): The day-to-day man-
agement of the fund may (1) be handled by a dominant environment-related
institution; (2) gather both environmental and financial expertise; or (3) be
under the supervision of a financial institution.
* Role of the FMO: (1) Only in charge of coordination and supervision (in par-
ticular to ensure consistency with environmental planning); (2) also in charge
of either financial or technical appraisal of subprojects; or (3) integrates all the
components of the subproject's cycle.
Sub-project management factors
A subproject is defined as an industrial pollution abatement subproject which is
financed by the fund. Subprojects can be identified by the enterprise itself before
applying for assistance to the fund, cooperatively negotiated between the fund and
the enterprise on the basis of the fund experience but without detailed field audit,
or rigorously identified by both the fund and the enterprise after a Technical Option
Analysis. During the implementation of a subproject, the fund may provide some
technical assistance to the enterprise. After the sub-project is completed, the fund
can monitor the environmental benefits and enforce the operation of the technical
im.pr ovement.
* Subproject identification: Projects funded by environmental funds can (1) come
directly from the enterprises application proposal; or (2) be identified cooper-
atively by both the Fund Management Office and the enterprise; or (3) be the
result of a technical options' assessment.
* Technical Assistance: The Fund management office (1) can or (2) not provide
an in-kind technical assistance to enterprises.
* Monitoring and Evaluation: The fund may (1) not evaluate the environmental
performance of a completed sub-project; (2) monitor the benefits but without
enforcing operation; and (3) monitor and enforce sub-projects operation.
Financial factors
Financial factors are describing the type of financial assistance that is provided by the
fund. A first important parameter is the size of the fund which is correlated to the
size and the number of subprojects that can be financed during a particular period
of time. The disbursement strategy may involve grants, soft loans (i.e. loans at an
interest rate below the market level) or a combination of grants and loans (which is
equivalent), or commercial loans. Last, the maturity of loans is an important indica-
tor of the lending strategy of the fund.
* Size of the fund: Depending on the nature of its sources of revenue, a fund may
have a relatively (1) small or (2) large size.
* Disbursement policy: Financial assistance could be provided as (1) grants; (2)
soft loans or a combination of loans and grants; and (3) commercial loans.
* Lending strategy: As most funds rely at least in part on loans, their design can
either focus on (1) long term loans; or (2) short-term, high profitability projects.
3.3.2 Operating indicators:
Once funds are in operation, several levels of assessment can be made on the basis of
financial indicators and a statistical study of the sub-projects that are funded. This
research focused mainly on a statistical processing of subprojects.
The first level concerns the global financial assessment of the fund. Indicators to
be considered are: (1) the annual management cost when available; (2) the annual
disbursement for sub-project financing; (3) the sources of revenue and in particular
the reimbursement cash flow. These figures allow to calculate (1) the default rate
which is the proportion of loans that are not reimbursed in time; (2) the undisbursed
ratio which is the amount of money undisbursed compared to the total size of the
fund; and (3) the transaction cost for which a proxy is the management cost divided
by the total amount of projects funded.
A second field for investigation is the technical characterization of subprojects.
The methodology described in section 2.1.1. and which included: (1) input substi-
tution options; (2) process changes; (3) waste recovery; (4) waste treatment; and (5)
product redesign, is primarily used to sort the various subprojects. This allows to
estimate a "Cleaner Production ratio" which represents the proportion of preventive
environmental approaches supported by the fund. A second dimension concerns the
part of the process which is being targeted: (1) primary process; (2) secondary pro-
cess; and (3) ancillary process. A third evaluation axis deals with the proportion of
(1) existing technologies that are financed (diffusion); versus the share of (2) new
technologies (innovation) supported.
A third level of assessment concerns the objectives of the fund. When the fund is
comprehensive, one of these indicators is the proportion of projects targeting a spe-
cific media (air, water, solid waste, noise). The industrial sector is another one which
allows to verify whether the fund is coherent with a local environmental plan identi-
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f~ing the prioritary polluters. Additional statistics concerning the type of enterprises
(size, type of ownership) are important to check if funds are limiting themselves to a
particular type of industries (SMEs or on the contrary large industrial groups).
Financial indicators are a fourth dimension for evaluation and are useful to estab-
lish correlation between the technical characterization of a subproject and its related
cost (it is often mentioned for example that "end-of-pipe" equipements tend to be
more expensive than cleaner production options). These include (1) the range of cost
of loans; (2) the proportion of grants; (3) the share of the loan compared to total
investment; (4) the maturity of loans; and (5) the interest rate.
The environmental impact should be yet another category of operating indicators
to be considered. However, difficulties raised by the aggregation of various classes of
pollutants, as it has been already discussed, prevent from making a global comparison
of the various venues. The equiscalar indicator previously mentioned was designed
to help establish a project pipeline in the case of the Chinese World Bank-supported
funds and cannot serve as a reliable quantitative indicator for environmental perfor-
mance. As a consequence, environmental comparison of the three venues will mainly
remain qualitative through this writing, essentially by comparing environmental ben-
efits for each subproject and all pollutants.
3.3.3 Methodology for evaluation
Evaluation of the design of funds
The previous subsection has identified nine design parameters that can be qualita-
tively determined. The short descriptions provided in subsection 3.2.3. for the various
funds, allow a ranking for each factor. The next subsection will present and propose
an interpretation of the results obtained when plotting each fund on an unidimen-
sional axis corresponding to a particular factor. In the case of the multiple Chinese
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funds, such a methodology illustrates what has been the World Bank strategy for
the design of the revolving funds and how these position themselves compared to the
original EPB model.
Evaluation of the operating of funds
Operating indicators have been previously described. Statistical results will be pre-
sented and discussed in the next chapter. Not all data nor complete information were
available for every fund. When possible, the following assessment was done for the
three dimensions of technologies previously described:
Typology of processes
The first dimension of the analysis concerns the type of process that is targeted
by the project. The methodology is similar to the Abernathy and Clark's tran-
silience matrix approach "4. However, here, the categorization involves three classes
of processes that are directly related to the degree of disruption of existing process
competence inside the firm: primary, secondary, and ancillary. As defined by Ashford
([61]), this terminology refines the concept of revolutionary innovation depending on
whether primary or secondary processes are targeted. Similarly to the Abernathy
and Clark's definition of disruption of existing competence, Ashford uses a criteria
measuring "how fundamental the process is in the manufacturing sequence for a par-
ticular product":
* primary processes "yields the basic functional form of the product such as form-
ing or casting a part from a material"
* secondary processes "might involve the application of a functional finish, such
"
5See [40] and figure B-29. The transilience matrix distinguishes two categories of innovation
depending on the degree of disruption of existing process competence inside the firm: regular versus
revolutionary.
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as noncorrosive or aesthetically pleasing finishes"
* ancillary processes are processes that do not affect the characteristics of the
product and that are usually less fundamental for the whole manufacturing
process. This includes for example the cleaning of a component prior to the
application of a finish.
This approach is motivated by the identification of rigidities or resistance to change
in one particular category of processes. It is expected that primary processes that
are often traditional and well-established, will be subjected to less process innovation,
and industry will be more resistant to changes. On the other hand, ancillary processes
can include the recovery of waste generated during primary and secondary processes,
by using closed-loop recycling. These usually relatively easy options are expected to
be dominantly observed.
Measuring ihnovation
In this research, the focus was exclusively on process innovation although, theo-
retically, product redesign may be an important part of an industrial strategy for the
environment. In practice, although product redesign projects could also be financed
by the agency, all projects that are funded belong to process innovation. This means
in particular that if we refer to the Abernathy and Clark map of innovation [40], the
domain of intervention of most funds covers the two lower quadrants, Regular and
Revolutionary innovations. However, along this axis of Technology/Production, three
different levels of innovation were distinguished, using the following definitions:
* grade "+"corresponds to any project concerning the implementation of a com-
monly adopted technology, including in the same industrial sector.
* grade "++" corresponds to any project concerning the implementation of a
commonly adopted technology in a new industrial sector, or the implementation
of several regular technologies for which the combination of these represented
an innovation (frequent when an environmental audit has been conducted).
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* grade "+++" corresponds to any truly innovative technology even if it is too
specific to be transfered to another industrial sector (usually the case for chem-
ical plants).
Under this terminology, the "+" grade should be rather seen as the diffusion of
well-known technologies. However, it was considered that for the internal manage-
ment of the plant itself (and not for the industry as a whole), the implementation
of such a technology was likely to be perceived as an incremental innovation. Sec-
ondly, the "++" level innovation gather in fact two different concepts: the innovative
trans-sectoral diffusion of a regular technology, and the innovative combination of
regular technologies. To a certain extent, was applied here the Henderson and Clark
definition of architectural innovation [89] to processes: the "core concept of existing
technologies" is kept the same but their combination in the whole process is being
changed. Lastly, the grade "+++" corresponds exactly to the Abernathy and Clark
definition of a revolutionary innovation.
Cleaner Production alternatives
As defined by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Cleaner
Production (CP) is "the continuous application of an integrated preventive environ-
mental strategy applied to processes, products, and services to increase eco-efficiency
and reduce risks to humans and the environment". This preventive environmental
approach has been introduced under various terms in statutes. For example, the U.S.
1990 Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) introduces the concept of pollution prevention
which is applied to any practice which -
(i) reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant en-
tering any waste stream or otherwise released into the environment (including fugitive
emissions) prior to recycling, treatment, or disposal; and (ii) reduces the hazards to




Based, on these definitions, this research adopted a "process-oriented" categoriza-
tion of technological choices, from the "substitution of inputs"and "process changes"
to options affecting outputs, namely "product redesign" and "waste recovery" alter-
natives. A "non-CP", reactive solution would on the contrary target exclusively the
treatment of waste, by following the so-called "end-of-pipe" approach. This typology
presents the advantage of not incorporating any innovation dimension as opposed
to other categorization used by UNEP or in the 1990 PPA, that mix all together
categories such as "new technologies" (i.e. radical innovation) and "good housekeep-
ing measures" (i.e. incremental innovations or diffusions), with "input substitution",
"process change" and "product redesign".
It is to be noted that the category of "product redesign" options could itself be
refined and that it could distinguish innovations concerning components from others
improving linkages, as introduced by Henderson and Clark [89]. However, as these
options turned to be almost never observed in the portfolio of the venue, and in order
to simplify, I chose to keep a single category for product innovation.
Finally, this categorization of options may be fruitfully interpreted by using the
Abernathy and Clark's transilience map [40]. Because "waste recovery" and "end-
of-pipe" options do not generally affect the process itself, such innovations should be
essentially interpreted as regular. On the other hand, most "process changes" and
"input substitution" options are likely to be located in the revolutionary quadrant.
"Product redesign" options can be either in the niche creation or the architectural
quadrants 46. This may have several consequences for the management of the firm:
"process change" and "input substitution" options may lead to the abandonment of
former technical approaches (and perhaps skills) - but also lead to new ones - while
"product redesign" ones may affect the existing market/customer relation of the en-
terprise. The Abernathy and Clark's paper talks about "the disruption of existing
46See B-29.
competence", although it should rather be understood in most cases as an extension
of existing knowledge. It is expected that resistance to change is going to appear for
these technological choices. This thesis keeps the Abernathy and Clark's terminology
but makes reservation to the choice of the negative concept "disruption of compe-
tence", when applied to technological improvements.
It is also very important to notice that two different interpretations of the Aber-
nathy and Clark transilience map are applied here: Firstly, the level of innovation was
measured as it would be done by an neutral observer considering the technology alone.
Secondly, the transilience map was used as the enterprise would do it, considering its
entire production process. For example, a truely innovative waste recovery option
ranked "+++" could be perceived as regular innovation by the enterprise because it
does not disrupt its existing technology/production competence.
3.3.4 Application to the design characteristics of the three
models
Results
The nine indicators are presented for the various funds in figures B-2, B-3, and B-4.
The assessment of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse is based on the description
that has been presented at subsection 3.2.1. The estimation of the various indicators
can be justified by the fact that the French water basin agencies are decentralized
governmental institutions with an autonomous budget. The management of projects
is entirely integrated; the agency acts as a financial body as well as a pool of technical
expertise. Although the agency provides technical assistance and monitor the imple-
mentation of technologies, the enforcement is done by another institution. Finally,
the disbursement policy focuses more on medium- to long-term no-interest loans and
the size of the agencies' funds can be considered as being large.
106
For the Central and Eastern Europe funds, figures B-2 to B-4 present the eval-
uation of the indicators for the Polish National Environmental Fund (Polish NEF)
and the Romanian Specific Fund for the Development of Energy Systems (Romanian
SFDES). This assessment is based on the presentation of these two venues made at
subsection 3.2.2.
The Polish NEF has an independent status although its operating strategy is re-
lated to the national environmental policy. It is a large environmental and financial
institution, which has integrated all expertise necessary to project management, and
it provides technical support to enterprises. Projects are identified cooperatively be-
tween the fund and enterprises, but, as the fund is autonomous, it does not have any
enforcing authority. Finally, the disbursement strategy is a combination of long-term
soft loans and grants.
The Romanian SFDES is a governmental institution (under the Ministry of In-
dustry) with a strong technical competence but less financial expertise. It handles all
stages of project management, identifies opportunities cooperatively with enterprises,
and provides recipients with technical assistance. However, the fund is very small
(less than one million USD) and the disbursement policy is grants.
For the Chinese funds, this qualitative evaluation is based on the individual de-
scriptions that have been presented at subsection 3.2.3. Relative estimations of the
various funds are justified by the following arguments:
* Status: The original EPB funds are obviously managed by a purely govern-
mental institution. Gradual distinctions from this model include (1) when the
Fund Management Office (FMO) is handled as a governmental institution with
no mention of autonomy but with separate accounting (Yunnan, Multicities,
Shandong); (2) when the FMO is mentioned to be autonomous (Hubei, Liaon-
ing, Tianjin) ; and (3) when a non-governmental actor is highly involved in
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the management of the fund (e.g. when the management board includes one
representant outside the administration from the local agent bank) (Jiangsiu,
Zhejiang).
" Institutional origin of the FMO: EPB funds are managed in large part by EPBs
under the supervision of the Finance Bureaus. Variations from this model in-
clude (1) when the FMO is exclusively hosted within the EPB but when the
management board gathers representants from other institutions (e.g. Finance
Bureau, Economic Commission) (Tianjin, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Hubei, Shan-
dong; (2) when the FMO itself includes staffs from various financial, technical
and environmental institutions (Multicities, Jiangsiu); and (3) when the FMO
is primarily established within a financial administration (Yunnan).
* Role of the FMO: The original EPB model let the EPB handle most of the
tasks related to project management even though the Finance Bureau also
plays a role. Externally-supported revolving funds either (1) specialize in the
global management and selection of candidate enterprises (Jiangsiu, Zhejiang,
Liaoning, Yunnan, Shandong); (2) also integrate financial or technical exper-
tise (Tianjin, Hubei); or (3) tend to integrate most of the tasks even if the local
agent bank and the Finance Bureau play a significant role for the financial tasks
(Multicities).
* Subproject identification: EPB funds rely heavily on the proposals that are
submitted by enterprises themselves. On the contrary, externally-supported re-
volving funds tend to move toward a cooperative identification of subprojects
catalyzed in part by the World Bank's reviewing of subprojects. In the case
of Zhejiang, an environmental audit is conducted during implementation to de-
velop in-house empirical expertise and improve the selection of subprojects. The
Shandong fund went even further by requiring a Technical Options' Assessment.
* Technical assistance: EPBs provide in kind technical assistance to enterprises
through affiliated Environmental Engineering Design or Research Institutes.
These institutions are also involved in all externally-supported funds. No addi-
tional assistance is scheduled in the design of revolving funds compared to EPB
funds. The involvement of World Bank technical experts in the supervision of
funds' operation suggests however a slight improvement in this domain.
" Monitoring and Evaluation: EPBs are also in charge of the enforcement of
environmental regulation which links together the funds' incentive policy, the
monitoring of environmental performance, and the enforcement to comply. Such
a situation also exists in the case of the Multicity funds. Some revolving funds
lost part of this performance evaluation of subprojects by weakening their re-
lationships with EPBs (Yunnan, Jiangsiu). Similarly but of less magnitude,
funds established in EPBs but with an autonomous status, may be less in-
volved than EPBs in the monitoring of the subprojects they finance (Hubei,
Zhejiang, Tianjin, Liaoning). On the contrary, the Shandong fund includes an
ex-post environmental audit with a certification procedure.
* Size of the fund: EPBs' funds usually are of the order of magnitude of a 2 to
4 million USD. World Bank's contribution to its externally-supported revolving
funds rank from 4-5 mln USD (Shandong, Jiangsiu, Yunnan, Hubei, Zhejiang,
Multicity), to 19 mln USD (Tianjin).
* Disbursement Policy: EPBs theoretically finance subprojects as grants or loans.
In practice, the recovery of loans is not satisfactory. Certain World Bank-
supported funds allow a varying percentage of grants (Liaoning, Zhejiang, Tian-
jin, Multicity). Others, only authorize disbursement under commercial loans
(Shandong, Yunnan, Hubei, Jiangsiu).
* Lending strategy Maturities of loans rank from long term loans for EPB funds
(enterprises can sometimes waive reimbursement), to the case of Tianjin with 3
to 7 years and all the other World Bank revolving funds with 3 to 5 years.
109
Discussion about the design of the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse
Although being decentralized and relatively independent from the "regular adminis-
tration", the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse, as well as the other water agencies, have
been obviously established in a public institutions' logic with the purpose of correcting
externalities. This is particularly illustrated by the management choice of financing
only projects that would not be naturally financed by the private sector because of
their low return on investment, and by the choice of not considering economic nor
financial criteria in the selection of candidate enterprises. Moreover, it is also con-
firmed by the disbursement policy through no-interest loans.
The agencies are also fully-integrated institutions performing the monitoring of
environmental quality, acting as technical consultants, and ensuring the financial man-
agement of funds. This monopolistic situation may penalize the emergence of private
environmental consulting firms in the country, but on the contrary, it contributed to
the quick emergence of a powerful pool of expertise at the local level with the financial
capability of assisting any environmentally-related projects related to the protection
of water resources. Surprisingly, the agencies do not seem to have many relationships
with the banking community, and they constitute a rather isolated financial entities.
On the contrary, successful partnership have been developed with research institu-
tions, industrial associations and other administrations.
Within the agencies' management, decisions concerning technical policy's orien-
tations are essentially located at two levels. The board of directors is firstly capable
of moving the agency's strategy toward extra incentives for innovative and preventive
approaches in industry. Secondly, the "ingenieurs charges d'affaire" are potentially
able to give themselves priorities in the management of their portfolio. The selection
of enterprises seems to follow a systematic and transparent methodology. On the con-
trary, the selection of technologies could be improved by a more systematic approach
involving either a technical option assessment or the management of an inter-agency
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database of technical alternatives. Overall, it seems that the agencies have ratio-
nalized their environmental strategy but not yet their management of technological
choice.
Discussion about the strategy for the World Bank-supported revolving
funds in China
The nine indicators that are considered allow to identify general tendencies of the
World Bank strategy to design revolving funds in China, as well as permissible vari-
ations within this global strategy.
It is firstly remarkable that the Bank seeks to move away from the purely environ-
mental and governmental model of EPB funds: the managing institution (the FMO)
has at least a separated accounting, is often autonomous, and the involvement of a
local bank in every issues related to the financial management of the fund, is most
of the time emphasized. This is associated with a change in the disbursement policy
toward short-term commercial loans, and in the institutional origin of the FMO in-
creasingly related to financial and economic institutions. Such a policy can be easily
justified by the will to improve the financial management of funds for which the policy
switch from a grant to a loan policy is frequently still to be implemented, with the
hope to catalyze a more private-oriented financing scheme. An increased involvement
of financial actors (local Finance Bureaus and local banks) is also a way for the World
Bank to reduce the risk of its investment. However, by moving away revolving funds
from the EPB funds' model, there is a risk to reduce the effective ability of these
demonstration models, to catalyze a change in the management of existing funds and
to promote capacity building of environmental institutions as it has been emphasized
in the SARs.
The double financial and environmental characteristics of national or externally-
supported environmental funds seems to result in a trade-off between the original
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EPB model - more focusing on the environmental side, with the in-house integration
of technical expertise and with a direct link with administrations in charge of mon-
itoring and enforcement -, and a more financially-oriented model specializing in the
coordination of subprojects and subcontracting specific tasks. In the first case, funds
are expected to perform better "environmentally", while the second model may offer
a better financial management. A lending policy that would intend to minimize the
financial risk would favor the second option. Moreover, the relatively small size 47
of the World Bank-supported Chinese funds confirms that this type of investment is
considered by the Bank to be relatively risky.
However, among the various funds that have been studied, several variations can
be identified:
* The Yunnan fund is the most extreme in terms of a move toward a more finan-
cial institution as it is primarily managed by the local Finance Bureau.
* The Shandong fund tries to improve significantly the selection and implemen-
tation of subprojects through an initial Technical Options' Assessment, and by
adding an ex-post environmental certification procedure.
* The Tianjin fund is distinctive by its larger size (four times other funds' sizes).
This characterization made, the study of funds' relative operating performances,
should help defining an optimal model for the design of externally-supported funds.
Comparison between the various venues
Figures B-2 to B-4 allow to identify similarities between the various funds and to
propose a convergence of the different models. Environmental funds, either designed
as part of a national policy or externally supported, all share the common feature
47They usually account for no more than a few percents of the total -cost of the development
projects they belong to.
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of providing technical assistance to enterprises. Thus, although the balance between
technical and financial expertise, differs significantly across the various funds, it seems
that an environmental fund can never be a purely financial institution, although it
could subcontract in part this technical competence.
The status of environmental funds varies significantly without being correlated to
the level of economic development of countries. However, funds managed by govern-
mental agencies should identify needs that cannot be fulfilled by private financing
institutions. This explains why the French water basin agencies only finance projects
with low returns on investments, with a long-term soft loans' strategy. On the con-
trary, World-Bank supported revolving funds in China are targeting projects with
substantial economic benefits that can be supported by short-term commercial loans.
Therefore, two very different strategies can be identified here: one is the World-
Bank and the EBRD's approach toward establishing more private-oriented, financial
institutions, in which financial resources are managed in a similar way as they would
be in a commercial bank. A main difference with a private financial institution,
is the importance given to technical assistance, although it could be progressively
charged to enterprises. Such an approach is likely to stimulate the emergence of pri-
vate capital for the environment, by correcting market failures that prevent profitable
environmental investments to happen. If technical assistance is progressively com-
mercialized, this may also encourage the development of private consulting companies
selling environmental audits and other environment-related services to industry. This
strategy can only be transitory, as these needs mainly exist in developing countries
and transition economies.
On the other hand, the case of France prove that when most market failures are
corrected by privatizations and economic development, there still remain large finan-
cial and technical needs in industry (especially SMEs as it will be discussed in the
next chapter). The disbursement policy then differ significantly from the private logic,
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with subsidies embodied in long-term soft loans, aiming at correcting externalities.
In addition, technical assistance remains a priority for such environmental funds.
The PHARE support to the Polish National Environmental Fund is following such
a logic by reinforcing this large financial institution which plays a key role in the fi-
nancing of environmental projects in Poland. If the Polish NEF structure is flexible
enough, it should be possible to progressively reorient its activities toward the cor-
rection of externalities, as private capital will emerge for profitable environmental
investments.
Therefore, it seems that a comprehensive strategy for the environment in develop-
ing countries should address both catalyzing the emergence of private capital for prof-
itable environmental investments through the establishment of externally-supported
revolving funds, in partnership with local banks, and assisting governmental envi-
ronmental funds in financing less profitable environmental investments in the most
cost-effective way (i.e. by adopting a loan strategy instead of a grant approach when
it is possible).
Chapter 5 will formulate such a strategy taking into account management differ-




Comparison of the Operation of
Three Different Models of Funds
In this chapter, projects financed by existing funds are assessed. The methodology
described in the previous chapter is used to evaluate the performance of these funds.
Among various indicators, the potential of these financial entities to promote CP and
technical innovation is particularly examined. A correlation between operation results
and design characteristics is established when relevant.
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4.1 Sources of Information and Research Meth-
ods
This section discusses the sources of information relied upon for this thesis (mainly
subloan.s' projects' documents or progress reports). Distinctions are made where ben-
efits are ez ante estimations or ex post measurements.
4.1.1 The French Water Basin Agencies
Description of sources
Documentation of the French water basin agency, Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse, was
collected during a visit to Metz (Eastern part of France) from March 23 to March 25.
The visit consisted of meetings with managers of the agency as well as a systematic
analysis of project documents.
The original basis for the research was a computerized list of projects funded by
the agency and categorized as Clean Technology projects. The period of time which
was considered corresponds to the "6th program" of the agency (1992-1996). This
list included 136 projects and specified for each of them whether the project had been
approved (1) by the board of directors lor (2) by the director of the agency 2, and
when the decision was taken. This information allowed to identify in the agency's
archives, the documents concerning each projects that had been submitted for ap-
proval either to the director or the board.
Typically, these documents include a one-page summary giving characteristics of
the project and a more detailed technical description of the technology. Most of the
information relevant for the purpose of this research were contained in this one-page
'The board meets four times a year to approve or reject project proposals submitted by the
agency.
2The director can approve a project under 300,000 FF. In practice, it happens that when a project
is litigious, even with a lower amount, the director prefers to submit the proposal to the board.
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summary. Technical documents were useful to identify the type of process (primary,
secondary, ancillary) and the CP option categories (process change, waste recovery
and input substitution). The level of innovation was then determined for each project
from an interview of the project manager who had been in charge of identifying and
implementing the technology.
Finally, a distinction was made in the original listing between regular projects and
"contract projects" which include several tranches and are usually signed with large
companies. Sixteen contract projects were referring to clean technologies.
Research Methodology
Out of the 136 projects of the original listing, only 118 could be identified in the board
and director's archives. From this new list were taken out 46 projects which all con-
sisted of the same technology for small wood processing enterprises. The technology
included civil works (roof and water proof floor) to prevent accidental pollution by
toxic substances used to treating wood. The choice of excluding it from the research
is justified by the fact that accidental pollution prevention does not belong to any
of the CP option considered in this thesis. Finally, a few projects (four) consisted
of end-of-pipe equipment and had to be taken out. The remaining 65 projects were
then considered for further analysis and are presented in tables A.41 to A.44.
For each project is specified (1) the industrial sector 3; (2) the size of the enter-
prise 4; (3) the process type; (4) the CP option category of the technology; (5) the
environmental benefits; (6) the level of innovation; (7) the amount of the loan; (8)
the percentage of the total project cost financed by the agency; and (9) the maturity
of the loan.
3 The name of the enterprise is a confidential information.
4 The criteria that were used is (1) a company is small when it employs less than 50 workers; (2)
iniddle-sized if 50 to 1,000 people are employed; and (3) large with over 1,000 employees.
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The level of innovation, which is the most qualitative criteria that was assessed,
was determined according to the following rule: (1) a technology receives a "+" if the
technology is well-known and commonly used in the industrial sector of the enter-
prise; (2) "++" corresponds to an incremental innovation, an innovative combination
of well-known technologies or the adaptation of a technology to a new industrial sec-
tor; and (3) finally, "+++" is exclusively used for a totally new technology (e.g. the
No Rinse process for surface treatment).
Finally, in order to be able to compare the distribution of costs of CP options to
end-of-pipe equipements, a cost distribution of end-of-pipe projects (categorized as
ouvrages de depollution) was obtained from the 1995 activity report of the Agence de
l'Eau Rhin-Meuse [3].
Discussion about the reliability of sources
Given the methodology previously described, information concerning the remaining
projects is thought to be highly reliable. The technical documents detailing each
technologies were precise enough to identify without ambiguity the process type and
the CP option category. The project manager who was interviewed to determine the
level of innovation is a senior agency engineer who was very familiar with each project.
4.1.2 The Polish National Environmental Fund
This research was initially planning to study the portfolio of technologies financed by
the Polish National Environmental Fund. For this purpose, interviews were conducted
with the Polish National Cleaner Production Center, a French consulting company
which has been involved in the design of financing mechanisms for the environment
in Central and Eastern Europe, the World Bank, and the European Commission.
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Results from these interviews do not allow to quantatively process data as it can
be done in the case of the Chinese and French venues. However, they are sufficient
to qualitatively estimate what may be the operating of the Polish fund. Given the
concurrence and the reliability of the various independent sources, this assessment,
although being incomplete, should be considered as being highly reliable.
4.1.3 The World Bank's revolving funds in China
Description of sources
Documentation of World Bank's externally-supported revolving funds in China was
collected during a visit to Washington D.C. from January the 13th to the 17th, 1997.
Seven project files were identified and examined in the World Bank's Asia Information
Service Center (AISC). Project files are kept in AISC till completion of projects, after
which, they are'moved to another department. All the projects that were studied are
still active, as the oldest one - the Medium-Sized Cities Development Project, will be
completed in June 1997. Project files are identified from their Credit Number (see
Table A.8).
Project files gather all information sent by the various World Bank's departments.
It is the responsibility of these departments to send a copy of each document related
to a particular project to AISC. In practice, AISC keeps a significant proportion of
this information, especially most of the standardized documents.
Documents are usually classified in three different types of binders:
* the Official Document binder (OD) which includes the Staff Appraisal report
(SAR), the Development Credit Agreement, the Project Agreement, the Negoti-
ations and the Statutory Committee Report
* the Project Report binder (PR) which includes the project reports and the fi-
nancial audit reports
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* the regular binders (chronologically numbered starting from one), which include
the preparation or supervision reports, the missions' Aide-Memoires, the pro-
curement documents of goods and works financed under the loan, and most of
the correspondence exchanged between the task manager and the borrower
The project file reflects the various stages of the project cycle as it has been de-
fined by the World Bank 5. The official documents provide information about the
rationale for the project and a detailed description of its various components. The
SAR provides a comprehensive review of all aspects of the project. Legal documents
(Development Credit Agreement and Project Agreement) describe respectively the
agreement signed between the borrower (the People's Republic of China) and the
World Bank (IDA or IBRD), or between the implementing institution (Tianjin mu-
nicipality for example) and the World Bank. Project reports and regular binders
provide information about the operation of the project in particular through the
Aide-Memoires of the supervision missions. Precise details of specific components of
the project can be found in the procurement documents that describe the technical
characteristics of goods purchased.
Research methodology
The choice of the seven prior projects was based on an original survey from the Asia
Technical Department (ASTEN) of the World Bank [136]. This list of revolving funds
established in China might not be exhaustive, but there do not seem to be additional
active World Bank-supported funds in this country. Completed projects were not
investigated.
In addition, ASTEN - in partnership with UNEP IE, is currently involved in
the design of a Cleaner Production revolving fund in Shandong province which is
5 See [60] for general information about the project cycle. Baum distinguishes six phases (iden-
tification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation and board approval, implementation and supervision,
evaluation). Appraisal - which is the Bank's responsibility, covers four major aspects of the project
(technical, institutional, economic, and financial). Evaluation is done during an ex post audit
by a separate department (the Operations Evaluation Department) to ensure independence and
objectivity.
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to be appraised in February 1997. Preparatory documents and mission reports were
collected from this eighth World Bank project in China that includes a revolving fund.
Several projects include more than one fund (see Table A.8). In that case, when
possible, documents collected were sorted according to the fund they were related to.
A total of eleven funds were ultimately considered including one which was finally
abandoned in June 1996 during the Pre-Appraisal mission (Yantai fund).
As the investigation was originally aiming at studying the operation of the funds,
regular binders were essentially examined after the date of the appraisal. In the case
of Hubei where the effective starting of the fund was substantially delayed after the
appraisal (corresponding to binder No. 11), only two binders (No.15 and 16) were
studied. On the other hand, the Tianjin fund which is the largest one and which has
been operated for a longer time than most of the others, was more carefully consid-
ered and every regular binder was examined. Table A.9 presents a summary of the
extent of the research.
All the documents related to the revolving fund component of each project were
then copied and archived. In the case of Suzhou and Wuxi, where a line of credit to
finance industrial pollution subprojects was also included, procurement documents
were collected in order to be able to make a comparison with this financial alterna-
tive. For the Hubei fund, no information was available concerning the operation of
the revolving fund; instead, documents describing the operation of a line of credit for
industrial pollution were collected. Results were presented in Section 2.3.3. of the
present study.
The official documents, as well as the preparatory reports, were particularly use-
ful for understanding, the design of these funds assessed in sections 3.2.3. and 3.3.3.
The survey of the operation of these funds was done by comparing the initial esti-
mations of projects eligible to be financed ( which are presented in most SARs and
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preparatory reports), with the subloans which were effectively disbursed. It is im-
portant to note that the pollution abatements resulting from a particular investment
are ex ante estimations from the project documents and that no quantitative ex post
measurements could be found in project files. Lastly, financial audit reports provided
information about the effective "revolving nature" of the fund and its financial effi-
ciency. Table A.10 indicates how each type of document was used in the present study.
Documentation collected
Table A.11 presents the documents that were collected in the project files. Mission's
Aide Memoires and Project Reports are identified by the trimester of their publica-
tion (and not by the month). This was particularly relevant for the quarterly progress
reports. Financial audits are published annually.
The number of documents missing for most projects except the Tianjin one jus-
tified the choice of this fund for a more detailed financial analysis. In addition to
these standardized documents, correspondence exchanged between the Bank and the
Chinese counterpart, provided extra information about operation, and replaced to a
certain extent the missing of reports. Financial audits are usually made for several
components of the whole project except for the Tianjin fund where financial reports
are exclusively dedicated to the revolving fund component.
Discussion about the reliability of sources
The high proportion of missing documents could have implied an impossibility to
make an accounting analysis of financial operations. This is true for all funds except
the Tianjin one for which the two first years of operation (1994-1995) could be de-
duced from three different sources: (1) the annual financial audit of the fund; (2) the
quarterly project reports that notice most financial operations; and (3) missions' aide
memoires. However, the missing third project report from 1995 required an extrapo-
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lation as it will be discussed below. Due to the multiplicity of independent sources,
financial data should be highly reliable.
The technical description of projects was detailed in only a very few cases (es-
sentially for the Southern Jiangsiu project). Moreover, the misuse of standard en-
vironmental terms such as "pollution control" or "cleaner production" in reports,
complicated the analysis. However, it is estimated than over 90% of the technical
descriptions provided in the tables is reliable.
An important distinction is also made between the pipeline of a fund (i.e. projects
selected for appraisal but not implemented yet) and its effective implementation plan.
Data provided correspond either to a predicted or on-going pipeline or to an imple-
mented project.
Unfortunately, environmental impact assessments are only available for a limited
number of projects. This is the case for the Liaoning fund but the pipeline is an SAR
projection, and for the Southern Jiangsu's funds. In this last case, estimations were
done by the Chinese themselves and no ex-post evaluation figures are available.
4.2 Results
The processing of data follows the methodology described in the previous chapter.
Tables and Figures sum up the results.
4.2.1 The French Water Basin Agencies
As a first step, the pipeline of clean technology projects with their characteristics,
is listed in Tables A.41 to A.44. This list includes the corrections described pre-
viously at subsection 4.1.1. Each project appears in two lists, one indicating the
industrial sector, the size, the process type, the CP option and the environmental
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benefits (Tables A.41 and A.42), and the other one precizing the CP option, the
level of innovation, the amount of the loan, the share of the total project cost covered
by the loan and the maturity of the loan (Tables A.43 and A.44).
On the basis of this information, a first task has been to sort projects by industrial
sectors (see figure B-17) and by the size of the enterprise (figure B-18). Financial
data are then assessed in figures B-19 (share of total cost covered by the loan) and
B-20 (maturity distribution). The distributions of the various process types and levels
of innovation are then respectively plotted in figures B-22 and B-21.
The next step has been to draw the cost distributions for the various CP options
(see figure B-23). A cost distribution for end-of-pipe equipment (new waste water
treatment plants) was also added to that graph. A similar cost distribution was also
drawn for the various levels of innovation (figure B-24), and for the process types
(figure B-25).
Finally, correlations were temptatively estimated between the various dimensions
of technological choices: between levels of innovation and the various CP options
(figure B-26), process types and CP options (figure B-27) and levels of innovation
and process types (figure B-28).
4.2.2 The Polish National Environmental Fund
According to several World Bank officials, the management of the Polish NEF's port-
folio is not transparent enough to justify the use of this existing fund to channel
World Bank financial assistance. This observation is confirmed by the interview of a
European Commission PHARE manager in charge of Poland, who admitted ignoring
the disbursement policy of the Polish NEF although this fund channels a significant
amount of PHARE grants. Moreover, an official of the Polish National Cleaner Pro-
duction Center who had been closely involved in the management of the Polish NEF,
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confirmed that no systematic study of the portfolio of industrial projects had been
conducted.
According to the same source of information, the Polish fund has two different
branches of activity: firstly, it aims at supporting pollution abatement investments
in enterprises and local governments; secondly, it provides assistance for environ-
mental education. This second category of activity has been supported in the past
by a bilateral Norwegian/Polish cooperation program which supported in particular
the establishment of the National Cleaner Production Center. Since January 1997,
this environmental education branch focuses on Cleaner Production demonstration
projects in enterprises, and a database of Polish success stories in this field will be
established during the next two years.
Finally, a consultant from the French Consulting Company BCEOM reminded
that the disbursement strategy of the Polish NEF, and in general of most Central
Eastern Europe NEFs, focuses essentially on large-scale end-of-pipe approaches for
municipalities and large industries. This seems to be similar to the earlier stage of
financing strategy for the French water basin agencies. This feature has also been
confirmed by the official from the Polish NCPC, although he pointed out that pre-
ventive approaches were starting to be investigated.
4.2.3 The World Bank's revolving funds in China
On the basis of the documents previously described, a first step has been to rebuild
the subprojects' pipeline for each fund or line of credit investigated. A distinction
was made between three types of pipelines:
* Initial SAR pipeline: This type of pipeline is identified cooperatively between
the Bank and the Chinese counterpart institution during the project prepa-
ration. Such pipeline is available for Zhejiang (Table A.27), Liaoning (Ta-
* Pipeline of candidate enterprises: These pipelines are managed by the Chinese
counterpart and include the enterprises selected for appraisal. Such a pipeline
is available for Tianjin (Tables A.14, A.15, A.16, A.17).
* Ex-post pipeline: This last sort of pipelines include subprojects that have been
already financed. They are available for Shashi and Changzhou (tables A.12, A.13),
Tianjin (table A.18), Wuxi and Suzhou (tables A.19, A.20, A.21, A.22, A.23, A.24),
and Liaoning (Table A.30).
As a second task, the expected environmental benefits of subprojects were collected
when available i.e. for two funds: Liaoning (SAR projection, Tables A.28, A.29) and
the Southern Jiangsiu's funds and lines of credits (Chinese subproject proposals, Ta-
bles A.25, A.26).
Extent of available information
Table A.32 presents the number of subprojects available for each fund with the related
environmental benefits, technical description and financial information. With the
exception of the Zhejiang fund 6, the number of subprojects ranges from 13 (Hubei)
to 38 (Tianjin) with most financial (more than 60%) and significant technical (more
than 48%) information available.
Operation indicators
The methodology developed in subsection 3.3.2. was applied to the various Chinese
funds on the basis of previous tables. In particular, tables A.32, A.33 compare the
operation of the various funds.
6Only five subprojects are reported and only three of them include technical and financial
information.
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bles A.28, A.29) and Hubei (Table A.31).
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Following the step-by-step methodology described in subsection 3.3.2., results are
presented in the following tables and figures:
* Global financial assessment: These financial data were only available for the
Tianjin fund. The annual management cost and its evolution with time is pre-
sented in Figure B-6, the total annual disbursement for subproject financing
in Figure B-6,and the reimbursement cash flow in Figures B-7, B-8). The de-
fault rate, the undisbursed ratio and the transaction cost are summed up in
Table A.34.
* Technical subprojects' features: These technical data can be seen in Figure B-12
and Table A.32, and the correlated Cleaner Production ratios are displayed in
Figure B-13. Technical data were not detailed enough to be able to distinguish
among subprojects for the type of process (primary, secondary, ancillary) or for
diffusion versus innovation of technologies.
* Fund objectives: Media and industrial origin statistics are presented in Ta-
ble A.33 and Figures B-14, B-15. End-of-pipe (EOP) subprojects are displayed
on the negative values of the vertical axis to distinguish them from Cleaner
Production subprojects displayed as positive values.
* Financial indicators: The global range of subprojects' costs is displayed in Fig-
ure B-11. For the various technical categories, this distribution is presented in
Figure B-10 in the case of the Tianjin fund, and in Figure B-16 for all Chinese
funds (aggregated). In addition, Figure B-9 compare the range of subprojects'
costs for the pipeline of candidate entreprises and the ex post pipeline for the
Tianjin fund. Additional financial information about subprojects (average loan
size, the proportion of grant (ratio Grt/Ln), the share of loan compared to total
investment (% of tot. cost), the maturity) can be found in Table A.33. Infor-
mation about interest rates is only available for the Tianjin fund (Table A.18).
* Environmental benefits: They are only available for Liaoning (Tables A.28, A.29)
and the Southern Jiangsiu's funds and lines of credits (Tables A.25, A.26)
Results provide an evaluation of the performance of the three models of funds. The
three models are compared in the context of the influence of the economy. Correlation
between operating results and design characteristics presented in the previous chapter
are made when relevant.
4.3.1 Evaluation of the performance of the three venues
The Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse
By interpreting previous results, the following discussion will address three points:
(1) the overall disbursement strategy of the agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse; (2) the cost
heterogeneities across categories of projects; and (3) the correlations that may exist
between level of innovation, process types, and categories of CP options.
What is the overall strategy of the agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse?
It first appears that the agency targets a broad range of industrial sectors, thus
probably reflecting the local distribution of economic activities in the region. Sec-
ondly, the enterprises that are targeted seem to be essentially middle-sized firms,
while large plants are the least concerned by the agency's financial assistance (see
figure B-18). This can be interpreted by a change of strategy adopted by the agency
after the years 70s-80s during which, most large polluters received financial support
to install large scale waste water treatment plants. Since, realizing that fewer large
plants needed this type of end-of-pipe equipements and because economies of scale
prevent such approaches to be economically feasible for SMEs, the agency started to
focus on SMEs and on preventive approaches in industry.
In terms of characterization of the type of financial assistance, it appears that it
is rather standard with a large majority of loans covering 75% of project cost, with a
9 years maturity (see figures B-19 and B-20. Obviously, the disbursement scheme of
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4.3 Interpretation and Discussion
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the agency for clean technologies is rigid. The few exceptions that exist, correspond
to projects with substantial economic benefits, although it is sometimes difficult to
understand why the decision to reduce the share of the total cost covered by a loan,
has been taken 7. However, this presents an advantage for the purpose of this research
that (1) loans' amount distribution can be considered to be a good proxy for the to-
tal project costs' distribution; and (2) the financial incentives given to the various
categories of projects are essentially the same.
Finally, the type of technologies supported by the agency are mainly (1) incre-
mental innovations (ranked "+" with the present typology; see figure B-21); (2) waste
recovery options (see figure B-23); and (3) targeting ancillary processes (see figure B-
22). A decreasing number of projects with the level of innovation stresses in fact the
focus of the agency on diffusion rather than on innovation. It should be noticed that
the proportion of "other-than-incremental" (ie ranked "++" or "+++") innovations,
is however relatively high (around 40%). The focus on waste recovery options and
on ancillary processes can be interpreted in various ways: this approach is expected
to be the easiest, the less risky and the less expensive. This will be discussed further
when correlations existing between these three dimensions will be presented.
What are the cost heterogeneities observed across categories of technologies?
A first feature that could be expected is a correlation between the cost of a tech-
nology and its level of innovation. This is not confirmed by figure B-24 which shows
for instance that, on average, projects ranked "++" for the level of innovation tend
to be more expensive than "+++" revolutionary technologies. However, it should be
observed that the most expensive projects (over 5 million FF) never correspond to a
low level of innovation, and that the least expensive ones (less than half a million FF)
7This is noticeable in the case of wood processing companies sharing similar features, for which
the same equipment was differently supported by the agency, with two loans differing significantly
by the amount granted and by the share of the total cost covered.
are overwhelmingly ranked "+". This suggests that incremental innovations tend
to be slightly less expensive than more innovative projects. The significant differ-
ence observed for "mid-innovative" technologies is in fact partly due to the fact that
such projects involve the implementation of several incremental innovations (what
had been defined as an "architectural process innovation" at subsection 3.3.3.) and
therefore, tend to be more expensive than the implementation of single technologies.
A similar distribution for CP option categories (see figure B-23) confirms the
expectation that process changes tend to be more expensive than waste recovery op-
tions. Too little data are available for input substitution options to be able to bring
them into the discussion. On the other hand, the curve obtained for end-of-pipe
equipment can be characterized by a small number of high cost projects (exceeding
five million FF) and a significant proportion of technologies ranging from less than
500,000 FF to less than 3 million FF. This can be easily interpreted by identifying the
expensive technologies with the few new waste water treatment plants that are being
constructed, and less expensive maintenance interventions on existing industrial waste
water treatment plants. Therefore, if the agency decided to limit the amount of its
loans by targeting only high cost technologies, such a strategy may heavily penalize
CP options (waste recovery ones in particular) relatively to end-of-pipe equipements.
Finally, the distribution obtained for process types (see figure B-25) supports
the idea that primary and secondary processes' technologies tend to be more expen-
sive than ancillary processes' ones. This feature had been suggested by Ashford,
considering ten technologies corresponding to recent USEPA-negotiated enforcement
settlements ([61]), to explain why companies may be reluctant toward innovations
in primary production, given the cost and the risk associated. The present research
does not however identify statistically significant difference between secondary and
primary processes in terms of costs.
How are the three dimensions correlated?
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By establishing correlations between the three dimensions (see figures B-26 to B-
28), it is possible to point out the following features: (1) waste recovery options are
targeting ancillary processes and have a low level of innovation; (2) primary processes
include exclusively process changes and have a rather high level of innovation; and (3)
secondary processes are concerned by both process changes and input substitution
and have a high level of innovation, although being slightly lower than for primary
processes.
Three categories of interpretation should then be distinguished: (1) the expla-
nations that are inherent to the definitions of the categories of technologies; (2) an
interpretation involving S-curves for the various technologies; (3) the bias that may
be introduced by the agency's strategy; and (4) the interpretation from resistances
existing in the firm toward a particular class of technology.
The first interpretation scheme explains, for example, why waste recovery options
are only targeting ancillary processes: almost by definition, a technology consisting
in the recovery of wastes (internal recycling) is not a fundamental part of the man-
ufacturing process but rather a refinement toward an optimal use of raw materials.
Similarly, input substitution in primary processes are almost never observed because
these processes are frequently rigid to such changes, as inputs usually correspond to
raw materials necessary to manufacture the product (e.g. fibers in the paper indus-
try). Therefore, changing inputs in primary processes usually means redesigning or
changing the product. On the contrary, secondary processes may favor input substi-
tution options because the number of inputs is usually higher (e.g. hexavalent versus
trivalent chromium in electroplating plants).
The second explanation uses Foster's theory of innovation S-curves ([80]). This
would position process change and input substitutions in the steep part of the S-curve
while waste recovery would be in one of the plateaus corresponding to low or high po-
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tential for innovation. Because waste recovery have been largely financed in the past,
it seems more likely that the potential of innovation in this field is now lower and that
this category of CP options is in the upper plateau of the corresponding S-curve. Such
an approach with process types would also explain why ancillary processes (mainly
corresponding to waste recovery options) have a low rate of innovation. More sur-
prisingly, it seems that primary processes have a slightly higher rate of innovation
than secondary processes. Given existing data, it is impossible to determine if the
potential for innovation is higher for primary or for secondary processes 8. However,
it may be expected that many process changes in secondary processes have already
taken place, which would position these types of processes closer to the upper plateau
of the S-curve than for primary ones (see Figure B-43).
Such differences could also be a consequence of the agency's disbursement policy.
Because the risk, the cost, and the level of difficulty is lower for waste recovery options
and ancillary processes, the agency may have focused extensively on these technolo-
gies, thus moving the rate of innovation up to the top of the S-curve. In other words,
because they have been already widely implemented in industry, there is (1) less
innovation to be made; and (2) a sufficient pool of easily diffusable technologies to
justify a focus on diffusion. A similar argument may also relate the difference in the
rate of innovation for secondary and primary processes, to the difference between the
number of projects targeting these two types of processes. However, these differences
are small and may not be statistically significant. Secondly, by adopting a policy
against too profitable and risky investments, the agency may have refused to support
technologies in primary and secondary processes, with both significant environmental
and economic benefits. This explanation relies however on the assumption that tech-
nologies in primary and secondary processes are more profitable than for ancillary
processes.
8It deDends how the two process types are positioned relatively to the inflexion point of the
S-curve.
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Finally, these features could find their origin in rigidities existing inside enter-
prises. Figure B-29 has positioned the various CP options on the Abernathy and
Clark's transilience matrix and relates the level of disruption of existing competence
to the level of innovation effectively observed. A refinement is introduced in figure B-
28 by using Ashford's triple categorization. Because firms perceive waste recovery
options in ancillary processes has regular innovations, not fundamental to the core
process, they may see little gain from investing high research and development re-
sources for innovating in that field. On the contrary, innovation may appear to be
more important for process changes or input substitutions in primary and secondary
processes, where they can yield more economic benefits or contribute to improve the
quality of products. Management choices may also explain the predominance of waste
recovery options and the focus on ancillary processes. A 1990 Cohen and Levinthal's
paper in the Administrative Science Quarterly journal [70] stressed that "interactions
across individuals who each possess diverse and different knowledge structures will
augment the organization's capacity for making novel linkages and associations". Be-
cause firms have usually separated environmental activities and production, it seems
natural that individuals dealing with environmental issues inside the firm tend to
stay outside of core processes and focus on waste recovery options. This approach
which has first induced the "end-of-pipe" strategy, would now favor waste recovery
options and ancillary processes. It is likely that such an explanation is going to be
particularly validated in the case of SMEs and for traditional processes (breweries,
tanneries) for which rigidities against process modifications are even greater.
The Chinese World Bank-supported revolving funds
A first observation about what has been presented previously is that the information
processed imperfectly reflects the operation of funds and lines of credit. While finan-
cial data are usually relatively abundant, technical descriptions are scarce and do not
allow for example to identify what type of process is improved or if the technology
implemented is innovative. This lack of detailed technical proposal may be partly
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due to the fact that the technical reviewing of subprojects by the Bank is sometimes
done by outside consultants and that technical proposals are not archived in the Asia
Information Service Center. Moreover, when available, environmental benefits are
incomplete, sometimes not standardized (units are missing, benefits are only concen-
tration or quantity-based) which makes a precise evaluation of subprojects impossible.
The equiscalar pollution index (see subsection 2.3.3.) which is usually mentioned in
SARs to be used for subprojects' selection, never appears in subprojects' proposals
submitted to the Bank. However, although being too incomplete to make a precise
and detailed assessment of the performance of the various funds, the data that have
been processed are useful to understand the perception that the World Bank - and
particularly task managers - can have of revolving funds.
Revolving funds obviously differ from lines of credit at least from the size of the
subprojects' costs: a revolving fund's average loan is always below 10 million RMB
9
, while a line of credit's average loan largely exceeds this value 10. Another differ-
ence, which is heavily correlated, is the fact that subprojects are more media-specific
for funds and more comprehensive for lines of credit 1. A possible interpretation
is that lines of credit tend to finance a global environmental clean-up in enterprises
while funds focus on a particular type of media and of pollution. Typically, a large
heavily-polluting enterprise will be targeted by a line of credit and have its process
renovated, and air and water pollution control equipment being installed, with the
risk of allocating financial resources to less cost-effective investments.
Apart from these two differences, technical statistics 12 put into relief the large
number of end-of-pipe technologies financed by the Hubei line of credit while the
Jiangsiu lines of credit focus essentially on process changes (including relocation of
9Usually 2 to 7 million RMB (see Table A.33).
1027 million for Jiangsiu's lines of credit and 66 million for Hubei.
llwith the exception of the Jiangsiu funds but this can be explained, as it will be discussed later,
by the fact that these two funds may have been heavily influenced by their co-management with
lines of credit (see Table A.32 and Figure B-14).
12See Table A.32 and Figure B-12.
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plant and renovation of processes). Very few waste recovery options are considered
by these lines of credits. This gives a very low Cleaner Production ratio for the Hubei
line of credit while the high value obtained for the Jiangsiu's ones is essentially due
to the high proportion of process changes.
A last observation concerning the comparison between funds and lines of credit is
the correlation that seems to exist between the Jiangsiu revolving funds and lines of
credit. The average loan size is much higher for the Jiangsiu funds than for the others
although the size of these two funds is smaller than the Tianjin one. Moreover, sub-
projects financed follow the same pattern (essentially process changes and end-of-pipe
equipment) and tend to be comprehensive. It can be inferred that the co-existence
of the two financing mechanisms (both are managed by the same institutions) may
influence the disbursement policy of the revolving fund.
Before going further in the interpretation of technical data, one should notice that
the Zhejiang fund include too few subprojects to be statistically relevant for a sub-
projects' analysis 13. This remark made. there seem to exist a difference between
the Multicities project's funds which focus largely on end-of-pipe water pollution
abatement technologies, and the Tianjin and Liaoning funds (more concerned about
process changes and waste recovery subprojects) 14
The study of objectives of the various financial mechanisms show - as already
mentioned -, a tendency of funds' subproject to be more media-specific. Water pol-
lution seems to be predominant with the exception of the Hubei line of credit where
air pollution is the main concern 15. The industry origin shows the importance of
chemical enterprises as contributors to ambient pollution 16. In the case of Tianjin,
"
3 Only three subprojects are mentioned which gives a Cleaner Production ratio of 100% because
all of them are process changes (see Figures B-12, B-13).
14 See Figure B-12.
15See Figure B-14.
'
6 See Figure B-15.
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this is in large part due to the contribution in the subproject pipeline of candidate
enterprises, of many proposals coming from the same chemical group 17
The distribution of subproject costs 18 illustrates the fact that only the Tianjin
and the Liaoning funds are considering financing projects below one million RMB.
However, Figure B-9 shows that after two years of operation, the Tianjin fund has im-
plemented most of the low-cost subprojects and that the ones remaining in the pipeline
are of a higher value. Two explanations could be proposed to this phenomenon: (1)
the Tianjin FMO chose to start implementing low cost technologies to minimize the
financial risk while educating itself; or (2) under the influence of the Bank, the FMO
moved its disbursement strategy toward higher cost options 19. This can have several
negative consequences for the selection of a particular category of technologies if this
category is on average of a lower cost. Figures B-16 and B-10 make such a study
for all funds (aggregated data) or just the Tianjin one. This dual analysis is justified
by the risk of having subprojects including several technologies which would distort
interpretation (less probable for Tianjin because of the media-specificity). Results in-
clude the three following observations: (1) end-of-pipe equipements are either of very
low cost (basic filters for example) or of very high (more than three million RMB for a
water treatment plant); (2) process changes' average cost is below three million RMB
(replacement of a single technology) or on the contrary over this value in case of plant
relocation or renovation of the entire process; and (3) waste recovery are generally
below three million RMB and often below one million RMB 20. No conclusion can be
made for product redesign and input substitution's options due to the small number
of data available. Therefore, a shift toward higher subprojects' costs may penalize
certain categories of Cleaner Production options 21
17 Yinghai, see Tables A.16, A.17.
1sSee Figure B-11
19This recommendation frequently appears in the correspondence between the bank and the FMO
and is justified by the high undisbursed ratio of the fund.
20This is more obvious from the observation of the Tianjin fund only due to the fact that for other
funds this category of options is associated to other technologies in the same subproject's package.
2 1This can be observed in the case of the Tianjin fund for which the change of subprojects' selection
policy according to the cost criteria triggered a suddenly increased selection of water treatment plant
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Although possibly favoring Cleaner Production options, this low cost subproject
strategy for the Tianjin fund had a negative consequence on the total amount of
projects financed which happened to be much below the SAR predictions during the
two first years of operation 22. Other financial indicators concerning the reimburse-
ment of subloans allow to estimate a default rate of around 30% 23. Although such a
comparison is controversial because the EPBs concerned are not the same, it seems
interesting to observe that this value is the same that measured by Spofford, Ma,
Zhou, and Smith in the case of the Jinan EPB's fund ([122]). Therefore, it could be
that this high value for the default rate is influenced by the behavior of enterprises
toward the reimbursement of loans from EPBs' funds.
Revolving funds may also be criticized because of their higher management cost
due to the administrative inefficiencies of hosting institutions. The management cost
of the Tianjin fund actually exceeded the SAR forecast especially if we do a pro rata
calculation compared to the total number of projects financed 24. However, an ap-
proximated calculation of the transaction cost, as previously defined, does not reflect
a significant increase in 1995 compared to 1994 while the value observed is around
1% 25
A last discussion about previous results should address the environmental benefits
presented in Tables A.28, A.29 (Liaoning) and A.25, A.26 (Jiangsiu). Most envi-
ronmental benefits concern conventional water pollutants (BOD, COD, SS) and air
pollutants (particulates, dust, S02). Only a few subprojects are addressing pollution
by hazardous wastes. Pollution abatement frequently exceeds 80-90%, which suggests
projects during the last quarter of 1995 (see Tables A.16 and A.17).22 An undisbursed ratio of 75% is observed in 1995 (see Figure B-5) and can explained why the
Bank pushed toward higher subprojects' cost and finally recently considered a reduction of the total
amount of the World Bank loan to the fund.
2 3 See Figures B-7 and B-8.
24 See Figure B-6.
25This means that a disbursement of 100$ in subloans, requires 1$ spent in management cost.
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there exists a huge potential for abatement in Chinese enterprises.
4.3.2 Temptative correlation with design characteristics pre-
sented in section 3.2.
Given the fact that the information available is largely partial, correlation between
the relative performance of funds and their design cannot be established with cer-
tainty. However, the following discussion proposes probable explanations and intends
to relate features observed in this chapter to the potential factors for success that had
been presented at subsection 3.3.1.
Firstly, it seems that there exists a relation between the range of project costs
and the status and institutional origin of the fund management office of the fund (see
figures B-11 and B-2. According to the cost distribution of projects for the various
venues, a classification from funds funding the least expensive projects to funds fund-
ing the most expensive ones, is:
Tianjin i Liaoning i Multicities i Jiangsu = Zhejiang.
On the other hand, the ranking from funds with the "most governmental status"
to funds with the least one is:
Multicities i Tianjin = Liaoning i Jiangsu = Zhejiang.
The classification from funds with a "more environmental" FMO to funds with a
'"more financial" one is:
Tianjin = Liaoning = Zhejiang i Multicities i Jiangsu.
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Obviously, the correlation is not perfect 26 and many other exogeneous factors
could explain this observation. However, this research suggests that the more "gov-
ernmental" and "environmental" the fund is and the more lower cost projects are
preferred. Possible explanation of that feature include: (1) the fact that governmen-
tal funds may be related too closely to the existing EPB fund which tend to finance
very low cost projects; (2) the fact that funds that are more concerned by financial
issues will be more receptive to incentives from the World bank to raise projects'
costs; and (3) the fact that more environmentally-concerned funds such as Liaoning
and Tianjin may be more concerned by preventive approaches which tend to be less
capital intensive than end-of-pipe technologies.
This may have important implications if CP is to be promoted. Figure B-10
has clearly established than CP options such as waste recovery and process changes
(when the whole plant is not renovated) tend to be much less expensive than indus-
trial waste water treatment plants. Therefore, the risk is that, by moving its strategy
too rapidly from funds closely linked to governmental environmental institutions to
more autonomous and financial institutions, the World Bank will lose, in the recip-
ient country, an environmental expertise and a financial context that could be more
favorable to CP.
Experience from the French water basin agency's fund confirms the fact that an
environmental fund focusing on CP should address low cost technologies (compared
to end-of-pipe ones) and should probably not adopt the same financial approach as
would do a commercial bank for example. If being positioned in the previous classifi-
cation, after conversion of currencies and corrections of the cost of living being done,
it is likely that the French fund would not contradict the correlation that has been
proposed.
26 Zhejiang and Multicities do not "match" perfectly but Zhejiang is controversial because of
its small pipeline, and the fact that the multicities fund has been created at a time when the
governmental status was the only alternative (it is the eldest) may also explain the distortion that
is observed.
139
Secondly., the correlation between project cost and the status of funds could be
completed by a similar analysis of the disbursement policy:
From a more soft loan approach to the commercial loan approach:
Tianjin i Liaoning i Zhejiang i Multicities i Jiangsiu.
From a long-term to a short term lending strategy:
Tianjin i Liaoning = Multicities = Jiangsiu = Zhejiang.
Such ranking results seem to confirm the fact that a more financial "banking" ap-
proach (short-term commercial loans) is associated to larger project costs. This rein-
forces the distinction that is proposed between the "governmental/environmental/subsidy/low
cost/CP" approach as opposed to the "autonomous/financial/commercial/high cost/end-
of-pipe" strategy. However, at least in the case of China, the second strategy could
include a large proportion of high cost process changes involving large-scale process
renovations in addition to the end-of-pipe technologies.
Finally, the observation that the Tianjin fund has been given incentives to move
toward a more end-of-pipe approach and higher cost projects, is directly linked to
the size of the fund which overestimated the needs, leading to a high undisbursed
ratio. To accelerate the disbursement rate, managers from the Tianjin fund were
given negative incentives toward CP, which explains the 1995 increasing proportion
of end-of-pipe technologies in the fund's pipeline.
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4.3.3 Discussion on the influence of the economy and of
other exogeneous factors
The comparison across the various economies may be controversial as, obviously, there
may exist many different explanations to the differences observed between funds.
Among others factors, these differences should include: (1) the marginal pollution
abatement cost is larger in industrialized economies 27; (2) the level of equipment
of enterprises with end-of-pipe technologies is much higher in industrialized coun-
tries (which may even be saturated in these equipment as far as economical feasi-
bility is concerned; (3) the type of enterprises is different between economies (more
tertiary activities in western economies and more secondary activities in transition
economies and developing countries); (4) the environmental concern and the social
pro-environment pressure is greater in industrialized economies; (5) diffusion of tech-
nologies through technology transfer reduces the average technological risk in transi-
tion economies-and developing countries; and (6) market failures are more frequent
in transition economies and developing countries.
It firstly seems that in the three venues, environmental funds tend to focus initially
on end-of-pipe approaches in enterprises. This had been the case a few decades ago for
the French water basin agencies, is observed in the earliest phase of the World Bank
strategy in China, and has been reported to be largely verified in the case of Central
and Eastern Europe funds although no data have been presented in this thesis. Even
in the case of the Tianjin fund, the focus on end-of-pipe options remains significant,
partly due to the move toward high cost projects as previously mentioned. This may
be explained by the following arguments: (1) an economic explanation: the marginal
cost of pollution control may be lower in early stages than for pollution prevention;
(2) a regulatory explanation: environmental regulation may favor end-of-pipe as a
2 7 A difference between transition economies and developing countries is not as obvious: the
amount of pollution accumulated in certain heavily industrialized transition economies may lower
the marginal abatement cost compared to developing countries less equipped with abatement tech-
nologies but less polluted.
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first step and encourage prevention only for refinement; and (3) a management ex-
planation: funds may prefer to start with pollution control for didactic and capacity
building reasons. As proved by results from Duan ([73]) in the case of China 28,
the first argument does not seem to be verified. On the contrary, a combination of
explanations (2) and (3) is more likely to explain why end-of-pipe tend to be preferred.
It is important to observe that, with the exception of the Tianjin fund considered
individually, the aggregated distribution of project costs for the various CP options
and all Chinese funds, tend to give more weight to process changes than does the
French "agence de l'eau". This can be explained by the conjunction of two factors:
(1) the French fund does not focus in priority on these investments because of their
probable higher economic returns; and (2) there exist more opportunities in the case
of China because processes are obsolete and renovation needs to be done.
This comparison may be particularly relevant for the design of CP environmental
funds. Limiting the permissible maximum amount of loans may give an extra incen-
tive toward CP options. This will prevent the implementation of capital intensive
end-of-pipe technologies and the renovation of obsolete processes. If such projects are
still environmentally relevant, other financial resources should be made available to
support these technologies. Chapter 6 will discuss further what strategies could be
proposed.
28Duan studied a World Bank CP demonstration project (see chapter 5) and compared the average
cost of abatement for CP and end-of-pipe. Because, this is supposed to happen in the earliest stages
of the abatement curve and because the difference he found was very significant, it can be predicted





The specific case of a demonstration project in China illustrates the CP potential
that exists in Chinese enterprises and the assistance that may be needed. Technol-
ogy Options Analysis reports provide data about probable environmental and financial
performance of CP investments.
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5.1 Presentation of Sources
Data are taken from a UNEP IE/World Bank Cleaner Production demonstration
project in China. After a description of the project and in particular of its methodol-
ogy, the documents that have been used in the study (audit reports) are presented.
5.1.1 Overview of the B-4 subproject
The B-4 subproject named "Promoting Cleaner Production in China was the first
World Bank Cleaner Production demonstration project in China. It is one compo-
nent of the China Environmental Protection Technical Assistant Project which was
agreed in 1992 between the World Bank and the Chinese national Environmental
Protection Agency (NEPA) 1. The subproject was technically guided by the Industry
and Environment Center of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP IE).
The project objectives were (1) to develop and test a Chinese systematic approach
to cleaner production; (2) to prove the existence of a large potential for cleaner pro-
duction in 25-30 Chinese enterprises; (3) to develop adequate Cleaner Production
policies; and (4) to help disseminate the Cleaner Production approach in China. For
this purpose, the subproject B-4 included (1) the translation into Chinese of docu-
mentation related to Cleaner Production auditing procedures; (2) the organization
of training workshops; (3) conducting cleaner production audits and options' imple-
mentation in selected enterprises; and (4) conducting policy studies providing recom-
mendations to promote Cleaner Production within the national environmental policy.
This thesis focuses exclusively on the audits and options' implementation sub-
component. Audits were conducted in two phases: 11 companies were audited during
a preparation phase from March, 1993 to March, 1994, and 18 others during the
demonstration phases from March, 1994 until March, 1995.
'See [48, 127, 43] for a more detailed description of the B-4 subproject
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5.1.2 Description of enterprises selected
Tables A.35 and A.36 describe the enterprises that were selected during the B-4
preparation and demonstration phases. The typology used to estimate the size of
enterprises has been: (1) small enterprises employ less than 500 workers; (2) middle
enterprises employ between 500 and 1500 workers; and (3) large enterprises employ
more than 1500 workers. The type of ownership include state-owned enterprises as
well as town and village -owned industrial enterprises (TVIEs). Although there exist
also some private enterprises in China, none of them were targeted by the B-4 sub-
project.
These results put into relief the comprehensiveness of the subproject. Enterprises
belonging to the most common types of ownership, and of various sizes were chosen,
from a small TVIE such as Shaoxing Cereal & Oil Factory to plants belonging to
the huge state-Qwned chemical group, Beijing Yanshan Petrochemical (30 plants and
45,000 workers). Similarly, the sectoral distribution of enterprises is very broad with
6 enterprises belonging to the light industry, 10 to the chemical industry, 2 to the
petrochemical industry 2, 2 to the construction industry, 6 to the textile industry, and
3 to the metal finishing industry (electroplating). Therefore, the sample selected for
the purpose of this thesis, is likely to represent most of the major industrial sectors
in China.
5.1.3 Technology Options Analysis reports and previous
studies
Cleaner Production audit reports were collected during a visit to UNEP IE in De-
cember 1996. Unfortunately, about a fourth of these reports are missing and in some
cases, only a draft version is available 3. Finally, nine draft versions and thirteen final
2Chemical and petrochemical industries belong to two different ministries in China.
3 There are two kinds of reports: a draft version called "Mid-Term Cleaner Production Audit
Reports" and the final "Cleaner Production audit report". When available, the final version was
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reports were collected. Final reports were particularly helpful for the purpose of this
research because they included a first screening of options and a detailed assessment
of a few preferred options, after low and non-cost good housekeeping options having
been implemented.
It is to be noted that there exist already at least two evaluations of sub-project
B-4, one made by the University of Amsterdam which was a major academic part-
ner to the project 4, and one by the Chinese National Cleaner Production Center 5
Compared to these previous studies, the present research tries to focus exclusively
on technologies involving enough capital to become relevant for an environmental
fund and enlarges the evaluation scheme by using the three dimensions previously
reminded instead of addressing exclusively Cleaner Production.
5.2 Methodology and Results
Results in the various enterprises are presented after a description of the type of
technical and financial assistance that has been offered to companies. Difficulties
observed during the implementation of the Cleaner Production options are recounted.
5.2.1 Methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the operation of the various funds with the
"ideal situation" in which subprojects would be identified after a technology option
analysis. In this regard, the methodology has been to apply the same evaluation
scheme as it had been presented at subsection 3.3.2. Thus, a first step has been to
identify the primary targets of subproject B-4, i.e. checking if this demonstration
project had been for example focusing on a particular industrial sector or a specific
preferred for the purpose of this research.
4 See the final report from Rene Van Berkel ([128]).
'See the OECD paper of Ning Duan in particular ([73]).
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type of enterprises.
Then, the three dimensions of a consistent technological policy for the environment
were estimated (type of process, level of innovation and categories of CP options).
Finally, correlations between these dimensions were plotted as it had been done in
the case of environmental funds.
A significant difference compared to previous evaluations is the fact that esti-
mations of the level of innovation could only be done roughly. Therefore, only two
levels were considered depending on whether projects are just the implementation
of well-known technologies (diffusion) or on the contrary whether there do not exist
any examples running in the country ("innovation"). It is important to notice that
this definition of innovation is relatively broad as, with the exception of one or two
projects, most of the projects that were mentioned involve a technology which has
been successfully implemented abroad. Therefore, the definition of innovation used
here corresponds rather to the definition of "transfer of technology".
5.2.2 First processing; pipeline of candidate projects iden-
tified by assessing technical options
On the basis on final reports, the list of major technologies identified after the first
screening phase of the auditing procedure is presented in tables A.37 to A.40. These
technologies were chosen among many others listed in the Mid-term audit reports, be-
cause of their performance for feasibility, potential environmental benefits, and their
cost, high enough to justify a request to the the World Bank for financial assistance.
In the final reports, these particular options were further investigated and their eco-
nomic and environmental benefits as well as their feasibility, were precisely assessed.
Sometimes, these technologies are alternatives, meaning that only one option would
be selected. However, options identified after this first auditing round were consid-
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ered all to be good candidates to receive assistance from an environmental fund. The
final pipeline of candidate projects is based on data contained in the thirteen final
project reports that were collected. For each option is specified (1) the amount of the
investment; (2) the CP category; (3) the type of process; (4) the level of innovation;
(5) the environmental benefits; and (6) the payback time 6 as a rough estimate of
the economic benefits of the project. Each technology appears in fact in two tables:
either table A.37 or A.38, and either table A.39 or A.40.
5.2.3 Results
Results come from the processing of previous tables and are displayed in figures B-30
to B-42. The industrial origin of enterprises selected is presented in figure B-32.
Five industrial sectors were considered: chemical industry (34.5%), food processing
(20.7%) which includes in large part breweries and wineries, light industry (24.1% )
representing textile industries and tanneries, construction (6.9%), and metal process-
ing (13.8%). The distribution of process types is displayed in figure B-33. Enterprises
are also classified according to the type of ownership (state-owned or TVIEs) 7, and
to the size .
As a next step, projects were classified according to their belonging to the inno-
vation or the diffusion type (see figure B-36), and to their categories of CP options
9 (see figure B-37).
For innovative technologies, figures B-34 and B-35 identify what proportion of
the various process types and CP option categories are concerned by innovation.
6 The payback time is defined as the annual economic return (not discounted) divided by the
initial investment.
7 See figure B-30.
8 See figure B-31.
9There is a category for end-of-pipe equipment as in a few occasions, these technologies were
mentioned in audit reports.
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For each category of CP options, the cost distribution 10, as well as the payback
distribution 11, were then plotted. The payback distribution is also displayed for the
various process types in figure B-42. Finally, a correlation is also estimated between
CP options and process types, in figure B-40.
5.3 Interpretation and Discussion
The interpretation of the results compares the B-4 subproject's data with the theoretical
discussion on CP's potential and requirements that had been presented in section
2.2. Revolving fund's characteristics (the offer of CP assistance) are compared to the
corresponding need (the demand) assessed from this demonstration project.
5.3.1 Selection of enterprises
As has been mentioned previously, the purpose of this chapter of the thesis is to
investigate what a more CP-oriented policy could bring to the model of an environ-
mental fund in a developing country such as China. It seems first that the list of
technologies that have been identified in this demonstration project could very easily
have been the pipeline of an externally-assisted environmental fund, although the
project design was in fact copied on the line-of-credit model. However, if the sectoral
distribution as well as the size of enterprises is diversified enough to be compared
to the pipeline of a fund, the cost distribution differs from what had been obtained
in the case of the Chinese World-bank supported funds. Projects' costs are in fact
lower, implying that although this demonstration project is in fact a line of credit, the
range of loans offered to enterprises does not correspond at all to the normal pattern
of the line of credit financing scheme. Even if we aggregate the cost of the vari-
ous options for a single enterprise and consider that the company received the total
10See figure B-38.
'
1 See figure B-41.
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corresponding financial assistance, this cost distribution is very likely to remain lower.
The distribution for the type of ownership and the size of enterprises reveals that a
majority of companies selected were large, state-owned plants. This is not surprising
for several reasons and is likely to be similar to the case of the World Bank-supported
funds or the EPB funds. Reasons include the fact that such governmental programs
target more easily this category of enterprises, that this pattern corresponds to the
normal distribution of enterprises in China, and that the threshold to classify large
enterprises (over 1,500 employees) is likely to have been chosen too low given the size
of an average Chinese plant.
5.3.2 Selection of technologies
Firstly, the distribution of process types (see figure B-33) underlines the emphasis
that is put on ancillary processes, while primary and secondary processes are almost
equally targeted. This feature had been also observed in the case of the French water
basin agency and the discussion that has been made at subsection 4.3.1. should still
be valid here. However, it is remarkable that in the case of the B-4 subproject, the
proportion of primary and secondary processes that are targeted, seems to be higher
than in the French venue. Three reasons could be proposed: (1) the B-4 subproject
is a demonstration project for which the policy to target a wide range of processes
may have been deliberately chosen; (2) the B-4 subproject represents the optimal
management of a CP portfolio of technology because technology options assessment
have been conducted, while the French fund would on the contrary be sub-optimally
managed; or (3) there exist differences across economies and in particular obsolete
primary and secondary processes offer more opportunities for CP in developing coun-
tries. It is impossible to conclude with the present data, about the relative validities
of these three explanations. Further research ought to be done to conclude whether
what is observed here is a sampling bias (explanation (1)), a difference of performance
(explanation (2)), or whether it is due to a difference between levels of economic de-
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velopment (explanation (3)).
Secondly, the selection of technologies underlines the fact that the B-4 sub-project
focused essentially on the diffusion of well-known and generally adopted clean tech-
nologies or at least on the transfer of technologies that were successfully implemented
in industrialized countries. This was particularly obvious in the procedure which has
been followed by audit teams for the screening of options, as the feasibility was de-
fined in large part by the extent of previous experimentation. This is justified by
the fact that the B-4 project aimed at measuring the maximum potential for Cleaner
Production in Chinese enterprises and thus, tended to reduce the technological risk
and to recommend the implementation of simple and well-known technologies. More-
over, the assessment of difficulties to implement CP was more designed to evaluate
the reaction of Chinese enterprises toward technical options' assessment, rather than
the potential for innovation of these enterprises. This simplifies the analysis of fac-
tors for success or for failure in the implementation of the various technologies, as
technological uncertainty associated with innovation should only play a marginal role.
However, it seems that the project could have included the implementation of one or
two innovative technologies (and not only technology transfers) to test the potential
for innovation instead of designing a screening procedure that eliminated such pro-
posals in the first stage of the technical options assessment.
The categorization of innovative technologies presented in figures B-34 and B-35
may therefore be controversial due to the limited number of data. It seems from
these graphs that input substitution is accompanied by innovation 12 but this may
be a statistical bias. More reliable interpretation indicates that fewer innovation
would happen for primary processes than for secondary and ancillary ones, but waste
recovery and process changes are equally innovative. These results oppose the in-
terpretation to the ones that have been obtained in the case of the French fund. It
suggests that waste recovery and process changes in China may both be located at
'
2 Two input substitution technologies have been identified, including one innovative.
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the bottom of Foster's innovation S-curve. It may also indicates that ancillary pro-
cesses may still offer a large potential for innovation and therefore be located in the
steep part of the S-curve, as opposed to the French venue for which most innovation
would have already happened in this field. Primary processes, because of the rigidi-
ties toward change for environmental purposes would still be at the bottom of the
S-curve. The high rate of innovation observed in the case of secondary processes may
be a consequence of large opportunities for technology transfer (see Figure B-43).
Further evidence should be found to confirm these results and the interpretation that
is proposed here.
The distribution of the various categories of CP options stresses the large focus on
process change with more than 55% of all technologies. Waste recovery options come
second with 30% while input substitution and product redesign are only in minority.
This importance of process change illustrates the fact that many processes are obso-
lete and need to be updated. However, the relatively small number of waste recovery
options hides the fact that these become more numerous if the low- and non-cost
options were also considered 13. To take this feature into account, Duan's OECD pa-
per used a different methodology which distinguished "technological update", which
are mainly representing process changes, from "low- and no-cost options" for which
waste recovery dominated other alternatives. However, the range of project costs that
would be obtained with such a categorization, may be too low to justify the financial
assistance from an environmental fund.
This is confirmed by the cost distribution obtained for the various categories of
CP options (see figure B-38). Waste recovery options present a relatively flat pattern
decreasing after three million RMB. Process changes are dominantly located in the
range 3 to 10 million RMB but are also significantly observed in the range 300,000 to
600,000 RMB. This may be interpreted by the existence of two categories of process
'
3 These were implemented as "good housekeeping" measures right after the first phase of the B-4
subproject as they did not require external financial support.
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changes: one targeting capital intensive part of the process (usually involving the ren-
ovation of the core process), and another involving local interventions on the process
(replacement of a single technology). This explanation is reinforced by figure B-40
which establishes the focus of process changes on primary and secondary processes
while ancillary ones are dominated by waste recovery options.
The cost distribution of technologies according to the type of process suggests
that primary and secondary processes follow a similar pattern with a higher focus
on capital-intensive options for primary ones. Ancillary processes, on the contrary,
because they involve lower-cost waste recovery options can be targeted at a lower cost.
Finally, the distributions of payback times provide interesting information about
the economic benefits of technologies financed during the B-4 subproject. Still rele-
vant with Duan's observations ([73]), waste recovery options have a better return on
investment than process changes (2 to 4 years compared to 4 to 6 years). This may
contradict the intuition given that process changes would be expected to improve
more significantly production efficiency than do waste recovery options which are not
affecting core processes. Moreover, given the low cost of waste and of raw materials
in China, savings in these two categories should trigger low economic returns. On
the other hand, a possible explanation could be that given the poor maintenance
and performance of processes in developing countries, large quantities of waste and
raw materials may be saved by simple internal recycling. This is confirmed by the
description of environmental benefits that are observed, with reductions by several
orders of magnitude of water or energy consumptions.
In spite of the significant correlation between waste recovery options and ancil-
lary processes, and between process change and primary and secondary processes,
figure B-41 shows that ancillary processes' investments tend to have longer payback
period than secondary and ancillary ones. This should be a consequence of the fact
that process change options for ancillary processes tend to trigger less economic ben-
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efits than for primary and secondary processes 14. This reinforces the idea that, apart
from when waste are recovered, options targeting core (primary and secondary) pro-
cesses are more profitable.
However, important policy consequences may incur depending on the primary
focus of the financing scheme that could support such technologies: if the focus is
on financial efficiency and security, options with short paybacks (i.e. waste recovery
options or process changes for primary and secondary processes) should be preferred.
On the contrary, if the purpose is to compensate for the lack of private capital for en-
vironmental issues where it is needed (when projects are not economically interesting
and when they have long payback times), then other options should be investigated.
The choice of an option should, in that last case, also be related to the environmental
performance i.e. the potential for pollution abatement. This aspect is not discussed
here and should be further investigated.
5.3.3 Comparison with the institutional model of an externally-
supported revolving fund
Such observations should be compared to similar results from the previously studied
environmental funds. This would show whether technologies identified after the B-4
audits are likely to be financed by existing models for environmental funds. Results
from the B-4 subproject are hereafter considered as the optimal pattern for the CP
portofolio of an environmental fund. However, this considers that the total cost of
each technology would be covered by a loan from a fund. Obviously, this is a strong
approximation and the pattern obtained in the case of the B-4 project should be
shifted toward lower costs to be able to compare with the loans' distributions of funds.
14Four examples are included in the data with paybacks of 4.9, 6, 5.6 and 5.3 years which are
significantly higher than for other options..
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Compared to the Chinese funds, a first main difference is the focus of the B-4
subproject on Cleaner Production whereas environmental funds have addressed both
end-of-pipe technologies and CP. Dealing with the CP component, the most relevant
example is, as it had been previously reminded, the Tianjin fund because of the num-
ber of technologies that were financially supported. Surprisingly, the Tianjin fund did
focus more on waste recovery than on process change, compared to what CP auditing
had recommended in the case of the B-4 project. This may be a statistical bias from
the small number of data available but on the other hand, it cannot be caused by a
difference in industrial sectors targeted (both sources are similarly distributed across
sectors). Therefore, it is likely that an optimal management of the Tianjin portofolio
should increase the focus on process change options. Moreover, this would also in-
crease the average amount of loans as it had been advised by the World Bank.
Dealing with the cost distributions of the various CP categories, one could ob-
serve very significant differences between the Tianjin fund and the B-4 subproject
even when accounting for the fact that one represents the total cost of technologies
and the other for the loan which covered only a share of that cost. Whereas the B-4
waste recovery options are well distributed until ten million RMB, the Tianjin ones
are in majority lower than one million RMB. Similarly but less remarkable, process
change options are also less expensive in the case of the Tianjin fund. This observation
could confirm the fact that this fund has been focusing on too low-cost technologies
and in fact the level of its financial assistance may be below the level for which pri-
vate capital and internal financing would be sufficient in a strong enough regulatory
context. In the case of the B-4 projects, companies have financed by themselves most
of the low- and no-cost options identified after the first phase of the technical options
assessment but this was motivated by the incentive to get a loan from the World
Bank to implement more expensive technologies. Therefore, it could happen that an
audit procedure prior to the granting of a loan, could encourage the enterprise to
self-finance these low cost options while the fund would provide financial support for
higher cost technologies. On the other hand, such a strategy should avoid having a
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"gap" between the maximum cost that a company would be willing to pay for the
environment given the regulatory background, and the minimum amount that the
fund would consider for assistance. It could happen that the range of 300,000 to
one million RMB that is targeted by the Tianjin fund is still relevant in this respect.
Moreover, this is highly dependent on the size of the enterprise as SMEs have much
lower financial capabilities than large companies. It also depends on the economic
returns of the technology. The CP audit procedure may provide extra incentive by
showing (what is usually observed) that low- and no-cost options have a much lower
payback time than expensive technologies ([73]). As a conclusion on this issue, the
Tianjin fund is obviously financing too many low cost technologies but should not
decide to stop funding this category of subprojects. Evidence from the French wa-
ter basin agency shows that these technologies still require financial assistance even
in the case of an industrialized country where private capital for the environment
is more available and the regulatory background is stronger. Finally, the fact that
the aggregated pattern of cost distributions for all Chinese funds matches the B-4
subproject's pattern, does not account for the significant differences that exist across
funds.
Important differences and analogies seem to exist between the CP component of
the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse and the B-4 subproject portfolio. The discussion on
innovation versus diffusion made at the previous subsection, undermines the fact that
the French agency adopted a policy toward innovation while the Chinese project ad-
dressed innovation exclusively at the level of technology transfers. As already pointed
out, the distribution of enterprises across the three levels of process types shows that
the B-4 subproject focused more on primary and secondary processes than does the
French agency. Compared to the French venue, the Chinese project also included
more process change options, suggesting that in developing countries, there might
exist more opportunities for the replacement of obsolete technologies than in indus-
trialized economies where processes have already been updated.
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All these differences may be important when designing an environmental fund ded-
icated to Cleaner Production. Policies in favor of higher cost technologies or in favor
of short term loans, may have various consequences on the distribution of technolo-
gies across CP options' categories and process types. The B-4 subproject had been
designed with the purpose of measuring the potential for CP in Chinese enterprises
after completion of a technical options assessment. As such, it should also represent
the optimal outcome that could be obtained at that time from an CP externally-
supported environmental fund. Lessons from the French water basin agency may as
well be useful for designing the long-term evolutions of such a fund. The next chapter




and for Designing Cleaner
Production Revolving Funds
This chapter concludes with a set of recommendations for development banks to es-
tablish revolving funds in developing countries. Technology Options Analysis might be
a useful instrument to identify cost-effective options and to promote Cleaner Produc-
tion. A comparison with other financial schemes such as lines of credit for industrial
pollution, is done in the case of China and the World Bank. Institutional design and
operating procedures are both considered.
158
6.1 Methodology for Evaluating Existing National
Environmental Funds in order to Implement
Externally-Supported Revolving Funds
In conclusion, based on the previous discussion, the model of national environmental
fund is examined with particular attention brought on its capacity to promote CP.
An evaluation scheme is proposed to determine from the design characteristics and
the operating results, whether a fund is likely to perform well in promoting CP in a
particular economy.
6.1.1 Conclusion on the capacity of national environmental
funds to promote CP
Coexistence of preventive and reactive environmental policies
Environmental funds can be designed to address specifically CP or to allocate specific
resources for this purpose. Existing models have used this possibility with the "clean
technology" approach of the French water basin agencies, the demonstration program
recently initiated by the Polish fund, and the CP World Bank-supported revolving
funds in China. By doing such, the strategy has been to develop within a financial
structure dedicated to the promotion of industrial pollution abatement, a more pre-
ventive approach. Competition with traditional "end-of-pipe" technologies suggests
that the French approach of classifying separately clean technologies may allow to
evaluate rapidly the extent of use of the preventive approach, and may prevent a
progressive abandonment of CP as it has been partially observed in the case of the
Tianjin fund at the end of 1995.
This problem of the coexistence of the two different approaches - reactive and pre-
ventive - (one only being socially optimal), could be solved by (1) the earmarking of
specific f.Lunds for CP; or (2) modifying economic parameters or human management
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in favor of prevention. The first solution would be more "regulatory" by deciding to
dedicate a certain amount of the fund's human and financial resources to CP, while
the other could be achieved by for example lowering the maximum amount of loans
or giving extra subsidies to CP projects. The earmarking approach may not be eco-
nomically efficient and, in fact, none of the venues studied in this thesis seem to have
used it 1. The second approach has been used by another French water basin agency,
the Agence de l'Eau Seine-Normandie, which lowered its interest rates for loans sup-
porting clean technologies 2. This intervention on the value of financial parameters
may as well hamper the extent of the use of CP options, as it has been established
in the case of the Tianjin fund, when incentives were given to raise the cost of projects.
However, it seems from the present research that an essential element of a policy
aiming at promoting CP within a fund's institutional context, is related to managers
in charged of identifying potential projects within the organization. In the case of the
French water basin fund, the "ingenieurs charges d'affaires" who are in direct contact
with enterprises, are an important level of the decision making process leading to the
arbitrage between end-of-pipe and CP technologies.
Such considerations suggest that the structure of an environmental fund can be
suitable to implement a preventive environmental strategy. Mechanisms to implement
it should not use the "earmarking" approach which strongly reduces the flexibility of
financial management, nor focus on the economic approach which may not prove to
be effective because of market failures, but should on the contrary concentrate on the
training and sensitivity toward prevention, of task managers in charge of identifying
technologies eligible for funding within enterprises.
1The French water agencies do establish an accounting separation for CP projects but without
fixing a total amount for the resources used for that purpose.
2According to an official from the agency, this did not seem to have caused an increase of the
number of CP projects financed by the water basin agency. Further research ought to be done to
explain this characterized "market failure".
160
Evaluation of the selection of enterprises and technologies
In all the funds that have been examined here, there seem to be a broad policy for se-
lection across industrial sectors. Deliberate focus on a particular sector is not suitable
because, once again, in would limitate the whole benefit of the cooperative system,
which is the flexibity of allocating resources where they may be the most needed .
However, as a transitional policy and when a fund is created, such a sectoral approach
in the selection of enterprises, may facilitate the initial capacity building of the insti-
tution, and be used for didactic reasons.
There seem to be, on the other hand, a focus on a particular size of enterprises. All
types of enterprises should be eligible for CP, but it should be taken into account that
CP often becomes the only alternative for SMEs (unless, they discharge their waste
in a common pollution treatment system but this is not possible for air pollution).
Moreover, large firms may already be equipped in pollution abatement technologies,
as it is the case in France, or may have more technical and financial resources. How-
ever, in the case of China, large firms are more easy to target because they usually
are state-owned and therefore, better known by governmental institutions such as
EPBs. This strategy choice should therefore be dictated by an identification of needs
for support from environmental funds. This may differ between countries although it
seems that in all economies, SMEs (TVIES in China) tend to be important targets
for a CP strategy.
The issue of media-specificity and the debate local/national are similar to the
previous point, because they also involve the "earmarking" of resources. The Chi-
nese and the Central and Eastern European funds are all comprehensive, as opposed
3An exception to this rule has been observed in Shandong province in China where a legislation
was passed to collect a tax calculated on the level of production in the paper and brewing industries,
and which was redistributed integrally to enterprises to invest in pollution abatement (i.e. each
enterprise recovered the same amount it contributed to, minus the transaction costs). This should
be considered as a marginal example which may not be both economically and politically acceptable
elsewhere.
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to the French water agencies. However, the water agencies increased their financial
flexibility by having designed a cooperating system in which not only enterprises, but
also households and farmers are contributing. There may be also some advantages
increasing the economic efficiency of resource allocation, by specializing on a partic-
ular media or by being present at the local level. Further economic research should
be conducted to determine how this tradeoff may distort the efficiency of environ-
mental funds. Other arguments against media-specificity invoke pollution transfer
across media. In the case of the agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse, this issue has been
addressed under a few occasions when the implementation of a technology caused
emissions into the air of toxic particulates which were finally falling on the ground
close to the plant, and contributing to the pollution of ground water. In these cases,
the policy of the agency has been to reject the technology but theoretically a tech-
nology making a transfer of pollution from water to the air could be funded. After
having considered the technology portfolio of the agency, it seems however that the
effect is likely to be marginal. Direct transfer to workers' health by increasing the
occupational risk may be significant, even with comprehensive funds. None of the
funds that have been studied seem to have included this criteria in their screening
procedure of technologies. Moreover, a recent study done by Ashford, Banoutsos,
Christiansen and Stratikopoulos ([52]) has established that certain "clean" technolo-
gies may increase the occupational hazard. Such investigation should be pursued with
the present venues.
The selection of technologies clearly results in preferences within the portfolio of
environmental funds. The present research has identified a large focus on diffusion,
ancillary processes, and waste recovery and process change options. This may be the
result of differences in opportunities between these various categories but could also
be a distortion from the technological strategy of environmental funds or from the
technological choices of enterprises. Other CP options such as input substitution or
product redesign, technologies targeting primary and secondary processes, innovative
approaches for certain categories of technologies and processes, should probably be
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more encouraged. Differences across economies have been observed suggesting that
such a technology policy should also consider the level of economic development. This
thesis suggests that further research should be done to precisely define what should be
the optimal portfolio of an environmental fund. A systematic screening of alternatives
(technology options assessment or CP audit) could help determining for individual
enterprises what might be the optimal choices. In the case of the Chinese funds, com-
parison between technology distributions after audits, and funds' project portfolios,
suggest that the policy for selection of technologies may not be optimal for funds.
Further research is needed to confirm this result, but including a systematic screen-
ing of options in the policy of funds is likely to become an important factor for success.
Finally, it should be stressed that resistances to certain categories of CP options
(process changes, input substitution, product redesign), technologies targeting pri-
mary and secondary processes, or to innovation should be expected in enterprises. In
none of the present venues, there seem to exist specific incentives to support these
types of technologies. However, the promotion of innovation should be an essential
part of CP, as well as a focus on primary processes where a large potential for pollu-
tion prevention may exist. A different rate of innovation observed across categories of
technologies should be expected, given their relative positions on their corresponding
innovation S-curve. This may for example, have been observed here with a rate of
innovation significantly lower for waste recovery options compared to process changes.
Evaluation of the disbursement strategy
The financial policy of environmental funds may be an important way to influence
the promotion of specific technologies. The distributions of project costs that have
been established, clearly indicate that various categories of technologies may differ
significantly in terms of costs. There is strong evidence in particular that by regu-
lating financial parameters, such as putting a lower limitation for project costs, may
penalize CP and more particularly certain categories of CP options. The size of en-
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vironmental funds compared to its human resources may play an important role by
encouraging a raising of the average project cost to minimize the undisbursed ratio
of the fund. This is particularly illustrated by the experience from the Tianjin fund.
Funds seem to be risk-averse for technological and financial risks. However, an
excess of risk-averseness for technological risk may penalize innovation, and the equiv-
alent for financial risk may distort the original environmental objectives of the fund.
To avoid this last bias, the French water basin agencies decided for example not to
consider financial or economic criteria in their selection of enterprises. In spite of such
a policy, the default rate is close to zero. On the contrary, the Chinese funds which in-
clude an evaluation of the financial and economic performances of enterprises in their
selection procedures, have a very high default rate due to unrecovered repayments of
loans. To improve this bad performance which should be partly caused by the lack
of financial experience of EPBs in financial management, the World Bank tend to
move environmental funds toward more financial and less governmental institutions.
Such an approach may succeed, but should not modify the primary environmental
objectives of funds. This research seem to have identified a correlation between this
policy and an increase of the amount of loans that may result in a decrease of the CP
performance of funds. The next section intend to propose a model that may improve
the financial performance of funds while keeping their primary environmental objec-
tives.
By considering the various venues, two tendencies can be clearly identified: one
observed with several World Bank-assisted revolving funds in China with a focus on
short-term commercial loans, that act as would do commercial banks and therefore
that intend to correct market failures. and one represented by the French water basin
agencies that intend to correct externalities and provide enterprises with a financial
assistance that private capital cannot support according to their criteria for profitabil-
ity. In developing countries, the two approaches should be supported if environmental
efficiency is to be achieved.
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Finally, the financial strategy of environmental funds should take into account
rigidities that may exist within the firm for the financing of technology improvements
in primary processes. Changes in primary processes are likely to happen at specific
times because the investment strategy of a firm often proves to be discrete. Envi-
ronmental funds should identify these "investment occurance" within the enterprises
they liaise with, to leverage environmentally-friendly changes in primary processes by
bringing financial and technical aid on those occasions. None of the existing funds
seem to have adopted a proactive attitude toward these opportunities yet.
6.1.2 Criteria that seem to be relevant to characterize the
success of a fund
The methodology that has been followed here addressed both issues related to the
design of funds and their operating performance. This research suggests that if an
existing fund is to be used to channel financial aid, the scheme that has been used
here could be helpful for evaluating the performance of a particular venue.
Determination of the primary objective of an environmental fund
According to the previous discussion, a clear distinction should be make between two
different types of financial instruments:
(1) funds aiming at correcting market failures; ie at providing financial assistance
to projects that should be normally handled with private equity. The purpose of these
are to stimulate the emergence of sources of funding for profitable financial invest-
ments, and to make the private sector (investors in particular) become more familiar
with the management of environmentally-related projects. These types of funds are
especially needed in developing countries and transition economies.
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(2) funds aiming at correcting externalities ie providing financial assistance to en-
vironmental projects that would otherwise not be financed by the private sector even
without market failures. These instruments should also promote the innovation of
existing clean technologies. Such funds, or other mechanisms designed for the same
purpose (regulation for example) are needed in all types of economies.
For both funds the importance of information dissemination seems to be critical.
Market failures may be caused by information failures if private financing institutions
are not aware of the potential for clean technologies. On the other hand, enterprises
do not have either incentives to investigate for non profitable environmental technolo-
gies and spend human resources in information collection in that field.
Before designing an environmental fund in a developing country, aid agencies or
development banks should consider what scheme is to be preferred. It seems that
aid agencies, that tend to channel more grant-type financial aid and that are govern-
mental institutions themselves, have focused on the second strategy. The assistance
granted by the European PHARE program to the Polish fund, is at least consis-
tent with such a strategy. Development banks, because they are more concerned
about the repayment of their loans 4and because one of their primary mission is to
promote the emergence of the private sector in developing countries and transition
economies, seem to have preferred the first solution. However, as part of the mis-
sions of the World Bank, "ensuring development is environmentally sustainable" is
being constantly stressed. Some Chinese World Bank-supported revolving funds seem
sometimes to be in between the two strategies, by working closely with environmental
governmental agencies or designing schemes with a mix of loans and grants. Unless
coordination with other aid organizations clearly results in a separation of respon-
sibilities between bilateral aid agencies and grant aid allocated to strategy (2) and
4This is very clear from the comparison of the various financing schemes that had been done by
the EBRD in the case of Romania. The revolving fund model was immediately eliminated in spite of
its good score, because it was considered that it should be limited to grant-type financial assistance.
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development banks focusing on strategy (1), the World Bank should also consider
providing assistance to governmental funds aiming at correcting externalities. This
thesis proposes that the revolving fund model can also be supported by a loan-type
financial aid.
Important design parameters
The nine indicators that have been defined for the purpose of this research may pro-
vide a good evaluation scheme for other environmental funds. As it has been observed
here, the use of these criteria allows in particular to identify if a fund primary ob-
jective is more focusing on one of the two strategies previously defined. Expected
tendencies should be:
Strategy (1): more autonomous and financial-oriented institutions; funds that
are more involved with the financial management of projects; selection of enterprises
based on their economic and financial performance; disbursement policy based essen-
tially on commercial loans with short-term maturities.
Strategy (2): more governmental and strongly environmentally concerned insti-
tutions; funds that tend to have a comprehensive approach by integrating environ-
mental, technical and financial expertise; selection of enterprises according to their
environmental impact; systematic identification of projects related to environmental
prioritization; disbursement policy based on long term, subsidized loans or grants.
Management of the project portfolio
Another aspect of the evaluation of an existing fund should address its operating per-
formance as it has been conducted here. Statistical processing of project portfolios
should focus (1) on the selection of enterprises; (2) on the technological characteris-
tics of the projects that are financed; and (3) on the financial characteristics of the
assistance that is provided.
If the fund belongs to the second strategy previously introduced, the selection of
enterprises should be consistent with the extent of their environmental impact. Top
polluters and polluters located in sensitive areas should be targeted in priority. If
the fund belongs to the first strategic alternative, emphasis on profitable enterprises
should be observed.
This thesis proposes, based on a methodology introduced by Ashford ([61]) in
1995, to assess, first separately and then by measuring correlations, three dimensions
of technological choices: (1) categories of CP options; (2) type of processes that are
targeted; and (3) the level of innovation. Each of these criteria may be measured
in various ways. This thesis has for example chosen a "process flow" approach for
defining categories of CP options and used two or three levels of innovation depending
on the quality of available data. Refinements could be introduced in these simple ty-
pologies, but the present experience emphasized the convenience and performance of
using such proxies. Secondly, the environmental performance of technologies should
be controlled. The use of aggregated "cost-effectiveness" ratios, mixing different cate-
gories of pollutants as the Chinese equiscalar index, should be proscribed due to many
possible distortions that could cause errors of interpretation. Considerations of the
pollutant abatement for each substance should be preferred. Moreover, distinction
should be made between ex post and ex ante evaluations of the environmental impact
of technologies.
Financial aspects are firstly correlated to the previous technological categorization
of technologies. Cost distributions successfully allow to identify cost differences across
categories. The effective disbursement strategy of the fund may also be compared to
design objectives by controlling loans' amount, maturities, interest rates, and grace
periods. Finally, the financial performance of funds can be measured through the
measurement of the undisbursed ratio, the default rates and the transaction costs.
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This thesis conducted such an extensive study in the case of the Tianjin fund for
which data were available.
6.1.3 Proposal for an evaluation scheme
Enlightened by the experience from evaluating the previous venues, this research pro-
poses the following evaluation scheme for assessing the performance of environmental
funds:
(0) Identification of the demands for environmental investments, in particular (i)
financial resources necessary to offset market failures; and (ii) investments necessary
to compensate for externalities. Estimation of the corresponding existing offer for the
two categories of investments.
(1) Identification of the declared objectives of the fund (usually easily identifiable
in statutes). Comparison with the estimation for demand presented at stage (0).
(2) Assessment of the design of the fund; (i) status; (ii) policy for identifying
options; and (iii) financial regime. This assessment should be compared to the objec-
tives of the fund identified at stage (1).
(3) Measurement of the distribution of the fund's portfolio; categories to be dis-
tinguished should include: (i) financial parameters; (ii) type of enterprises; (iii) type
of technologies; (iv) environmental impact.
If the fund is well designed and operating properly, consistency should be observed
between the various stages. This thesis has conducted only a partial evaluation ac-
cording to this evaluation scheme: too few data were available to conduct the assess-
ment of the demand, although hypothesis have been proposed. The environmental
impact of technologies was not discussed into details due to the fact that all data
were ex ante estimations and often incomplete. Further research ought to be made
to complete the present evaluation.
6.2 Recommendations for Designing CP Revolv-
ing Funds
For development banks willing to promote CP, externally-supported revolving funds
may be relevant especially in a country where a national environmental fund is already
in place. This section intends to contribute to solving this dilemma, to propose a model
of CP revolving fund and to provide recommendations.
6.2.1 Conclusion on the relevance of designing externally-
supported revolving funds to promote CP and of us-
ing existing national environmental funds. Compari-
son with financial alternatives.
Advantages of externally-supported revolving funds
Existing NEFs may be good candidates to channel financial resources dedicated to
environmental protection because (1) they provide an existing administrative struc-
ture; (2) they will remain once the development project is concluded and will build on
the experience developed to become a sustainable financial mechanism for the envi-
ronment; (3) they may increase the overall impact of a development program through
capacity building; (4) they can bring their experience of local enterprises; (5) they
offer flexibility for future investments once the capital is "revolving"; (6) they allow
lower-cost projects with high environmental value to be funded; and (7) they can help
raise counterpart funding for the environment.
These positive features can be observed in the case of the World Bank-supported
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Chinese funds. When the enterprises selected for the purpose of a line-of-credit ap-
proach are usually pre-defined and exclusively involving large investments, environ-
mental funds succeeded in having a flexible pipeline of lower-cost projects. While
other financial instruments stop operating at the end of development projects, revolv-
ing funds based on NEFs will remain after reimbursement of the foreign assistance's
loan.
Difficulties to be overcome compared to other financial alternatives
Three criticisms are usually addressed to the use of existing NEFs to design externally-
supported revolving funds: (1) their lack of transparency; (2) their disbursement pol-
icy based on grants which makes a transition toward a loan approach more difficult;
and (3) a high default rate because the capital is inacurately recovered.
It should first be observed that all these criticisms involve financial issues and
that they critize exclusively the financial management of funds. The grant policy is
however largely dominated by a soft loan policy in most NEFs. Exceptions involve
NEFs that are not addressing industrial pollution but rather disburse grants for other
environmental issues such as the protection of biodiversity or the support to the NGO
community to promote environmental consciousness. It should be stressed however
that even industrialized countries' funds such as the French water basin agencies may
include a mix of grants and loans or soft loans to finance environmental projects.
These funds intend in fact to provide the relevant "package" - economic incentives of
subsidies and taxation, plus technical assistance - to enterprises to internalize exter-
nalities. If revolving funds to be established do intend to target strategy (2) as defined
at section 6.1., soft loans or combination of loans plus grants should be considered as
design options.
The "lack of transparency" argument may effectively be observed when assessing
NEFs, partly due to the fact that no systematic management of portfolios are being
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used. This has been for example observed during this research with the case of the
Polish fund. However, it should be stressed that this lack of transparency seems to
result more from poor management techniques rather than from intentional mis-use
of financial resources. Proper reporting procedures such as the one designed by the
World bank for most of its externally-supported Chinese revolving funds, reinforced
by annual financial audits, may be sufficient to guarantee a precise cash flow assess-
ment of funds as it has been done here in the case of the Tianjin venue. Once these
have been established, it also becomes the responsibility of the foreign lending institu-
tion to process this information to follow the fund's evolutions with time. Additional
risk of "intentional mis-use of resources" through the falsification of procurement doc-
uments, is the same for revolving funds as it is for other financial mechanisms such
as lines of credit.
Finally, a high default rate may effectively be observed at least in the case of one
Chinese fund. This may disrupt one of the main advantage of the revolving fund
model, consisting in the re-investment of the capital that is reimbursed by enter-
prises. This is in large part a consequence of the past "grant policy" of NEFs and the
difficulty of the transition toward a loan approach ' for institutions that are still inex-
perienced with bank-style procedures such as financial management and loan recovery.
The next subsection will propose some recommendations to improve the default rate
of revolving funds. If proving to be successful, such a model of externally-supported
revolving fund could play a catalytic role in promoting the policy change toward soft
loans in Chinese EPBs.
5 As it has been stated before in this research, this is suggested by the fact that the same default
rate is observed between NEFs that have just switched to the loan policy, and externally-supported
revolving funds.
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6.2.2 Proposal to design a CP revolving fund
Using the environmental competence of governmental agencies and the
financial expertise of private financial institutions
As constantly stressed in this thesis, environmental funds should develop both a fi-
nancial and an environmental expertise. In developing countries where both the two
strategies described at section 6.1. should be applied, a single model could be used
to stimulate both the emergence of private capital for profitable environmental in-
vestments, and contribute to the financing of high environmental impact industrial
projects.
The institution that is proposed here would build on existing EPBs funds which
have accumulated significant experience in the management of environmental invest-
ments, and on the financial expertise of a local commercial bank. This model is
similar in many ways to the one that has been used by the World Bank in China.
However, this thesis introduces significant differences based on the methodology pre-
viously described. A three-step methodology should guide the selection of enterprises
and technologies:
(1) Existing EPBs funds have been designed with the purpose of internalizing
environmental externalities and therefore, the selection of enterprises should follow
at first, a purely environmental approach. A methodology should be developed to
identify, and target in priority, heavy polluters or polluters creating the highest risk
for local populations' health. No economic nor financial criteria should be taken into
account during this first phase.
(2) Assessment of the financial situation of the firm should be conducted as a
second step with the assistance of the commercial bank. Companies should be sorted
in three categories: (i) heaviest polluters with good ability to repay; (ii) heaviest pol-
luters with less good ability to repay but not expected to go bankrupt; and (iii) less
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serious polluters with good ability to repay. Enterprises selected to receive assistance
from the fund should be targeted in that order.
(3) Technology options assessment should be conducted prior to granting finan-
cial assistance. Options should be sorted in (a) high environmental impact and high
economic returns; (b) high environmental impact and low economic returns; and (c)
low environmental impact and high economic returns.
Ideally, a NEF following strategy (2) (such as the French water basin agencies)
would select enterprises exclusively in panels (i) and (ii), and technologies in cate-
gories (b) exclusively. On the other hand, if there were no market failures, private
capital should be found to finance (a) and (c) in enterprises belonging to panels (i)
and (iii). A mixed approach, can be found, that keeps the primary objectives of the
NEF:
(1) Finance technologies (a) and (b) in enterprises (i) in priority. Technologies (a)
should receive less subsidy than technologies (b). For example, the interest rate could
be raised, the maturity diminished, or the ratio Grant/Loan be decreased (grants
could come from counterpart funding, see next subsection).
(2) Then, finance technologies (a) in enterprises (ii). This increases the financial
risk because enterprises (ii) may have difficulties to repay. However, such high en-
vironmental impact technologies implemented in heavy polluting industries should
remain priority targets for NEFs.
(3) If the default rate observed by targeting enterprises (ii) becomes too high,
technologies (a) and (b) in enterprises (iii) should be selected 6.
6 Rather than technologies (c) in (i) because environmental funds could gain more experience
from becoming familiar with the implementation of high environmental impact technologies.
(4) Finally, the identification of technologies (c) with high economic returns should
give incentives to the agent bank to finance them apart from the fund mechanism and
therefore contribute to the reduction of market failures for environmental projects.
(5) In the long-term, the proportion of technologies (a) financed by the fund should
decrease as market failures tend to disappear. The fund should try to negotiate co-
financing of such projects with commercial banks (starting with the agent bank).
This prioritization scheme (see Figure B-44) is expected to correspond better to
the initial objectives of the fund rather than a cost-effectiveness ranking which could
cause misinterpretations.
Designing precise financial parameters
The international lender or donor may interact in different ways with the existing
NEF when establishing an externally-supported revolving fund. Traditionally, the
World Bank approach is based on a 50% counterpart contribution principle. For ex-
ample, in most of the Chinese funds, the World Bank loan is progressively "injected"
in the fund while pollution levies collected from Chinese enterprises flow in with the
same rate. However, in all but the Tianjin fund, this counterpart funding is supposed
to stop when the World bank loan is fully disbursed. This produces a progressive re-
duction of the size of the fund which may threaten the sustainability of the financial
mechanism by reducing dramatically its rate of activity. For this reason, the Tianjin
model, for which counterpart funding from pollution levies do not cease, should be
preferred.
Experience from the Tianjin fund which has been the largest World bank-supported
revolving fund in China suggests that given the current size of EPBs funds and the
learning curve of these institution, which conditions the number of projects in their
initial pipeline, an optimal size should be between 10 and 20 million USD. Therefore,
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an optimal World Bank loan for these institutions should be 5 to 10 million USD on
a 50% counterpart funding basis. A progressive increase of this size could be planned
with continuous counterpart funding flowing into the fund, as previously suggested.
Previous discussions suggest that disbursement parameters such as the maturity
and the interest rate should be properly designed. Technologies with high economic
returns should be supported by short-term loans and high interest rates '. On the con-
trary, technologies with high environmental impact and long payback period should
be supported by lower interest rates and longer maturity. If such a strategy is pre-
ferred by the original NEF (because a too rapid transition toward a pure loan policy
is not acceptable), a combination of grants and loans could also be used.
Finally, this research has put into relief the negative consequences that lower-
bounding of loans' amounts could cause to the technology portfolio of the revolving
fund. An upper limitation may be suitable because (1) it may prevent the financing
of large waste water treatment plants and favor the preventive approach; and (2) it
may guarantee an optimal "revolving" of the fund (an prevent for example the fi-
nancing of an initial high-cost technology which would immobilize a large part of the
capital and therefore, would dramatically reduce the number of projects that could be
financed). The lower-bounding limit (if any) could be determined with the purpose
of (1) reducing the undisbursed ratio; and (2) not financing too low-cost projects
which could be self-financed by enterprises, but it should not cause sub-optimal dis-
tribution of technologies within the fund's portfolio. However, to encourage primary
processes to be targeted, sufficient financial assistance should be made available as
these categories of investments usually have a higher cost. Further research should
be conducted to decide if parameters influencing the distribution of loans' amount
should be introduced. To simplify the model, and as it has been the case for the
World Bank funds in China, an upper limitation should be sufficient.
7 Further economic analysis should be conducted to decide whether commercial loans are suitable
or if "slightly soft" loans should be preferred.
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Favoring a technology-based policy for CP
Small funds, as they could be multiplicated in China, based on the existing EPBs'
network, seem particularly relevant to promote CP due to the relatively low level of
financial assistance they could disburse. Training programs should be provided as an
important part of development projects to familiarize funds' technical staffs with the
preventive approach. Particular attention should be put on technical options' assess-
ment procedures which should represent essential factors for success. The method-
ology that has been followed during the B-4 subproject with the CP-audit scheme,
could be used as a success story and the same type of documentation be used.
These audits usually allow to identify numerous no- and low-cost options with
high environmental impact (usually "good housekeeping" measures). Such options
are not suitable as potential candidates for environmental funds because their cost is
generally much to low. However, their implementation could be promoted by requir-
ing it as a criteria for eligibility to the funds.
Post-implementation monitoring should also be conducted by the fund institution
to evaluate the proper implementation of technologies and their effective environ-
mental performance. Comparison with technology options' assessment's expectations
should be done as well.
In countries such as China, where National Cleaner Production Centers have been
established, such an existing local expertise could be used to facilitate the promotion
of CP. Other bilateral programs with an emphasis on clean technology transfers, could
as well be used as a local resource 8
8 In China, many of such programs have taken place such as a CP project initiated with the
support of the Environmental Protection Agency of the state of Illinois (IEPA) or another one
supported by the Nor-wegian aid agency.
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Finally, this training should include a part dedicated to the management of a clean
technology portfolio. The three dimensions (level of innovation, type of process, CP
options' categories) introduced by this thesis, should become important criteria to be
considered in this technology management.
6.2.3 Recommended strategy for development banks
Targetting both financial strategies
This model of externally-supported revolving fund allows development banks to fo-
cus on both financial strategies: on one hand, the partnership with the existing NEF
promotes a long-term strategy of public financial instruments aiming at correcting
environmental externalities. On the other, the partnership with a local commercial
bank may catalyze the emergence of private capital for profitable environmental in-
vestments and improve the financial management of the NEF.
Such an approach would be consistent with both a support to "environmental
sustainability" and to the promotion of the private sector. In that sense, it would
improve the current strategy of development banks which tend to focus particularly
on the development of private capital in developing countries.
Possible project strategy
A main practical difficulty of implementing these models of externally-supported re-
volving funds is the high cost of preparation relative to the small size of funds. As
previously argued, increasing the size of funds may not be suitable because the num-
ber of projects that could be financed may not be flexible enough and this would just
increase the undisbursed ratio.
In China, the large number of existing EPBs suggests to target several of them
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within the same project. For example, a loan of 20 million dollars could be proposed
to a group of four EPBs. Disbursement would be done progressively, as funds identify
projects and compete one with another. Such a scheme would allow to allocate more
financial resources to the most efficient funds and would give extra incentives to funds
for increasing their portfolio. However, constraints on the cost of projects should be
imposed to avoid a situation in which funds would exclusively choose high-cost in-
vestments. This strategy would also reduce the preparation cost as negotiation and
training sessions could be done at the same time for several funds.
An additional improvement that would give an extra incentive to funds to re-
duce their default rate and increase their portfolio would be to take into account the
cash flow coming from reimbursement. External financial resources would be made
available only as a complement to the normal resources of the fund. For example, if
after the first round of investments from the fund, 400,000 USD are expected to be
reimbursed the second year, and if the total amount of the second round of invest-
ments accounts for one million USD, the external assistance would only be 300,000
USD (the additional 300,000 USD coming from counterpart contributions). Associ-
ated with the competition between funds, this additional feature could be a strong
economic incentive to encourage funds to recover loans' reimbursements.
Finally, these two policies could only be implemented on condition a very precise
technical and financial monitoring of projects is implemented. Well designed short re-
porting documents precising all the relevant parameters previously mentioned, should
be sufficient to achieve an accurate follow up of the contents of funds' portfolios. Tech-
nical review could be done with the support of NCPCs or equivalent pools of expertise
for CP. This could be easily achieved by simply reformulating and completing existing
reporting forms such as the ones used by the agence de l'eau Rhin-Meuse or between
agent banks handling Chinese revolving funds and the World Bank. Such a moni-
toring system would allow to make a continuous evaluation of the various funds that
would be competing, and identify factors for success.
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Adopting different approaches for revolving funds and for lines of credits
Another difficulty to implement a revolving fund approach as opposed to the more
traditional "lines of credit", is the fact that foreign aid procedures may have been
largely designed for the purpose of the second financing mechanism. As opposed to
lines of credit whose focus is more on capital-intensive investments in large enter-
prises, revolving funds are more suitable for more numerous small-scale projects with
high economic benefits and in all types of enterprises.
Providing a systematic list of such modifications of financial procedures is out of
the scope of this thesis, and a detailed assessment of the needs and the constraints
imposed to aid agencies and more particularly to development banks, should be firstly
conducted. However, results from the present research suggest that the possibility
for environmental funds to provide soft loans or a combination of loans and grants
should not be suppressed 9. Similarly, a too strict focus on profitable projects un-
dermining environmental benefits, would contradict the original objectives of these
funds. Moreover, the existence of several financial intermediaries before the World
Bank loan finally reaches the implementing fund level, raises very significantly the
final interest rate. Improvements may be achieved in that field.
Finally, the observation that the design of revolving funds has frequently been
copied from one fund to the other 10 suggests that a proper policy design could be
easily disseminated after having been successfully implemented. This research pro-
poses a basis for the writing of such a project description. The SAR that had been
prepared for the Shandong fund could constitute a good basis as it gives a large part
9This possibility which was kept in the design of the earliest IDA revolving funds in China,disappeared in the latest IBRD ones. Theoretically, a combination of loans at the commercial rate
for resources coming from the World Bank, and of low-interest loans or subsidies, for counterpart
resources could be used to obtain soft loans.
ioThis is particularly obvious if considering the SARs of the World Bank Chinese funds. Entire
paragraphs describing procedures have just been copied from one document to the other.
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to CP and proposes to include a technology options' assessment to select projects.
Such a policy, designed specifically for China, could then be adapted to other devel-
oping countries and transition economies.
6.3 Propositions for Future Research
6.3.1 Assessment of other funds
This thesis has focused essentially on the Chinese World Bank-supported revolving
funds and on the Agence de l'Eau Rhin-Meuse in France. The Polish fund could
not be processed sufficiently due to the lack of quantitative data. As emphasized
at section 3.1., there exist a large number of environmental funds and a significant
proportion of the ones existing in developing countries and transition economies have
been used to channel international aid, especially grants from bilateral aid agencies.
As a continuation of the present thesis, research could be pursued on a country
by country basis, and, as this thesis has tried to proceed, it should at the same time
compare the situation existing in various economies to forecast the future evolution
of environmental funds.
In the case of France, such a study could use data from all of the six water basin
agencies and compare results with the present research. Moreover, the significant
differences in policy that exist between the various French agencies, could provide
useful suggestions for specific factors for success in the design of NEFs. Additional
research could also be conducted in the case of France, by doing a similar study for
the ADEME environmental fund 11
" This French national agency focuses on air pollution and energy efficiency by providing technical
and financial assistance to enterprises. As for the water agencies, the ADEME fund is financed by
earmarked revenues from environmental taxation.
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The Polish fund could also constitute a relevant theme for research. No study
seems to have been conducted so far to assess the types of technologies that have
been supported by this fund. The interactions between this fund and the Polish
NCPC could also be investigated. The Polish example could enlightened the perfor-
mance of the NEF model in Central and Eastern Europe as it is at the same time
one of the eldest and one of the largest of such financial mechanisms. Other funds in
these transition economies could be investigated as well.
In the case of China, the EPB funds constitutes many examples of NEFs that
could be assessed. A World Bank study ([122]) has addressed the example of Jinan
municipality in Shandong province and pointed out important features for the pur-
pose of the present research. Given the current speed of evolution of policies and
institutions in China, a second study of the Jinan case could be particularly relevant
especially after the implementation of the last World Bank-supported CP revolving
fund in Xiaoqing river basin 12
6.3.2 Adding an environmental performance approach to
the technology-based study of the present thesis
This thesis has more particularly addressed the technological side of the portfolio of
these environmental funds, although ex ante estimations of the environmental impacts
have been sometimes presented. Further research should be conducted to confirm the
environmental relevance of the Cleaner Production revolving fund model.
A good indicator of the potential for pollution abatement offered by CP could
be found in several case studies' databases such as the UNEP IE's ICPIC resource
3. There seem today to exist large evidence that the preventive approach is more
12 Jinan municipality is located in the Xiaoqing river basin.
'
3 A diskette version of the International Cleaner production Information Clearinghouse can be
obtained by contacting the Paris Industry and Environment Office of UNEP.
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cost-effective and reliable than the old "end-of-pipe" strategy, especially in developing
countries. A less studied issue would be to compare the global environmental impact
across economies and across various financial mechanisms. The ICPIC database could
there constitute a standard for comparison as it mainly gather achievements from CP
demonstration projects i.e. for which the identification and the implementation of
options is likely to have been conducted under optimal conditions and not under rou-
tine procedures.
Such an evaluation could build on the three-dimension categorization used in this
thesis. This would be an extension of the technological analysis that has been done
here. As a second step, it should consider the effective pollution abatement achieved.
Few data seem to be available about ex post estimations of pollution abatement
achieved after implementation of technologies. Such a field study would therefore be
particularly relevant to confirm the performance of environmental funds.
6.3.3 Confirmation of the hypothesis proposed in this thesis
Finally, this thesis has formulated a large number of interpretations for the results
obtained. Results that should be confirmed include:
* The low innovation rate observed for waste recovery. A systematic study should
allow to identify the relative positions of the various CP options on their S-
curves.
* The difference in opportunities for CP options, existing between economies. The
opportunity for process changes seems to be greater in developing countries due
to obsolete processes.
* Options targeting primary and secondary processes tend to be more profitable
than options targeting ancillary ones. This had been observed by processing
results from the B-4 project in China.
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* The separation of employees dealing with environmental issues from the pro-
duction activities result in a focus on ancillary processes.
* Secondary processes offer more opportunities to input substitution options.
* The role of lower-level managers is determinant to explain the distribution of
an environmental fund's portfolio.
* A move away from the governmental/environmental model of environmental
fund is related to the financial policy of funds toward higher cost technologies.
* Portfolios of the World Bank-supported Chinese funds are not optimal when
compared to results obtained after CP-auditing during the B-4 sub-project.
This thesis should also encourage research in the following fields:
* How the media-specificity of an environmental fund may improve its efficiency
by developing deeper expertise in specific categories of clean technologies?
* How general equilibrium models of earmarking may be built, taking into account
short-term social benefits from this option? When does a transition from ear-
marking to general budgeting of financial resources raised by effluent taxation
may be suitable, and how can it be scheduled and implemented?
* To what extent technologies currently considered as being "clean" and diffused
through mechanisms such as environmental funds, do increase the occupational
risk? This could complement Ashford's results on the ICPIC case studies ([52]).
* How do the decision of a company to invest for primary processes may differ
from a similar decision targeting secondary and ancillary ones? How this feature
could be included in the design of environmental funds to promote diffusion and
innovation of clean technologies targeting primary processes.
* How should be distributed the optimal portfolio of an environmental fund? How
does this may differ with the level of economic development?
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* How do funds differ in their environmental performance (ie the pollution reduc-
tion achieved)'? How does this evolve with the level of economic development?
* How technology transfer may be included in the policy of environmental funds?
What should be an optimal training program for officials from an existing NEF





The original purpose of this thesis was to investigate the rationale beyond the policy
model of national environmental funds and their potential to channel external finan-
cial resources through a financing scheme known as an externally-supported revolving
fund. The evidence researched included a review of the existing literature on funding
instruments for the environment, project documents from international aid organi-
zations and development banks, and the processing of data available from existing
environmental funds' portfolios in France and China.
The first conclusion from this research is that a clear distinction should be made
between two types of funding mechanisms for the environment: one aiming at cor-
recting environmental externalities by financing high environmental impact projects
with economic returns that are insufficient to justify a financing "by itself" from en-
terprises, and a second type of instrument aiming at correcting market failures by
promoting the emergence of private capital for profitable environmental investments.
In developing countries and transition economies where both instruments are needed,
a focus on one category of objectives exclusively, may be suboptimal and result in
a partial solving of the problem of lack of providing adequate financial resources for
the environment.
This thesis has tried to propose an "evolutionary" instrument capable of target-
ing both objectives before specializing in the correction of externalities. Utilizing
existing local resources and institutions, this policy instrument model may improve
the cost-effectiveness of development resources by promoting capacity building to-
ward a sustainable financial mechanism for the environment. Moreover, it may be
particularly suitable to implement Cleaner Production practices in industry if proper
selection criteria for enterprises and technologies are used and if the methodology of
Technology Options Assessment is developed.
Recommendations proposed by this research include a focus on designing op-
erating financial parameters, selecting technologies and handling the institutional
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management of environmental funds. Evidence from the World Bank experience in
China suggests that the policy model of externally-supported revolving funds has not
reached its full potential in this country. Further implementation should, in particu-
lar, build on the experience gained from the B-4 Cleaner Production demonstration
project in China.
Finally, this research has identified significant technical and financial hetero-
geneities existing in the portfolios of existing funds. Possible interpretations have
been proposed but should be considered as a first step for future research. Results
from the present research may help defining what could be the optimal portfolio and
approach of an environmental fund. The three-dimensional categorization of tech-
nologies which has been used in the thesis could be useful in identifying internal or
external distortions influencing an inaccurate selection of technologies. This research
will hopefully initiate a more systematic approach in the management of technical
alternatives in the portfolio of environmental funds, but could also be extended to



































- state budget allocations
- taxes on waste, spent oil,



























grants and technical support
to industries and municipalities
for cleaner production,










Table 1: Environmental Funds in industrialized countries (sources: OECD).
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- nitrogen oxide charge
- federal grants (80%)
- state funds (20%)
- earmarked charges
in certain cases




















in the area where
the tax is raised
grants for pollution
control investments










Table 2: Environmental Funds in industrialized countries (continued).
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- import tax on used cars
water, air, waste
and land charges
water, waste and air
pollution charges
- fuel tax








- air and water
pollution charges
















- national and regional
- government-affiliated




- national and local
- government affiliated
Table 3: Environmental Funds in transition economies (sources: Lovei, OECD).
grants for environmental
protection facilities and studies
grants and soft loans for
monitoring and entreprises
grants and soft loans for
water and air pollution control












loans for air and
water pollution control
grants for investment projects
for air and marine water pollution
grants for pollution control,





Revenue sources Institutional Status Disbursement Policy
- state budget






- national and regional
- government-affiliated
governmental
grants for water and air
pollution abatement
grants for entreprises and
other organisations for
environmental protection activities
grants for legal documents


















































Table 5: Environmental Funds in developing countries (sources: Santa Cruz report, Lovei).
Revenue sources Institutional Status Disbursement Policy
Chile



























- debt swaps Canada
- Entreprise for the Ame-
ricas Initiative's grant
banks' credit




- Canada debt swap


























































































- Canadian Aid (CIDA)
- German Cooperation
- GEF



















































Table 7: Environmental Funds in developing countries (continued).
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Project
Medium-sized Cities Development Project
Tianjin Urban Development and Environment Project
Southern Jiangsiu Environmental Protection Project
Zhejiang Multicities Development Project
Liaoning Environment Project























Table 8: Projects investigated and related funds.
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Credit nb Appraisal Fund(s)
project
Medium-sized Cities Development Project
Tianjin Urban Development and Environment Project
Southern Jiangsiu Environmental Protection Project
Zhejiang Multicities Development Project
Liaoning Environment Project
Hubei Urban Environment Project
Yunnan Environment Project
Shandong Environment Project





















11, 15 and 16
Table 9: Extent of project files' investigation.
Notation:
(1) - OD = Official Document binders
(2) - PR = Project Report and Financial Audit binders
m










- Design of funds (rationale and description)
- Initial list of projects (pipeline)
- Design of funds (procedures)
- Operation of funds (reporting of past projects;
project pipeline and difficulties of implementation)
- Financial efficiency (reimbursement of subloans:
investment policy and review of current portofolio)
- Design of funds (rationale; difficulties of preparation)
- Operation of funds (difficulties of implementation;
review of portfolio)
- Operation of funds (evolution of pipeline; environmental,
technical and financial assessment of projects)

























































































loan WB: 2,579,000 Y
loan WB: 2,607,000 Y
loan WB: 1,663,600 Y
fund: 277,300 Y
total: 2,772,7100 Y
loan WB: 2,199,500 Y
loan WB: 1,320,000 Y
fund: 216,000 Y
total: 2,400,000 Y
loan WB: 10,258,800 Y
fund: 1,140,000 Y
total: 53,610,000
loan WB: 5,115,600 Y
fund: 4,847,200 Y
total: 9,962,800 Y
loan WB: 2,000,000 Y
fund: 1,750,000 Y
total: 3,750,000 Y
loan WB: 2,690,000 Y
fund: 2,706,100 Y
total: 5,396,100 Y
loan WB: 1,800,000 Y
fund: 1,200,000 Y
total: 3,000,000 Y










































































loan WB: 2,204,000 Y
fund: 3,996,000 Y
total: 6,100,000 Y





















loan WB: 1,772,500 Y
fund: 295,400 Y
total: 2,891,900

























Table 13: Ex post pipelines
1996 (2)











































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17: Pipeline of candidate entreprises of the Tianjin Industrial Pollution Control Fund (4)
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RemarksName of Entreprise





























































































































































































process change waste water treatment
process change for air
pollution, waste water treatment
process change










































































































































































































process change, air and
water pollution control
process change, dust
collection and water treatment


















































































































reduction of coal consumption (by 30%)
smoke discharge cut by 95.51% and SO2 by 49.20%
100% of water treated and internally recycled
noise pollution abatement and elimination of acid waste
air: particulates (45 to 17 tpy) and S02 (-7%)
water: -260 tpd of mud , COD: -40 tpd; oil: -35 tpy
air: particulates (-53 tpy), SO02 (105 tpy)
water: reduction of oil discharge by 3.7 tpy
COD reduction from 270 tpy to 90 tpy
COD from 1,820 tpy to 170 tpy, BOD from 6,240 tpy
to 100 tpy and SS from 10,000 tpy to 100 tpy
waste water reduced from 27m/a to 8.1m/a
Cr from 266 mg/l to 0.5mg/l,pH from 2.15 to 8.0-9.0
dust reduced by 88%; noise reduced by 4 dB(A)
waste water reduced by 36%, COD by 99%, BOD by 97%,
SS reduced by 75.6%, aniline by 90%, phenol by 80%
solid waste eliminated, COD: -92.3%, BOD: -95.6%
waste water: -40%, COD: -92%, BOD: -90%, SS: -80%,
noise: -17 dB(A), dust: -50-75%; air: smoke: -20%
COD and SS discharge eliminated
waste water: -80%, COD: -93.7%, SS: -96.5%, oil: -97.4%
air: SO02 emission reduced by 80.4%, dust by 98%
water: COD pollution reduced by 66% and BOD by 74%
waste gas reduced by 28.8%, S02 by 51%, dust by 82%
waste water: -20%, COD: -83%, BOD: -84%, SS: -68%


















water: SS reduction from 15,000 tpy to 90 tpy
COD from 24,000 tpy to 240 tpy; BOD from 6,000 tpy to 90 tpy
water: COD reduction from 174 tpy to 50 tpy
air: particulates from 8.0 tpy to 0.3 tpy;
benzene and toluene eliminated
COD reduction from 200 tpy to 2 tpy
elimination of 115 tpy of toxic and hazardous waste
particulates reduced from 2,825 tpy to 500 tpy
water: COD: -75%, SS: -54%, Phenol: -70%
boiler smoke dust reduced by 62%
air: waste gas pollution eliminated
waste water: -74%; COD: -97%; SS: eliminated






















































































































































































Fushun Coal Briquet Plant
















































































































P% of total projects
Techno. available
% of total projects
Fin. available
% of total projects
Techno. statistics
EOP air
% of total techno.
EOP water
% of total techno.
process chg. I
% of total techno.
mat. substi.
% of total techno.
waste recov.
% of total techno.
prod. redsgn.










Multic. Tianj. Jgs. RF Jgs. LC Zhej. Liaon. Hub. LC
21 38 25 29 5 14 13
0 0 15 6 0 14 0
(0) (0) (60) (21) (0) (100) (0)
19 38 18 14 3 14 13
(90) (100) (72) (48) (60) (100) (100)
21 38 25 29 3 14 13
(100) (100) (100) (100) (60) (100) (100)
2 4 1 4 0 1 7
(11) (11) (6) (29) (0) (7) (54)
13 14 13 6 1 8 8
(68) (37) (72) (43) (33) (57) (62)
4 11 11 13 3 1 1
(21) (29) (61) (93) (100) (7) (8)
0 1 0 0 0 1 0
(0) (3) (0) (0) (0) (7) (0)
1 13 0 2 0 11 2
(5) (34) (0) (14) (0) (79) (15)
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (33) (0) (0)
3 9 1 1 - 2 5
(18) (28) (7) (17) - (14) (38)
13 22 7 2 - 12 4
(76) (69) (50) (33) (86) (31)
1 1 6 3 - 0 4
(6) (3) (43) (50) (0) (31)
- - 1 - - - 2
- 2 3




% of total pjcts
Light
% of total pjcts
Metal/Carbon
% of total pjcts
Food
% of total pjcts
Other
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Table 33: Comparison of the various World Bank supported Chinese funds (2).
Notation:
(1) - unit = RMB.


















China (EPB) China (Tianjin) Poland France
Default rate 30%1 30% N.A. 0
Undisbursed ratio N.A. 2  75%3 N.A. N.A.
Transaction cost 20% 1% N.A. 4%
Table 34: Global Financial Assessment of the various venues.
Remarks:
(1) - In the case of Jinan municipal EPB (Spofford, Ma, Zhou, and Smith, [?])
(2) - Non-Available




Beijing Chemical Works No.3 (BCWN3)
Beijing Electroplating General Factory (BEGF)
Plant Nol, Beijing Pharmaceutical Works (BPW)
Chemical Works No 1, Beijing
Yanshan Petrochemical (CWN1, BWPC)
Chemical Works No 2, Beijing
Yansfhan Petrochemical (CWN2, BWPC)
Changsha Chromate Factory (CCF)
Shaoxing General Bicycle factory (SGBF)
Shaoxing Cereal & Oil Factory (SCOF)
Shaoxing Wool Textile General Mill (SWTGM)
Zhejiang Huasheng Printing

























Table 35: Enterprises selected during the Preparation Phase of the B-4 subproject.
Notation:
(1) - Town and Village (-owned) Industrial Entreprise.
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Name of entreprise Owner!
Penglai County Brewery (PCB) N.A.
Yantai Second Winery (YSW) state
Yantai Seaweed Industry Company (YSIC) N.A.
Muping Lockware Factory (MLF) N.A.
Qufu Cement Factory (QCF) state
Dezhou Second Building N.A.
Material Factory (DSBMF)
Fuyang Winery (FW) state
Ma'anshan Sulphuric Acid Factory (MSAF) state
Refinery, Beijing Yanshan Petrochemical (RBPC) state
Synthetic Rubber Plant, Beijing state
Yanshan Petrochemical (SRP)
Chemical Works No 1, Beijing state
Yanshan Petrochemical (CWN1)
Beijing East Chemical Works (BECW) state
Beijing Pharmaceutical Works (BPW) state
Beijing Tannery (BT) N.A.
Shaoxing Silk Printing & Dyeing Group (SSPDG) state
Shaoxing No 3 Printing & Dyeing Group (SN3PDM) TVIE
Shaoxing Yuejin Printing & Dyeing Company (SYPDC) TVIE
Dushu Printing & Dyeing Corporation (DPDC) TVIE






















Entreprise and CP option
CWN1, BWPC
water recovery from steam
stripping of aldehyde waste water
enlarging waste water disposal






optimizing the plating process
replacing the plating bath
updating the polishing process
SCOF














































































































use residue to produce albumen




iron recovery from slag
material storage extension
QCF




using less alkali in process
setting up a recycling system
vacuum filtering
MLF
reforming the existing line
automation of the line
























































































Entreprise and CP option
CWN1, BWPC
water recovery from steam
stripping of aldehyde waste water
enlarging waste water disposal






optimizing the plating process
replacing the plating bath
updating the polishing process
SCOF










beer recovery by pressing
recycling cooling water
Environmental Benefit
260,500 t of water saved per year
19,300 t water saved, 227 t COD
65,100 t water saved, 309 t COD
18,000 t C02 reduction per year
100% N2 and 90% CH4 recovered
dust pollution eliminated




Ni and 3% Cr saved
Ni and 25% Cr saved
84,900 t water saved per year
water, oil and alkaline savings
COD reduced by 136 t per year
75% water saved
70% water and 302 t COD saved
50% water and 50% COD saved
reduce 0.3% beer losses
reduce 0.5% beer losses
reduces 2% beer losses
save 25,000 t/yr water































use residue to produce albumen




iron recovery from slag
material storage extension
QCF




using less alkali in process
setting up a recycling system
vacuum filtering
MLF
reforming the existing line
automation of the line
complete automation of the line
solid waste reduction by 10 t/yr
95% of alcohol is recovered
30% materials are saved




85% of the water recycled
33% slag reduction




































































































































































96% NOx pollution reduction
75% Cu pollution reduction
meets standards
most of COD pollution recuction
95% SS pollution reduction
chlorinated solvents replaced
70% soda recovered








50% Cu pollution reduction
85% soda pollution reduction
95% SS pollution reduction
meets standards
40% COD pollution reduction
water consumption reduction
60% COD pollution reduction
100 kg toxic pollution reduction
150 1 solvants recovered
entire water pollution suppressed
50 kg/j COD pollution reduction
700 kg/j COD reduction
water comsumption reduction
50 kg/j COD reduction
200 kg COD pollution reduction
Table 41: Entreprises selected for Clean Technologies projects financed by the Agence de l'Eau



















































































































































60% COD pollution reduction
25% effluent reduction
N.A.
180 t/yr SS pollution reduction
400 Kg COD pollution reduction
20 Kg/day metal pollution reduction
50% water consumption reduction
40% effluent reduction
50% water consumption reduction
effluent suppressed
170 Kg/day CDO pollution reduction
COD pollution reduction
effluent eliminated
500g/day solvant pollution reduction




9n Kg COD eliminated
25 Kg soda pollution reduction
200 Kg/day COD pollution reduction
80% sludge reduction
effluent eliminated
800 Kg COD reduction
N.A.
metal pollution reduction
4 t/day COD eliminated
440 t/day SS pollution reduction
toxic effluent reduction
100% water and sludge re-used
toxic effluent reduction
toxic effluent reduction
80 Kg/day COD pollution reduction
300 Kg COD pollution reduction
N.A.
Table 42: Entreprises selected for Clean Technologies projects financed by the Agence de l'Eau





































































































































































































































































































































L------ - ----------------.. . . .
End-of-Pipe
Figure B-1: Process flow-oriented categorization of the various CP options.
NB: Reactive approaches other than "end-of-pipe" do not figure
on the present diagram (i.e. "external recycling", "disposal", and "dilution").
232




























Zhejiang TianjinHubei Multicity EPB



















Subproject Entreprises' proposals Cooperative identification Technical options' assessment
Identification
























, J~I~ur] *OI · ·fdl,|· · ·· · ·····- •
EPB
ITianjin








P ILneJ ng Hubei
EPB Tianjin Multicity Jiangsiu
Disbursement policy .Grants Soft lons or grants and loans Commercial loans
Romanian Agence de l'Eau
SFDES Rhin-Meuse Polish NEF



















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
year
Figure B-5: Evolution of the Total Project
lution Control Fund in 1992-1995.















Figure B-6: Evolution of the Management Cost of Tianjin Industrial Pollu-
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Figure B-9: Comparison of the








Figure B-10: Project costs of the Tianjin
depending on the type of technology.
pipeline of candidate entreprises and the ex
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Figure B-17: Industrial origins for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse clean









Figure B-18: Entreprise sizes for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse clean




share of total subproject cost covered by a loan
Figure B-19: Share of total project cost for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse









Figure B-20: Loan maturities for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse clean










Figure B-21: Level of innovation for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse clean














Figure B-22: Process types for the Agence de l'Eau Rhin Meuse clean tech-










range of cost (FF)
Figure B-23: Cost distribution of the various CP options for the Agence
















Cost distribution and level of innovation for the Agence de




Figure B-25: Cost distribution and type of process for the Agence de I'Eau
Rhin Meuse clean technology subprojects funded during the 6th program.
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Figure B-26: Innovation and CP option categories for the Agence de l'Eau






Figure B-27: Process types and CP option categories for the Agence de l'Eau





















Figure B-28: Process types and level of innovation for the Agence de l'Eau


























NICHE CREATION A ARCHITECTURAL
Product Redesign Product RedesignProduct Redesign U -
Disrupt Technology/Production
Competence
o End-of-Pipe U Process Change
O Waste recovery * Input Substitution
REGULAR REVOLUTIONARY
Categorization of CP options in the transilience matrix
as they are perceived by entreprises
Figure B-29: The Abernathy and Clark transilience matrix; categorization
of CP options and correlation between the perception of the level of inno-
























































Figure B-34: Distribution of innovative projects depending on the category







Figure B-35: Distribution of innovative projects depending
process for entreprises selected during the B-4 subproject.























Figure B-36: Level of innovation of projects funded
ject.

















range of cost (RMB)
Figure B-38: Cost distribution of the various CP options identified by CP-
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range of cost (RMB)
Figure B-39: Cost distribution of projects targetting the various process





















Figure B-40: Process type and CP options for technologies identified by
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Figure B-41: Payback distribution and proc(
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Figure B-42: Payback distribution and type
identified during the B-4 subproject.
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Figure B-43: Possible positioning of the various CP option categories on









Good Ability to Repay
Heaviest Polluters with
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Figure B-44: Strategies of the various financial mechanisms for the environ-
ment.
Private financial institution
NEF (French water basin agencies)
Externally-supported revolving fund (strategy 1)
Externally-supported revolving fund (strategy 2)
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